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Summary
This thesis explores the role of interpretation in design activity through the development of a
computational model of constructive interpretation. It asks the question: how does the construc-
tion of interpretations from expectations within a situation affect design activity? This work
hypothesises that designers construct their world from their expectations through interpretation.
In interpreting their own work designers are able to make unexpected discoveries and explore the
implicit knowledge held within their expectations of the world. These expectations are grounded
in experience.
A conceptual model for constructive interpretation is described. Knowledge held by designers is
represented in a perceptual symbol system, in which knowledge organised in a hierarchy. Within
this hierarchy, higher layers represent an increased level of abstraction. Knowledge is learnt
through experience in an environment. The topmost layer in this hierarchy is the situation.
Interpretation occurs through pull from the expectations. Expectations in a layer are changed
by the layer above. The construction of expectations utilises knowledge about the world that
the designer gains through experience.
A computational framework for this conceptual model is described: (i) based upon conceptual
spaces, where expectations within the situation perturb each other; and (ii) based upon a hier-
archy of unsupervised learning networks, where prototypes represent convergence zones within
conceptual space.
Constructive interpretation is implemented in a number of demonstrations utilising modified self-
organising maps linked together to represent layers in the conceptual model. Demonstrations
show: (i) how situations are changed through construction from implicit expectations; (ii) how
situations co-ordinate concepts through expectations that are grounded in experience; (iii) how
construction from expectations produces stability in a changing environment; and (iv) how useful
rather than accurate interpretations can be produced by constructing from expectations.
A model of constructive interpretation in design is developed in which a system iterates through
generation of designs from expectations and constructive interpretation. In one experiment
an agent has experience with a number of floor plans. It uses its experience to draw in a
design medium and interpret its own work. Through constructive interpretation from implicit
expectations the situation changes leading to a new space of designs. It provides a model of
the way that designers make unexpected discoveries within their work that are useful to the
design task, through expectations, and relevant to the source, as the basis for constructing the
ii
iii
interpretation. Another experiment uses sets of growth indicators about countries as concepts.
The model shows how the space of designs changes through constructive interpretation and
explores the effects of salience weighting upon the construction of interpretations.
The work looks towards a situated model of design: a model of design that integrates interpreta-
tion, expectation and memory into the one cognitive framework. Constructive interpretation has
applications for models of analogy and computational creativity. Future work in constructive
interpretation is described.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
During design activity, designers interpret by constructing from expectations. Whenever a de-
signer brings something from the external world into their internal world, interpretation is oc-
curring. For example, when a designer reads a design brief, considers their own work whilst
sketching or observes behaviours of a model, there is some relationship between the meaning
that they construct and what they have experienced; they do not experience the world tabula
rasa. What then can be said about the nature of this relationship between interpretation and
experience? The thesis considers this question and proposes that designers interpret from a set
of expectations about the world, constructing from what they expect to find.
What does construction from expectations mean, how it can be computed and what is its sig-
nificance for design? The hypotheses that are explored in this work are that: (i) designers
hold expectations about the world that come from their experiences; (ii) interpretations are
constructed from these expectations with reference to the external world; and (iii) the cognitive
state of the designer can be changed by the act of interpretation.
Interpretation for the purpose of this work is about the ‘construction of meaning’ as distinguished
from interpretation as the ‘processing of information’ (Bruner 1990). Whilst this work argues that
human designers always interpret in a constructive way, the term constructive interpretation will
be used to differentiate it from other types of interpretation that do not involve construction from
expectations. The experiences of a designer and the way that these experiences are organised
and used (in the form of expectations) all contribute to the construction of an interpretation.
As Henry David Thoreau put it “It’s not what you look at that matters, it’s what you see”
(Thoreau 1851). There is a well-known children’s game that can be used to illustrate the con-
struction of an interpretation: one player scribbles some lines on a page such as that seen in
Figure 1.1. The second player then has to draw a picture using the lines in the scribble. In
order to do this they need to interpret the lines in the scribble ‘as’ something. For the scribble
in Figure 1.1, as with any representation, there are many possible interpretations. In Figure 1.1,
a drawing could be made using the lines of the scribble in which the circle becomes the wheel of
a car, the eye of a bison or a hole in a cliff face - in each case the player has seen the drawing
in such a way that an action is suggested. There are no limits to possible interpretations within
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the representation, only within the mind of the viewer. The example demonstrates that the
meaning lies not in the representation itself but rather is constructed by the player looking at
the scribble - and a different player will likely construct something different from the lines. In
doing this the player is making use of their knowledge from experience in the world to construct
an interpretation. The thesis begins by asking: How does this construction occur? It uses this
starting point to enquire into interpretation within design activity.
Figure 1.1: Lines on a page from which an interpretation can be constructed
It has been well recognised that the construction of interpretations is a part of design activity
(Scho¨n and Wiggins 1992, Suwa and Tversky 19971). Designers sketch by considering elements
and the relationships between them. When they look at what they have sketched, they are able
to see things in the representation that they did not intend. In this way designers change their
own idea of what they are doing through interpretation (Suwa et al 2000, Oxman 2002).
This work will expand upon our understanding of this relationship between the way that designers
construct an interpretation and their knowledge from experience. It looks particularly into the
way that interpretation is implemented in computing for design; how interpretation in design
computing could be better able to model the phenomena that are observed in designers. It focuses
on the way that an interpretation arises not just from the representation and the designer’s
knowledge about the world, but also from ‘whereabouts’ within this knowledge the designer is at
when interpreting; their current cognitive state or what situation they are in when interpreting
(Clancey 1997, Gero 2007). There is a bi-directional relationship between interpretation and
situation: the situation that the designer is in changes their interpretation, and the act of
interpreting can change the situation.
These ideas are explored computationally in this work. A computational model of interpretation
requires a computational model of knowledge and its re-use. The thesis develops a model that
1The importance of these two studies on ‘kinds of seeing’ and ‘what do architects and students perceive in
their design sketches’ is underscored by the fact that they are the two most cited papers within the Design Studies
journal since 1990 (Google Scholar as at 11/09/2010)
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addresses this cycle of learning from experience through interpretation and then interpreting
using experience. It does this in a way that can be generalised across multiple domains.
The work refers to ideas about the formation and use of concepts to represent knowledge from
experience. In keeping with convention, concepts which exist inside a designer will be referred to
in small capitals (such as cat) to distinguish them from references to the external entity (a cat).
The purpose of the work is not to explain human cognitive processes, rather it is to represent
and explore the way that interpretation affects the design process.
This work implements constructive interpretation computationally and performs experiments to
examine its effects. The terms design agent and designer are used interchangeably and refer
to both human designers and theoretical computational agents (Jennings 2000) that perform
design. The terms design activity and designing are used interchangeably. The word ‘design’
on its own is used to refer to the activities associated with designing. The product of design is
referred to as such or as design artefacts or design documents.
1.1 Motivation
Research into creativity, analogy, concept formation and tools that support designers all make
implicit assumptions about the way that designers interpret. A motivation for this work comes
from the recognition that the computational models in these areas do not yet include a model
of interpretation that is a good fit for what is observed in cognitive studies. The initial impetus
to look at interpretation comes from cognitive studies of design, which suggest that design-
ers interpret using expectations, and work on situated design, which proposes a model for the
development and re-use of knowledge from experience.
A phenomenon that comes up repeatedly in the design literature is the ability for designers to
‘reinterpret’ representations - seeing elements and the relationships between them in a way that
the designer was not previously aware of and changing the meaning of them within the design
(Scho¨n and Wiggins 1992, Gero and Yan 1993, Karmiloff-Smith 1994, Gross and Do 1996, Suwa
and Tversky 1997, Jun and Gero 1997, Oxman 2002). This phenomenon represents one of the
ways that designers bring new ideas into a design problem (Suwa et al 2000).
Recent work on design as a situated activity (i.e. as an activity that occurs in a sequence
of situations) has begun to develop a cognitive framework for design in order to explain the
development and re-use of knowledge from experience (Gero 1998, Gero 2007). Design can be
considered an exercise in producing design documentation based upon the function, behaviour
and structure of a design (Gero 1990). Situated design places interpretation at the centre of this
ontology for design, where function, behaviour and structure must all be interpreted to be used
in designing (Gero and Kannengeisser 2004). Figure 1.2 shows the three worlds within which
design occurs: the external world outside the designer, the interpreted world of meaning, and the
expected world within the internal world. Design activity occurs inside the head of a designer,
and interpretation occurs in order to bring representations inside this world. Interpretation is
particularly important for design because it is an activity that is dependent upon the way that
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designers conceive of what they are doing, from the way that they conceive of the design brief
through to the finished design (Gero 1990).
external world
interpreted world
expected world
Xe
X
X
e
X
ei
Xi
i
Xei expected representation
internal representation
external representation
push-pull process
focussing
transformation (action)
Figure 1.2: Situated design recognises that design comes from the interaction of three worlds,
the external, interpreted and expected worlds (after Gero and Kannengeisser 2004)
Each of these areas points to the importance of interpretation in design, but there are not yet
adequate computational models of interpretation that account for the situatedness of designers.
Interpretation in situated design is about two things: (i) the way that the current situation
changes the way that the world is given meaning (what a designer sees is influenced by what
they expect to see); and (ii) the way that the designer’s situation is changed by interpreting.
Returning to cognitive studies, an example of both of these can be seen in the activity of sketch-
ing. When designers sketch they have an idea of what they are trying to represent, of what they
would answer if you were to ask “what are you doing now?” (Clancey 1999). Yet when they
look at what they have drawn they frequently see more in it than they intended to put there
(Scho¨n and Wiggins 1992). The unexpected discoveries made when looking at design sketches
can influence the trajectory of design, allowing designers to see new elements and new relation-
ships between elements (Suwa et al 2000). We also observe that designers ‘re-interpret’, seeing
old elements in new ways (Karmiloff-Smith 1994, Jun and Gero 1997, Oxman 2002). Work done
in this area has hypothesised the way that situated concept formation agents that interpret from
expectations could be implemented (Gero and Fujii 2000) but no such implementation has yet
occurred.
Models of creativity or of analogy take an implicit stand upon interpretation. For example, many
models are variations upon the ‘generate and test’ school of thought (Langely 1987). In contrast
to this, a situated view of design suggests that interpretation, action and the use of knowledge
should all be linked through expectation and construction from memory (Gero 1999). Agents
interpret the world through their situation - from within their current cognitive state - which
entails certain expectations of the world. Their generation of a representation through design
actions comes not just from their knowledge, but from where they are within this knowledge. In
addition to this, they reflect upon their actions whilst designing, and in this way change their
situation during generation. This kind of interaction between expectations, interpretation and
design action needs further exploration. Some models, such as Reflect-a-Sketch (Saunders 2002)
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for creativity, and tabletop (French 1995) for analogy, capture some aspects of this, but they
do not focus upon the role played by interpretation in facilitating situated design. Many of
these models are also given knowledge representation schemas that are a good fit for the domain
knowledge but are not a good fit for using that knowledge. This work is motivated by a desire
to prioritise the situatedness of the knowledge system above its use for any particular domain.
Knowledge development and re-use is also an important part of the development of design tools,
as there is a significant amount of information generated when users interact with tools that
is not utilised. Situated design asks the question of whether it would be possible to have tools
utilise this knowledge and re-use it to better support designers (Peng and Gero 2006). A tool is
required to interpret both its own knowledge and the representation that a designer is working
with, in order to re-use knowledge in a situated way. This work on constructive interpretation
looks towards tools that construct a representation within a situation through expectations.
In summary, the work has its genesis in the prevalence of reinterpretation phenomena in cognitive
studies of designers and the lack of an adequate explanation for them. Situated design provides
a framework that hypothesises some explanations for these phenomena based upon the way that
knowledge is used and re-used. The work is motivated by a desire to explore, articulate and
implement some of these hypotheses by taking a stand that interpretations are constructed from
expectations within situations.
1.2 Aim and objectives
The aim of this research is to explore the role of interpretation in designing through the devel-
opment of a computational model of constructive interpretation. The thesis asks the question:
how does the construction of interpretations from expectations within a situation affect design
activity?
The following objectives are required to meet the above aim:
1. To develop a conceptual model of constructive interpretation: the construction of interpre-
tations from expectations by designers within situations
To achieve this requires: (i) a description of how an interpretation is constructed given
expectations; (ii) a description of expectations and where they come from; and (iii) a
description of how knowledge arises through experience from interpretation. The model of
knowledge from experience needs to be situated, in that it must be tied to its use. The same
knowledge ought to be able to be used differently in different situations. This description
needs a cognitive basis and needs to focus upon knowledge as it is used for interpretation
during design activity. Situations are defined in Section 2.2. Constructive interpretation
is defined in Chapter 3.
2. To develop a computational framework for constructive interpretation in which: (i) the
expectations are situated; (ii) the interpretation is constructed from expectations; and (iii)
the situation can be changed by interpretation
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The computational framework is required to show the computation of the construction
of internal representations from internal expectations and a source in the external world.
The framework needs to include the way in which this can change the internal state of the
agent. The computational framework also entails a model of knowledge formation from
experience.
3. Implement a model of constructive interpretation in the design process and analyse and
evaluate results
The framework needs to be implemented and used for experiments which model some of
the phenomena observed in designers interpreting. These experiments need to show: (i)
the way that construction from expectations occurs; (ii) the way that the designer can be
changed by interpretation; and (iii) the effect that this can have on the design process.
Results from experiments need to be analysed and evaluated to reach conclusions about
constructive interpretation and its role in design. The analysis needs to consider whether
the conceptual and computational models put forward are a good match with what are
observed in designers.
1.3 Organisation of the thesis
The following paragraphs outline the organisation of the rest of the thesis.
Chapter 2 reviews background research relevant to theoretical and computational models of
interpretation in design. Cognitive studies and theoretical enquiries that describe phenomena
in which designers constructively interpret during design activity are surveyed. A number of
computational models related to design are described that have a form of interpretation that
is not a fit with the notion of constructive interpretation. Situated design is described as a
framework within which a cognitive model of knowledge from experience and its use is related
to design activity. Within this framework constructive interpretation is identified as both a
result of being situated and a driver of changing situations. Three models of concept formation
and representation - conceptual spaces (Ga¨rdenfors 2000), perceptual symbol systems (Barsalou
1999) and hierarchical temporal memory (Hawkins 2004) - are reviewed for their fit with situated
design and their use in a model of constructive interpretation.
Chapter 3 moves from phenomena of interpretation in design to a conceptual framework for
constructive interpretation based upon a model for representing knowledge. It describes push
and pull as the means by which an interpretation is constructed from a source using expectations.
Expectations are described as being implicit and explicit as well as related to both the course
of events and the state of affairs. A hierarchical representation of knowledge combined with
the model of constructive interpretation from expectations is hypothesised to result in situated
re-use of knowledge from experience.
Chapter 4 describes two models for computing the conceptual model of constructive interpre-
tation. The first is articulated through a thought experiment in which objects in a bag are
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interpreted by a blindfolded subject. The focus of this model is upon the effect of the situation
upon constructing expectations prior to interpretation. The second uses a hierarchy of unsu-
pervised concept learning systems to describe a model of constructive interpretation using ideas
from Ga¨rdenfors’ conceptual spaces.
Chapter 5 describes experiments with the computational framework to implement constructive
interpretation in a way that fits with the conceptual model. An implementation of constructive
interpretation is compared to models of interpretation that are not constructive. The system is
varied and used in different ways to assess its suitability for modelling the phenomena associated
with constructive interpretation.
Chapter 6 describes a number of demonstrations using the models developed in Chapter 5 to show
the role of constructive interpretation in design activity. It explores a possible explanation for
the way that designers explore their own knowledge and develops an hypothesis for a situated,
interpretation-driven model of design. In the models the space of possible designs changes
through construction from implicit expectations.
Chapter 7 assesses the achievements of this research with respect to the stated aims and objective.
The work is concluded by reflecting upon the progress made towards a model of constructive
interpretation, the significance of this work and the areas that require further research.
Chapter 2
Background
This Chapter reviews the ideas that provide the foundation for this research. The findings
from protocol studies of design activity suggest that interpretation is important for design.
Designers frequently change their internal representation of design elements during the early
stages of conceptual design. Computational models of design give and indication of how this
can be modelled and supported through design tools. Design is described as a situated activity
providing a framework for an enquiry into interpretation. Theories of human cognition from the
literature provide a platform for producing a model of constructive interpretation for design.
2.1 Interpretation in design
In this research, design is taken to be “a goal-oriented, constrained, decision-making, exploration
and learning activity which operates within a context which depends on the designer’s perception
of the context” (Gero 1990). This definition allows design tasks to be distinguished from other
tasks, such as problem solving, which are not dependent upon the designer’s perception of the
problem. Design includes under its umbrella a wide range of human endeavours where “the
process of design is the same whether it deals with the design of a new cathedral or the writing
of Dante’s Divine Comedy” (Gregory 1966).
Design activity is characterised as a conversation between a designer and a design medium (Scho¨n
1983); in other words, an interaction between the internal world (the world inside the head of the
designer) and the external world (the world outside the designer). This introduces the notion of
two separate worlds, Figure 2.1: (i) the internal world of a designer, where the cognitive aspects
of design activity occurs; and (ii) the external world consisting of all things outside the designer.
We are concerned with interpretation, the way that the external world comes to be represented
internally by a designer, and the relationship between interpretation and design activity. Clearly
there is some relationship, as we observe that:
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Humans... are by no means neutral or passive towards incoming information. In-
stead they select some parts for attention at the expense of others, recording and
reformulating them in complex ways (Neisser 1967).
internal world
of designer
external world
Figure 2.1: Design occurs within the internal world of the designer, who is located within an
external world.
Interpretation is defined as the use of grounded knowledge to create an internal representation
of data. Grounded knowledge is knowledge that has been learnt during experience. Data can be
autogenous, originating inside the agent, or exogenous, originating outside the agent (Gero and
Fujii 2000). The focus of this work is upon the designers interpreting exogenous data.
A world is assumed in which “there can be no unconstructed natural facts and no independent
world against which to determine the truth of a fact” (Kukla 2000). In such a world there
are many possible interpretations for data that a designer encounters. A roomful of designers
interpreting a design brief will likely represent the design problem in a roomful of different ways.
When watching a designer engaged in conceptual design an obvious question is, ‘how did the
designer reach this interpretation and not some other?’.
A survey of the design computing and cognition literature serves to establish the relationship
between interpretation and design, with a view to an understanding of how the production of an
interpretation is influenced by a designer’s expectations and background knowledge.
2.1.1 Cognitive studies of design
Sketching is used widely as a way of representing designs externally during design activity.
Despite the wealth of computer aided design tools, many designers prefer pencil and paper over
a computer in the early stages of conceptual designing (Lawson 1994, Cross and Clayburn Cross
1996). One reason for this is that designers frequently change their internal representation of the
design during the early stages of conceptual design. This changing of the internal representation
helps to develop design ideas. These claims are supported by protocol studies of sketching
activity (Scho¨n and Wiggins 1992, Suwa and Tversky 1997, Suwa et al 2000, Kavakli and Gero
2002).
Scho¨n and Wiggins (1992) describe design as an activity of “seeing-moving-seeing”. Designers
commonly work with a design medium, and this way of separating the seeing from the moving
makes it clear that designers are able to see more in their sketches than they intended to put
there. This work presents cases from protocol studies where designers draw something, look at
what they have drawn, and see something else within it that changes their idea of what they
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are doing. For example, a student looks at her own drawing of six classroom blocks and decides
that they are “too small to do anything with”. Within the act of looking, the student has seen
something about these elements that she was not aware of at the time of drawing. Figure 2.2
illustrates: (a) seeing through interpretation; (b) moving, by effecting an action; and (c) seeing
again through interpretation. The study supports the notion that interpretation is a part of the
evolution of design ideas, a “preparation for further designing” (Scho¨n and Wiggins 1992). The
work raises the questions of: (i) how designers are able to see things in their sketches that are
useful to their design activity; and (ii) how the act of seeing changes their subsequent design
actions.
design medium
seeing internal
representation(a)
moving
hypothesising
(b)
seeing new internal
representation(c)
Figure 2.2: The seeing-moving-seeing of the design conversation with: (a) the designer ‘sees’
by creating an internal representation of some part of the external world; (b) the designer
‘moves’ by hypothesising an action (and this hypothesising can utilise the internal representa-
tion) and effecting this action by changing the external world; and (c) the designer sees once
more.
Case studies that look at the difference between novice and expert designers suggest that one
of the major differences between the two groups is the way that they interpret their own work.
Specifically, that expert designers tend to focus longer and think more deeply about each element
in a sketch (Suwa and Tversky 1997), make more cognitive actions than novice designers (Menezes
and Lawson 2006) and have better organised cognitive structures (Kavakli and Gero 2002).
One reason why sketching is so useful to designers is that in the early stages of conceptual de-
signing they move frequently between different internal conceptions of what they are doing (Fish
and Scrivener 1990, Gero 1998, Gross and Do 2000). This is supported by a study suggesting
that designers are able to work just as well blindfolded (and relying upon imagery as a medium)
as they are sketching and using an external medium (Bilda and Gero 2006). One explanation
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for this is that the benefit comes not specifically from sketching so much as from activity that
allows a designer to focus whilst changing the notion of what they are doing. In other words, the
’seeing’ in the design conversation need not be visual but can be a matter of conceptual insight.
Re-representation looks explicitly at the way that designers develop their ideas by changing their
internal representation of a design notion. Re-representation has its roots in cognitive studies
of human development which suggest that an important part of learning is “representational
redescription” (Karmiloff-Smith 1994), learning how existing knowledge can be used in different
ways:
My claim is that a specifically human way to gain knowledge is for the mind to exploit
internally the information that it has already stored, by redescribing its representa-
tions or, more precisely, by iteratively re-representing in different representational
formats what its internal representations represent (Karmiloff-Smith 1994)
It has been recognised that designers re-represent, internally representing the same external data
in different ways (Damski and Gero 1994). In this way designers develop their design ideas, as
demonstrated in a protocol study of 15 designers (Oxman 1997). One way in which this occurs
is through visual emergence (Oxman 2002, Gero 1996, Stiny 1994), which has is roots in Gestalt
perception (Bruce et al 2003, Zusne 1970). Emergence is about the way that implicit features
(e.g. within a design sketch) can be made explicit by a designer (Jun and Gero 1997). When
people perceive visual figures they tend to group elements together on the basis of the principles
described in Table 2.1. This has been modelled by unstructuring and restructuring a figure to
overcome the tendency to see only primary shapes (Gero and Yan 1993).
Principle Description
Proximity Elements close to each other tend to be grouped together
Similarity Similar elements (e.g. through colour, size, shape, orien-
tation, topology, etc) are grouped together
Continuation Lines tend to have a continuation through intersection
with others
Closure Lines or arcs tend to be completed to create a closed shape
Symmetry Symmetric forms are grouped more easily than asymmet-
ric ones
Familiarity Familiar elements are grouped together
Table 2.1: Principles of organization in perception (after Damski and Gero 1994).
A protocol study of a practising architect (Suwa et al 2000) found evidence that: (i) unexpected
discovery occurred, suggesting that ideas came from the situation rather than re-use of explicit
knowledge; (ii) unexpected discoveries were an important part of the designer’s process; and (iii)
there was a bi-directional relationship between unexpected discoveries and situations, in that
unexpected discoveries tended to occur after a change in situation, and a change of situation
after an unexpected discovery. This last is particularly important, as it provides support for
the notion that designers interpret from within a situation and that a situation is changed by
interpretation.
These ideas of re-representation and emergence are brought together in the unexpected discover-
ies (the unintended consequences of actions) that designers make within their own design sketches
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(Suwa et al 2000). Unexpected discoveries within a sketch can be observed in the following ways
(after Suwa et al 1998):
1. Discovery of a visual feature of an element, such as new attention to shape, size or texture.
For example, observing that an element in a sketch is too small for its intended purposes.
2. Discovery of a spatial or organisational relation amongst elements. For example, observing
an axis of symmetry within a sketch.
3. Discovery of implicit spaces in the empty space between elements. For example, observing
an emergent shape within overlapping elements.
Unexpected discovery can be explained by referring to an example in the study by Scho¨n and
Wiggins (1992), Figure 2.3, where a designer has drawn a series of small rectangles to represent
classrooms. The designer then looks at what she has drawn and makes the judgement that the
classrooms are “too small in scale to do much with” and re-draws them as three larger L-shapes.
This can be explained as an unexpected discovery within the sketch, where the designer was
not attending to size at the time of drawing the sketch, but in the act of looking has been
able to make this judgement. From looking at this sketch from within this view of the world,
this judgement has occurred. An explanation for this is that tacit knowledge within the world
view of the designer has made this realisation possible. Making this judgement has facilitated
the subsequent design action of drawing the three L-shapes. This example can also be used to
demonstrate re-representation through emergence, Figure 2.4, which shows the way that lines
can be extended from the initial sketch based upon the principle of continuation. One of the
many shapes which now emerges looks similar to the second sketch by the designer. A different
representation has been constructed from the initial representation.
movingmoving seeing
Figure 2.3: An example of the moving-seeing-moving of the design conversation (Scho¨n and
Wiggins 1992).
Computer Aided Design (CAD) software has for a long time been seen as inferior to sketching for
use in the early stages of conceptual design, a notion supported by a protocol analysis comparing
designers using CAD to designers using pencil and paper (Bilda and Demirkan 2003). It has
been hypothesised that a reason for this is lack of support for the rapid changes in interpretation
that occur in these early stages (Gross and Do 1996, Peng and Gero 2006, Gero and Kelly 2008).
This issue has been addressed in a new generation of design tools known as Computer Aided
Conceptual Design (CACD) tools, which look towards a less visible interface (Gross and Do
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Figure 2.4: Re-representation through emergence based upon continuation of lines (after
Gero and Yan 1994).
2004). A comparison of a CACD tool to sketching has demonstrated through protocol analysis
that the two are equally able to support designers re-representation during the early stages of
conceptual design (Tang and Gero 2010).
In summary, these studies support the claim that designers change their internal representation
of the design frequently during the early stages of conceptual designing. Further evidence of this
can be seen in interviews with expert designers discussing their ideas about sketching (Lawson
1994, Robbins 1994). The importance of this for constructive interpretation is that we have a
basis for hypothesising that: (i) where the designer is at (cognitively) changes how they see the
design; and (ii) the act of looking at the design changes where the designer is at. Interpretation
as construction from expectations provides a basis for modelling the way that designers are able
to make useful unexpected discoveries within their sketches.
2.1.2 Computation of interpretation in design
This Section surveys some design tools and models of design that relate to these cognitive ideas
about interpretation. Computational research into interpretation in design can be grouped into
two areas: (i) systems that support designers (design tools); and (ii) systems that model aspects
of the design process. All of these systems implicitly make assumptions about the way that
either designers or computers interpret. Some of the design tools explicitly attempt to support
reinterpretation during design and are a useful guide for implementing aspects of constructive
interpretation. Other systems provide examples of the way that computational models do not
yet interpret in a way that fits with the phenomena in Section 2.1.1.
2.1.2.1 Tools that support designers
Designers reinterpret their own work during conceptual design. A number of tools have been
created with a goal of attempting to support this reinterpretation. It is typical in CAD software
to find representations that are two- or three-dimensional objects without obvious singular de-
compositions (there is no single interpretation that is necessarily more ‘correct’ than others). Yet
CAD software tends only to allow for a single decomposition based upon the history of the object
(Bijl, 1987). The cognitive studies suggest that this does not support the way that designers
shift between many internal representations for these objects during conceptual design. A simple
example of this can be seen in Figure 2.5 where a single large square element has been used by
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a designer to create a drawing of two overlapping squares. When looking at this representation
there are many possible decompositions. CAD software typically uses a representation that is
fixed based upon the way that it was constructed, in this case decomposing it into the elements
seen in A. However, when a designer interprets the work she may decompose it in a way that
has nothing to do with the way that it was constructed, such as that seen in B.
a design
element
drawing with the 
design element
elements in a
decomposition
A
elements in a
decomposition
B
Figure 2.5: A design element is used for drawing. Decomposition A shows the interpretation
that typical CAD software will maintain. Decomposition B shows one of many other possible
decompositions.
The Electronic Cocktail Napkin (ECN) attempts to support the way that designers change the
meaning of representations, with a goal of allowing designers to do on a computer those things
that they can do on the back of a cocktail napkin (Gross 1996). With a pen and a cocktail
napkin there is (i) support for reinterpreting the composition of sketches; and with the addition
of tracing paper there is (ii) the ability to re-work existing ideas easily. The ECN achieves this
computationally through a library of elements that are learnt from the designer’s pen strokes
and that can be easily manipulated. These elements are stored in categories within which they
are used. An example (after Gross and Do 1996) of an element is a simple line on the screen.
In the ‘General’ category this is simply a line. In the ‘Circuit Diagram’ category it becomes
a wire. In the ‘Room Layout’ category it becomes a wall. The ECN has a hierarchy of these
categories. When a user is sketching, they begin in the ‘General’ category, e.g. working with
lines. When the ECN finds an element that is unique to a more specific category, it switches to
that category. For example, upon finding a transistor symbol it would switch from ’General’ to
‘Circuits General’ (Gross and Do 1996).
The importance of the ECN is that it shows a tool that supports designers in reinterpreting their
own work. A single symbol in a sketch can be represented internally by the ECN in a number
of ways by a shifting of category. We could say of this system that where it is at (the category
that it is in) changes the way that it sees. We can also say that it is in some ways changed by
what it sees, as recognising elements causes it to change its category. These elements would be
found in a constructive interpretation system.
In another tool, the PERSPECTOR system, it has been recognised that there is a need for the
formalised representation of CAD tools to be complemented by formalised representation of the
reasoning that is used on these CAD tools (Haymaker et al 2002). In the ‘Perspective’ approach,
a way of representing automated reasoning about a building model is described (Haymaker et al
2003). The building model is represented as an acyclic graph of lines, shapes and relationships
described as a ‘narrative’. ‘Perspectives’ are created that capture dependencies (through rela-
tionships to the Narrative and other Perspectives) and automated reasoning (the ‘Perspector’)
about this narrative. In this way, Perspectives can be created that: (i) capture dependency upon
other Perspectives (e.g. a ‘Deck Attachment Perspective’ is dependent upon both a ‘Concrete
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Slab Perspective’ and a ‘Steel Framing Perspective’); and (ii) formalize reasoning used within a
Perspective (e.g. finding all cantilevered ceiling panels through reasoning about the relationship
between elements within the view). The contribution of this tool to interpretation is twofold: (i)
it supports the way that different designers require different views of a building model (e.g. a
structural engineer requires different perspectives to a fabricator); and (ii) allows for the capture
and automated re-use of reasoning within a perspective.
These tools address the question of how computers can support the tendency for designers to
revisit elements and the relationships between them and to interpret them in a dynamic way. In
the ECN and PERSPECTOR different techniques were used to allow the system to internally
represent an external representation in multiple ways. The goal of ECN can be summarised as:
(i) to do this in a way that made the internal representation of the system as close as possible to
the internal representation of the designer; and (ii) to make it as easy as possible for the designer
to change the internal representation of the system to be in line with their own.
Peng and Gero (2008) describe an agent-based design interaction tool for use in optimisation.
When a human designer is using an optimization tool a situated concept formation agent ‘ob-
serves’ and develops concepts. When it uses this knowledge it constructs from its memory in a
way that is informed by both the agent’s experience and the environment’s current state. This
addresses some of the limitations of previous design concept learners like BRIDGER (Reich 1993)
and ARGO (Huhns and Acosta 1992) in that knowledge in the system is changed by where the
agent is at when it is used.
Finally, tools for Computer Aided Conceptual Design (CACD) with an ‘invisible interface’ (Gross
and Do 2004) look towards support for the kind of interpretation that we are describing here.
These tools go part of the way towards support for designers changing their internal represen-
tation. However, we do not yet have sufficient knowledge of the way that designers do this to
support them. Further, as addressed by Gero and Peng (2008) design tools do not learn from
experience with the designer as much as they are capable of doing. This work addresses both of
these areas through constructive interpretation.
2.1.2.2 Computational models of creativity and analogy
There are many computational systems that aim to model analogy (systems that make con-
nections between representations) and creativity (systems that generate novel and useful rep-
resentations). These systems implicitly take a stand on interpretation. This Section describes
interpretation in these models and suggests that they could be changed in a way that fits with
the cognitive models through the implementation of constructive interpretation.
Creativity in design is usually related to the notions of novelty, being new or previously unseen,
and utility, being useful in some way (Boden 1990). There are many examples of the ‘generate
and test’ approach in which a system has heuristics for generating representations and an ability
to determine the utility or fitness of these representations, effectively separating out the novelty
and utility generating processes (Langely 1987). Whilst this has been a successful approach in
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producing an output that might be construed as creative (Lenat 1982, Langley et al 1987, Par-
tridge and Rowe 1994, Goldberg 1999) it is much harder to claim that the process that generated
these outputs is a match for the creative process observed in humans. Section 2.1.1 surveyed
a number of cognitive studies that all pointed to the importance of frequent reinterpretation
during the early stages of conceptual design. This work looks towards models of creativity in
which agents constructively interpret during the generation of designs in such a way that their
conception of what they are doing is changed by what they see.
An example of an early model that attempted to model the human process of reflection-in-action
is AARON (Cohen 1999), a program for generating artworks. The program is a set of heuristics
for generating works of art based upon encoded domain knowledge and some stochastic processes.
The contribution to interpretation comes from the way that it looks at its own work while it
is generating it and changes its actions based upon what it sees (Clancey 1997). However, the
focus here is upon the effect of vision on the way that actions are carried out, as opposed to
a situated approach which considers what knowledge is being used and how it is used. A later
approach to the same problem used curious agents (Saunders 2004) which switch between states
of divergent and specific exploration. In these agents, the way that they see is changed by their
internal state. For example, Reflect-a-Sketch looks at its own work and the agent changes the
actions that it takes based upon what it sees (Saunders 2004).
This work on constructive interpretation looks towards systems that interpret during the creative
process, in such a way that their situation changes the interpretation, and the act of interpretation
can change the situation. It looks towards models of computational creativity where the system’s
conception of what it is doing is changed by what it sees. Systems concerned with analogy have
touched upon this problem, notably the TABLETOP system (French 1995). Analogy making
systems typically frame interpretation as the goal of constructing an internal representation of
a source that is ‘useful’ to the agent.
For example, TABLETOP (French 1995), holds knowledge about the kinds of objects that are
found on a dining table. In this system, two agents each have an assortment of common dinner
table objects laid out in front of them, such as knives, forks and salt-shakers. They each have
knowledge about the objects - their size, shape and function. The two agents play a game in
which one agent (A) points to an object that is in front of it (e.g. a salt-shaker) and the other
agent (B) points to the object in front of it that is ‘most like’ the one that A just pointed to -
effectively B is being asked ‘which object is most like this salt-shaker?’.
The system captures some aspects of constructive interpretation in the way that agent B uses its
knowledge about the world to formulate an answer. The question of ‘which object is most like
this salt-shaker’ is affected by what agent B sees in front of it. It considers not just the similarity
of the objects in front of it (where an obvious solution might be to simply return the ‘most
similar’ object) but also attempts to map the layout of objects in front of A to the objects in
front of it, and use this in selecting an answer. In this way the use of its knowledge is changed by
what it thinks it is doing. It first constructs the problem, as perhaps ‘finding something similar
to a salt-shaker that is in the middle of the table near some knife-like objects’. The system is
changing its notion of how one thing is ‘like’ another depending upon its situation.
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Other analogy making systems use what can be described as function, behaviour and structure
mapping as a basis for creating an internal representation of the structure of one object and
looking through this ‘world view’ at the structure of another object (Gentner 1983, Qian and Gero
1992, Goel 1997). In this way a system uses the parts of its knowledge that are useful to what
it is trying to do. The Design Support System Using Analogy (DSSUA) is used during design
activity to search previous designs for both appropriate designs and design variables to assist
a designer achieve a design goal (Qian and Gero 1996). All designs in DSSUA are represented
symbolically through their function, behaviour and structure. In constructing an analogy some
part of a source is mapped onto some part of a target through function, behaviour and structure
mapping. For example, a designer working with a design prototype for a door (represented
as function, behaviour and structure) can ask DSSUA to find analogy-based suggestions for
achieving the design function. The system finds an analogy between the door and a shower
curtain despite the fact that the functions are different (for the door to allow access and provide
security; for the curtain to allow light transmission and to block light) and the behaviours are
different (the access to an area for the door and the light intensity for a curtain). The system
can make a mapping because the relationship between behaviour and function is the same in
both designs (where there are two functions, one achieved when the behaviour is at zero, i.e. the
door or curtain shut, and the other achieved when greater than zero, i.e. the door or curtain
are open). As a result the system suggests some ways that structure from the curtain can be
mapped on to the structure of the door, one example of which is to produce a folding door.
This has some elements of constructive interpretation. It could be said that the system looks
at each of its past designs differently based upon what it is trying to design. In this case, it
is designing a door and looking to see which of its previous designs can be mapped onto the
door structure. In the language of constructive interpretation the system is within a situation of
‘designing a door’ and this changes the way that it views the world. The difference is that the
knowledge in a constructive interpretation system needs to come from experience rather than a
priori symbolic knowledge.
A typical approach in models of analogy is to find ways structure or behaviours from a source
case can be analogically mapped onto a target case. For example, the archytas system (Yaner
and Goel 2007) creates an internal schema to represent the source and another for the target;
and finds mappings that allow for analogical transfer from former to latter through pre-defined
heuristics. This approach is constructive in the sense that the internal representation of one
design is changed by the internal representation of another. It raises two questions that are
relevant to CI. Firstly, the same source and the same target will always produce the same
interpretation; what would happen if it only used parts of its knowledge in creating analogies
and something was guiding which knowledge was used? Secondly, it has a form of push-pull
in the sense that the mapping from the target effects what is pulled from the source: what
would happen if this notion of what to pull came from a situation rather than from a pre-
defined algorithm? It is because these kind of questions remain open that this work on CI has
significance.
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2.1.3 Conclusions about computing interpretation
The models described in this Section are tools that support designers in the way that they
interpret the world and systems that model aspects of constructive interpretation. This Section
has shown models that look at what they are drawing and change their plan of action based
upon what they see (AARON) and models that learn by re-representing what they have drawn
(Reflect-a-Sketch). A variety of models have the knowledge in the system changed by where it
is being used: by the internal state of the design tool (ECN), by the elements that an agent
is currently perceiving (TABLETOP), and by the target of the analogy (DSSUA). As we have
seen in the cognitive study, these are phenomena that can be observed in designers interpreting
- that what they see is a product of their situation and that the situation is changed by what
they see. We can summarise this by saying that the following questions about interpretation are
raised by the cognitive study and only partially answered by the computational models:
1. What kind of internal representation is being produced?
2. What does knowledge from experience look like?
3. How is knowledge from experience used to produce an internal representation?
4. What is changed by the process of interpretation?
2.2 Design as a situated activity
Situatedness makes explicit the notion that a designer moves between different cognitive states
or world-views while designing, and that a different cognitive state changes the way that they
see the world. In a situated agent knowledge is tied to its use. Situated design and situations
are described to provide a framework for research into interpretation in design. An enquiry into
interpretation requires assumptions about knowledge. The point of capturing knowledge from
experience is that it gives us an insight into why designers might be making the interpretations
that we observe them make.
An individual’s pre-understanding is a result of experience within a tradition. Ev-
erything we say is said against the background of that experience and tradition, and
makes sense only with respect to it... Knowledge is always the result of interpre-
tation, which depends on the entire previous experience of the interpreter and on
situatedness in a tradition. (Winograd and Flores 1986)
2.2.1 Situations in design
When commencing conceptual design, a designer typically does not have all the knowledge that
is required (Gero 1998). In addition to this, the knowledge that the designer possesses is often
not organised in a way that is useful to the design task. The notion of a design situation is
useful for explaining how this comes to change during the act of designing. The notion will be
explained by first describing a more concrete notion, that of a design prototype.
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2.2.1.1 Design prototypes
A design prototype is a schema that brings together the required knowledge for design activity
(Gero 1990). Up to this point we have been referring simply to the ‘knowledge’ held by a
designer and the way that it is used. Design prototypes go beyond this to suggest that designers
hold knowledge about: function, structure, expected behaviour and actual behaviour (of the
design); relational knowledge; qualitative knowledge; computational knowledge; and context
knowledge (Gero 1990). A design prototype is useful as a way of describing the cognitive state
of a designer. It raises questions about the kind of knowledge used during design, suggesting
that both third-person knowledge (declarative knowledge) and first-person knowledge (knowledge
from experience) are used in designing. We have seen this in cognitive studies, that there is both
explicit and tacit knowledge being used by a designer. Explicit knowledge can be seen in the
kind of answer that a designer gives when asked “What are you doing now?” (Clancey 1999).
Tacit knowledge can be seen in the way that designers make judgements and reveal insights when
interacting with their environment, such as looking at a sketch. A design prototype is a type
of situation (Clancey 1997), where the new term is useful as it places the emphasis on the tacit
component of knowledge. A situation in this work is taken to be a schema of concepts currently
used by a designer. A number of things can occur that change this situation. Situations and
changes to situations will be further described in this and the next Chapter.
2.2.1.2 A situation: the nine-dot problem
We can illustrate the idea of a situation further through an example in the domain of problem-
solving. The ‘nine-dot’ problem (Duncker 1945), Figure 2.6, requires the problem solver to
draw four straight lines, without the pen leaving the page, such that all nine dots have a line
through them. When attempting this problem for the first time the problem solver often makes
an assumption that they are unable to draw outside the convex hull created by the nine dots
(Kershaw and Ohlsson 2004). Within this conception of the problem there are no possible
solutions. This is a tacit assumption, meaning that solvers are themselves typically unaware
that they have even made it (knowing that they had made this assumption would probably lead
to them solving the problem). Yet to a person watching the problem solver, it appears that they
are operating within a world-view where this assumption holds (Cariani 1990). Figure 2.7 shows
a solution to this problem that requires the problem solver to realise that they can draw outside
the convex hull.
An effect of the situation is that the knowledge of the problem solver has been constructed for this
particular problem. We can consider the knowledge that the solver might have about drawing-
a-line and contrast this to the way that they have, without realising it, used this knowledge as
drawing-a-line-between-dots. The point is that the problem solver is constructing their knowledge
about drawing lines within the current task; they are not na¨ıvely exercising their third-person
knowledge about what a line is and how it might be deployed.
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Figure 2.6: The challenge of the nine-dot problem is to draw four straight lines, without the
pen leaving the page, such that all nine dots have a line through them (after Duncker 1945).
2.2.2 The effect of situations
Design can be characterised as a sequence of situated acts (Gero 1998). When the designer
commences activity they are within a situation, a certain schema of knowledge put together
in a certain way. In addition to the knowledge that is explicitly within the prototype there
is implicit knowledge from the way of viewing the world that follows from it. In the nine-dot
problem this works against the problem solver where there is often an implicit assumption that
they cannot draw outside the convex hull created by the nine dots. The notion of a situation
provides the basis for an enquiry into the way that designers commence designing without the
knowledge that they need. The tacit knowledge in a situation is explored through design action
and interpretation. In the ‘moving-seeing-moving’ of the design conversation designers ‘move’
within one situation; and through the act of ‘seeing’ (from within that situation) can move to a
new situation. This cycle is a part of conceptual design.
Figure 2.7: A solution to the nine-dot problem.
Revisiting Figure 2.3, the observation that the classrooms were ‘too small’ can now be described
as having come from the situation. The situation that the designer was in, when used to look at
this particular representation, has led to a judgement that is useful to the design activity. Prior
to looking at the sketch, she was not explicitly aware that she even had this knowledge, was not
explicitly aware that the size of the classrooms was something to be attended to. This is what
Suwa et al (2000) refer to as an unexpected discovery from exploring the tacit knowledge held
by the designer. It provides a starting point for addressing the question of how designers are
able to see things in their sketches that are useful to their design activity. As we can see in the
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models of creativity, computer systems are very good at seeing many different things in a sketch.
It is far more challenging to have them see something that is useful to either their own system
or a designer.
2.2.3 The need for situated design
The departure that situated design makes from traditional models of design (design as search,
planning or exploration) is that it puts the emphasis upon where the designer is at cognitively,
the designer’s situation (Gero 1998). A useful phenomenon for explaining this is the way that
designers can look at exactly the same external representation at two different times, and produce
a different internal representation of it. An example of this is can be seen in Figure 2.5 which
shows a representation and two ways to decompose it into elements.
The point of the example is that external representations can be represented internally in many
different ways. The interpretation that is produced is a product of the situation that the de-
signer is in; and a different situation could lead to a different interpretation. For example, the
interpretation could be affected by the expectations the designer has. Yet these expectations
themselves are constructed within another situation. And the memories that these expectations
are constructed from were themselves created during experiences. The motivation for taking on
the challenge of untangling the effects of the situation is the explanatory power that is gained.
Conceptual designing can be understood as search within a space of possible designs (Coyne et al
1990, Gero 1996). Some processes which are understood to change the space of possible designs
are analogy, case-based reasoning and emergence. Situated design provides a unified framework
within which these processes can start to be explained (Gero 1998). For example, a typical
problem of analogy-making systems is not so much producing analogies as knowing which ones
are interesting (Goel 1997). Through the description of situations we can show why an analogy
might be interesting in one situation and not another.
In a similar way, situated design allows us to change the problems faced in answering questions
such as (after Gero 2007):
• How it is possible for a designer to commence a design without all the necessary information
being available?
• How is it possible for a designer to continue designing when all the necessary information
is not available?
• How is it that designers are able to produce novel solutions to what appear to be minor
perturbations of existing design requirements?
• How is it possible for a designer to produce a different design when later presented with
the same requirements?
Although the framework is still being articulated, the benefit of situated design is that it provides
a single framework within which all of these questions can be reframed and perhaps even begin
to be answered. The development of a framework takes on the task of developing a model for
knowledge acquisition and re-use that can serve as a basis for approaching these questions.
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2.2.4 Summary of situated design
Situated design provides a framework within which to explore cognitive phenomena of design
computationally. One example of similar work is the constructive memory system of Liew and
Gero (2004) which implements an agent that re-uses its knowledge in a situated way. Another
example is work on situated concept formation and re-use during optimization (Peng and Gero
2008). Each system implements a model of knowledge that aims at capturing situatedness and
focusses on a particular aspect of the framework. In this work the focus is upon interpretation in
design, which suggests a model of knowledge representation that builds upon the previous work
but has a focus upon expectations and the way that they are changed by interpretation.
1. A situation is a schema of all of the knowledge relating to the design activity
2. The knowledge held within the situation has its meaning constructed within a situation
3. The situation changes the way that the designer views the world. This is the ‘tacit knowl-
edge’ held in a situation. It is only by viewing the world from within a situation that the
effects of it become explicit.
The word ‘meaning’ has already been used extensively in this thesis, in the context of the
‘meaning’ given to an external representation. This use of the word ‘meaning’ refers to the use
of internal knowledge (specifically concepts within a situation) in order to ‘explain’ a source. For
example, Hawkins (2005) describes HTM networks as a hierarchy of layers in which each layer
attempts to ‘explain’ the data from the layer below. In other words ‘meaning’ is about the end
result of interpretation, in which a source is interpreted as a concept (Pylyshyn 1973); it says
nothing about how the interpretation is carried out.
The discussion about situations to this point has focussed on the way that the situation changes
the way that a designer interprets the world. Yet the descriptions so far have been quite circular,
where: (i) expectations are constructed from memory within a situation; (ii) expectations are
used to construct an interpretation within a situation; and (iii) the construction of an interpre-
tation changes the expectations of the designer. In order to advance the central thesis, that of
constructing from interpretations and showing the effect of this upon design, we need to discuss
what we mean by knowledge, memory, expectation and internal representation. To this end, a
description is provided of what is needed from a system of knowledge that fits with constructive
interpretation. The elements of such a system will be pulled from a study of the literature with
the aim of producing a system of knowledge to use for constructive interpretation.
2.3 Knowledge representation for situated design
Interpretation creates an internal representation. This representation only has meaning to a
designer because of the knowledge that they hold about the world. Knowledge here refers to the
concepts (and supporting structures) that a designer has developed through experience in the
world. This limited notion of knowledge keeps the focus upon interpretation.
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This Section provides a language with which to discuss the knowledge held by a designer through
the paradigms of concept formation and memory systems. Theories of concept formation that
are grounded in environmental interaction are used to build up a framework for knowledge. The
conceptual spaces framework for representing concepts is explained.
2.3.1 Concepts and Memory
Two related paradigms for describing what is meant by knowledge are concepts and memory,
both of which are concerned with the way that designers (referred to as agents in this Section)
learn from their interactions with their environment. In the paradigm of knowledge as concepts
the focus is upon different categories within knowledge, the way they are developed and how they
can be used for inference (Smith and Medin 1981, Murphy 2002). In the paradigm of knowledge
as memory there is a focus on the systems that control the way information is retained and
used. The two areas have much in common but use different language. In developing a model
of knowledge representation for situated design we will draw upon both vocabularies. A brief
review of the dominant ideas provides a foundation for articulating knowledge representation for
situated design.
2.3.1.1 Knowledge as concepts
Concepts are generalisations about the world that can be used for inference. No experience is
exactly identical to a previous experience, but because we hold concepts our world has some
stability (Smith and Medin 1981). By learning concepts we can acquire and then re-use knowl-
edge from experience in the world. Concepts allow for inferences to be made about the world
(Howard 1987). For example, by interpreting a new object as a pepper grinder we have an
idea of how it is used (most likely there is a part to be twisted in order to crush a peppercorn)
and what it is used for (to add pepper to food for taste).
There are many different theories about concepts that have in common the notion of abstraction,
that ‘knowledge of a specific category has been abstracted out of the buzzing and blooming
confusion of experience’ (Barsalou 2005). In other words, concepts are created from invariance
over experience. Dominant theories of conceptual structure are:
• Classical (rule-based): In this theory, a concept is a definition that includes everything
that the concept is and nothing that it is not (Murphy 2002). Concepts are held as
sets of defining features, and identification of a concept occurs when a stimulus has these
features. For example, a bird might be defined as having two legs, two wings and able to
fly. This allows for identification of a stimulus which has these features, such as a cockatoo
or a swallow, to be identified as a bird. The classical notion of concepts is criticised on
theoretical grounds because of the difficulty of finding any definitions that fit, such as
finding a set of rules for the concept of game (Wittgenstein 1953). In the example given,
the concept bird excludes an emu but includes a flying fox. The theory is also criticised
on empirical grounds, that this bivalent view of concept membership is not a match for
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what we observe in people - a stimulus might be interpreted as a bird in one circumstance
but not in another (Rosch 1978).
• Prototype (summary representation): In this theory, a concept is a prototype that
is the best example of a concept (Rosch 1975). In prototype theory concept membership
is not bivalent as it was in classical theory. Stimuli similar to the prototype are good
examples of a concept and things far from it are bad members. The prototype is not a
specific example of the concept, rather it is a list of features and most typical values for
these features, with some features being more important than others (Murphy 2002). A
prototype is also referred to as a summary representation.
• Exemplar: In this theory, a concept is the set of all examples of that concept that a
person remembers (Medin and Schaffer 1978). This is quite radically different from the
notion of a summary representation, as no explicit abstraction from the examples is being
stored in memory. Empirical evidence suggests that the memory of examples deteriorates
whilst the memory of a prototype remains (Medin and Schaffer 1978).
A related notion is that multiple concepts are given structure through the use of schemata:
• Schemata: A schema captures the relationships between concepts and includes a cluster
of related concepts (Skemp 1979). Often something can be both a schema and a concept
depending on how it is described. A face can be a concept for classifying faces, or it can
be a schema based on the concepts such as eyes, nose, mouth, ears and the relationship
between them. Rumelhart (1980) defines schema more loosely, as an organised body of
knowledge that represents some part of some stimulus domain. Concepts come to be
organised upon the basis of their relationship in both space and time (Howard 1987). Two
types of schema that demonstrate this are scene schemata (space) and event schemata
(time). An example of a scene schema is a soccer pitch, where it is expected that
certain elements will be present that they will be related in a certain way. An example
of an event schema is making tea which relates concepts in the order that they occur
(Schank and Abelson 1977).
2.3.1.2 Knowledge as memory
Memory considers the way that an agent retains and re-uses knowledge from experience in the
world. Some distinctions that are useful for a description of memory are:
• Implicit memory and explicit memory: Explicit memory is the form of memory used
“when performance on a task requires conscious recollection of previous experiences” (Graf
and Schacter 1985). Implicit memory is “when performance on a task is facilitated in the
absence of conscious recollection” (Graf and Schacter 1985) or “a behavioural, emotional
and perceptual form of memory devoid of the subjective internal experience of self or of
past” (Cozolino and Siegel 2009). An example of explicit memory is deliberately bringing
to mind the appearance of your first pet. An example of implicit memory is thinking
that a statement is true because you have overheard somebody making that statement
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in the past; where, crucially, you are unaware of the use of your memory of hearing that
statement; and where you may have thought the statement was false when it was originally
made (Begg et al 1992). The point of the distinction is that an agent can be unaware of
the way that memories are affecting their behaviours and thought processes (Schacter
1987). Three possible explanations for implicit memory are (Macleod and Bassili 1989
after Schacter 1987): (i) the multiple memory systems view, which holds that implicit and
explicit memory can be observed because they are separate systems within memory; (ii)
the processing view, which holds that memory processes can be top-down (conceptually
driven) and bottom-up (data-driven) and that implicit memory is associated with data-
driven processing (Roediger et al 1989); and (iii) the activation view which holds that
implicit memory involves the partial activation of memories below some liminal threshold.
Empirical evidence supports the processing view of implicit memory (Schacter 1994).
Two phenomena of implicit memory that will be used in later discussion are priming and selective
attention:
• Priming: is an effect observed when exposure to a stimulus affects the response to a
subsequent stimulus. Experiments have demonstrated both perceptual priming (of forms)
and conceptual priming (of categories) (Schacter 1994). For example, “words might be
presented in a study phase and then again, after a delay in a test phase when a priming
measure such as reading speed is obtained. Patients are instructed to read words as quickly
as possible in such a test and they are not informed that memory is being assessed. It
is observed that priming improves the speed of recognition” (Phaller and Squire 2009).
Experiments with amnesic patients that have damaged explicit memory but intact implicit
memory suggests that the two systems may not be linked (Schacter 1989).
• Selective attention: is where certain features of either external stimuli or internal rep-
resentations are noticed at the expense of others. Selectivity of attention has three dimen-
sions (Cozolini and Spiegel 2009 after Broadbent 1958): (i) filtering - focussing on specific
attributes (e.g. large shapes rather than small shapes); (ii) categorising - recognising in-
formation based on stimulus class (such as attending to squares and not other shapes);
and (iii) pigeonholing - only using perceptual information needed to place a stimulus into
a category (e.g. only looking at number of sides of a shape to classify it).
2.3.2 Grounded knowledge
Interpretations are constructed from expectations about the world. It follows that a model of
interpretation is about two things: (i) the process by which expectations are used to construct an
interpretation; and (ii) the development of the expectations. A model of interpretation for design
is dependent upon a model for learning grounded knowledge through experience. Knowledge is
learnt within a situation, i.e. made sense of within the view that the agent currently has of the
world:
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...all knowledge presents itself within a conceptual framework adapted to account for
previous experience and that any such frame may prove too narrow to comprehend
new experiences (Bohr, 1958 as quoted by Cariani, 1990).
The aims of the research require a model in which the interpretation is changed by the expecta-
tions, and the expectations are changed by interpretation. This section gives background to the
development of a model of knowledge through which expectations are developed in a way that
fits with situated design.
2.3.2.1 Knowledge from experience
Gero and Fujii (2000) outline a framework for a situated concept formation system that learns
through pull, in a way that is driven by expectation, and develops knowledge at different layers
of abstraction. This work is implicitly a perceptual symbol system (PSS) in that cognitive
representations are based upon perceptual states (Barsalou 1999). This is in contrast to an
amodal symbol system, in which cognitive representations use a language which does not have
a perceptual basis, e.g. natural language. The systems for concept formation proposed by
Barsalou (1999), Gar¨denfors (2000) and Hawkins (2004) all outline different aspects of a concept
formation system that is a good fit for situated design. What they, and the system described by
Gero and Fujii (2000) have in common is that the concepts arise as summary representations over
perceptual information - what starts as information in each of the senses becomes abstracted to
the level where it can be manipulated as symbols, a transition from sub-symbolic to symbolic. In
other words, the cognitive capabilities of a system arise from a combination of its native functions
as well as its experiences. Karmiloff-Smith (1994) labels this ‘the reconciliation of nativism and
constructivism’ and suggests that cognitive science can address the way that the two inform each
other.
The position of nativism can be seen in the following example: a human and a bee can undergo
the same experiences from birth but will learn different things because their bodies have differ-
ent functions (after Von Uexkull 1957). This is the tradition of embodied cognition, that the
functions of the body matter. The argument for constructivism put crudely is that two identical
people (perhaps identical twins), who undergo different experiences end, up with different cog-
nitive representations (after Piaget 1954). In a perceptual symbol system, these philosophical
implications are both satisfied; more importantly, it fits with what we observe in designers.
The distinction that knowledge is inherently perceptual can be seen within the ‘reflex arc’ ex-
ample (Dewey 1896). In this example a child learns that touching the flame of a candle causes
pain. The point made by Dewey is that the child learns within the act of touching; this is as
opposed to the view that the child touches, feels pain and then concludes something from the
experience. The sight of a candle, the control of muscles to move towards a candle, the feeling
of pain and the movement away from the candle are all controlled within the brain, and learning
occurs within the firing of each of these processes. The perceptual symbol systems mentioned
here are all descendents of this same school of thought, where:
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It being admitted that the sensori-motor apparatus represents both the unit of nerve
structure and the type of nerve function, the image of this relationship passed over
into psychology, and became an organizing principle to hold together the multiplicity
of fact (Dewey 1896).
Whilst there is a long tradition of hypothesising such systems, there are no such systems suc-
cessfully implemented computationally. Hawkins (2004) describes the essential features of such
a system of a hierarchy within which higher layers of abstraction bring together knowledge from
different modes of perception, Figure 2.8, where the lowest boxes represent information from
different perceptual modes, i.e. touch, audition and vision. Each box (representing a cortical
region) attempts to find the best fit that it can for the data coming into it, and it passes this up
to the box above it. In higher layers, the perceptual modes are brought together into convergence
zones (Damasio 1989).
spatially invariant slow changing “objects”
spatially specic fast changing “features”touch audition vision
Figure 2.8: An example of a PSS in which the higher layers of abstraction bring together
knowledge from the lower layers in convergence zones, with the higher layers representing
slower changing, spatially invariant concepts (after Hawkins 2005).
There are both a cognitive and a neurological basis for this type of model. Cognitively, a
number of experiments have been conducted that measure the time taken for subjects to verify
the properties that relate to a concept. For example a subject might be shown the concept
cat and then asked to verify whether the property of claw or the property of wings is valid
(Barsalou 2005a). Some interesting findings in these experiments were that: (i) larger properties
(in terms of real world size) take longer to verify (Solomon and Barsalou 2004); (ii) the shape
of the property is relevant, for example verifying mane for pony was faster after verifying
mane for horse but not after verifying mane for lion (Solomon and Barsalou 2001); and (iii)
switching modality comes at a cost to time in that verifying a sound after a sound was faster
than verifying a sound after a taste (Pecher et al 2003). There is a neurological basis for the PSS
view of cognition, which suggests that each part of the cortex is actually performing a similar
function (Mountcastle 1997, Hawkins 2004). There are also studies of subjects with brain lesions
and neuroimaging studies to support the case (Barsalou 2003).
All of this is a good fit with the models mentioned so far: (i) Barsalou (1999) describes simulators
as convergence zones bringing together perceptual information; (ii) Ga¨rdenfors (2000) describes
prototypes in conceptual space bringing together regions in perceptual space; and (iii) Hawkins
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(2004) uses Bayesian probability to describe the distinguishing of ‘causes’ at each layer of the
system. In the language of concepts and memory, a PSS suggests a prototypical theory of con-
cepts. It also suggests a system in which expectations can be both implicit and explicit through
the activation of regions within the system. This commitment to a PSS departs from much
existing work in design computation that relies upon amodal symbols, e.g. labelled concepts.
Gero and Fujii (2000) provide a framework for a situated concept formation agent that develops
knowledge from its sensory experiences. The layers in the agent are described as sensation,
perception, conception and situation, Figure 2.9. These four layers will be referred to as a useful
way to break up the levels of abstraction. This is not to imply that such a system has any such
delineation in its layers of abstraction, as suggested in the HTM system (Hawkins 2004). What
is important is that there is a layer for sensation at one end and a layer for situation at the other
and a number of layers in between. This a convenient way to discuss knowledge but there can
be many layers in an agent without a convenient delineation between where perception ends and
conception begins, merely different levels of abstraction within the agent.
ENVIRONMENT
AGENT
SENSATION
PERCEPTION
CONCEPTION
SITUATION
Figure 2.9: The layers of interpretation within an agent that is located within an environment
(after Gero and Fujii 2000)
Barsalou (2005b) identifies three problems that arise in trying to specify a category that repre-
sents an abstraction: (i) what information should be included in an abstraction? (ii) why is this
particular abstraction the correct one? and (iii) how does this abstraction handle the exceptions
that arise?
We adopt the PSS approach which suggests that summary representations arise from invari-
ance over perceptual information. This is a common thread throughout the work of Barsa-
lou, Ga¨rdenfors and Hawkins. PSS suggests that abstraction is about the ability to construct
temporarily useful abstractions from memories rather than attempting to find one particular
abstraction that represents a category (Barsalou 2005b).
Concepts are “multimodal categorizations of perceptual categorizations; ways of coordinating
perception and action; meaning and activity are inseparable” (Clancey, 1997).
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2.3.2.2 Constructive memory
Constructive memory is the notion that the use of knowledge as memory is ‘not just a function
of the original experience it is also a function of what has happened since the original experience
and of the situation which prevails when the demand for the memory is made’ (Gero 1999).
In other words, knowledge can be learnt within one situation, changed in a number of ways,
and then used within another situation. The constructive view of memory is distinct from the
traditional computational view of memory as a storehouse of information, where items are stored
in memory to be recalled upon request (Reigler 2005). In a constructive memory system there is
no such thing as a static memory; memories are constructed in the present and existing memories
can change with new experiences:
As an embodied network of constructive components, the evolutionary evolved cognition-
memory compound is not geared toward reproducing “true” facts. Rather, its goal is
to produce structure that maintains coherence with the rest of the network (Reigler
2004).
Cognitive studies can be used to give examples of constructive memory. Through a series of
experiments Bartlett (1932) demonstrates the phenomena of false memories, memories of events
that differ from what happened, and suggests constructive memory as a theory that explains
them. In one experiment that demonstrates this idea, a subject is shown a picture of an owl.
The next day the subject draws the picture from memory. The process is repeated iteratively,
introducing a new subject and showing them the newly created picture each time. The results
show that the picture repeatedly ends up as a black cat.
Schacter et al (1998) give empirical evidence of people constructing memories in different ways,
through false recognition, intrusion and confabulation. In experiments, participants are given
information to study and then asked about it, with results showing that people: (i) ‘remem-
ber’ instances that they have not studied previously (false recognition); (ii) produce nonstudied
information along with studied information (intrusion); and (iii) provide an account of events
which did not occur (confabulation). An example of an experiment in confabulation is described
by Reigler (2004):
In a typical experiment they asked subjects who had visited Disneyland before to
evaluate advertisements and answer questions about their trip to Disneyland. The
first group of subjects received an ad about the theme park that did not mention
any cartoon characters. The second group read the same text while a four-foot-tall
cardboard figure of Bugs Bunny was placed in the room. The third group received
a fake Disneyland ad featuring Bugs Bunny. And the fourth, double-exposure group
got both the fake ad and the cardboard cutout. Afterwards all participants were
asked whether they had met Bugs Bunny on their visit to Disneyland and whether
they had shaken his hand. A remarkable 30 percent of subjects in group 3, and
40 percent in group 4 said that they indeed have met him while only 8 percent of
the first group, and four percent of the second, thought they had met the rabbit
in Disneyland. It seems that the mere suggestion of the cartoon figure, either in
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a fake ad and/or as life-size cardboard figure was enough to convince many of the
participants of having met him although Bugs Bunny is a Warner Bros. cartoon
character and would never be featured in a Disney park. (Riegler 2004 after Loftus
2003)
The point of these examples is to demonstrate the way that memories are constructed within the
situation. Constructive interpretation is about construction from expectations. The development
of useful expectations relies upon some kind of knowledge from experience. Memory about the
re-use of knowledge, and a situated system will use a constructive model of memory. This
is as opposed to other models of knowledge such as Prolog, SOAR, connectionist networks
and statistical causal networks which are not constructive (Davis et al 1993). Constructive
interpretation would ideally be implemented in an existing situated knowledge system. However,
no such system exists. In developing the model of interpretation a model of knowledge ought to
be used that is as close to a constructive memory system as possible.
2.3.3 Representing knowledge using conceptual spaces
This Section provides a brief introduction to conceptual spaces from the background literature.
For the purposes of exploring interpretation we adopt a framework for representing concepts
known as conceptual spaces (Ga¨rdenfors, 2000). This framework is used because it: (i) gives a
formal mathematical model for representing concepts; (ii) can account for how they are formed
from experience; (iii) is compatible with the description of situated design; and (iv) fits well with
the theories of concept formation guiding this work. In this Section we describe the conceptual
spaces framework as it is articulated in the literature. The framework is extended to explicitly
account for situations in Chapter 4. This framework is the basis for the computational model
explored in the rest of the thesis.
2.3.3.1 Dimensions, domains and conceptual spaces
An agent has sensors which produce data during interaction with the external world. For ex-
ample, an eye can sense changes in light, an ear changes in air pressure (Ga¨rdenfors, 2000).
The different things about the world that can be sensed make up dimensions which represent
the qualities of an object. Some examples of quality dimensions that humans sense are: height,
width, depth, brightness, pitch, temperature and weight (Ga¨rdenfors 2000). A dimension is a
one-dimensional space within which stimuli can be located.
Dimensions that are inseparable create a perceptual domain. Inseparable means that the agent
cannot get information for one of the dimensions without getting information for all of them.
For example, three dimensions of visual perception are hue, brightness and chromaticity. The
way the eye is structured, we do not get information for hue without also getting information
about brightness and chromaticity. A perceptual domain (e.g. texture, colour) is a space with
dimensions of those things that the agent can sense. In the example of colour being sensed by
hue, brightness and chromaticity, this results in a three-dimensional domain. A stimulus could
be located within this domain based on a three values.
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A concept is a convergence zone that brings together spaces within perceptual domains that
experience has shown to be related. For example, the concept for banana might bring together
areas in the color domain that we might call yellow, green and brown with areas in a shape
domain that we associate with the Lady Finger and Cavendish banana varieties. It implicitly
adopts a prototype theory of concepts where the most typical perceptual regions (e.g. the colors
and shapes above for a banana) are associated and less typical instances of a concept have some
distance (measured in conceptual space) from a prototype (Murphy, 2002). Figure 2.10 shows
the way that dimensions create the space of a perceptual domain, and the way that a concept
associates regions in domains with each other. A part of the meaning of a concept comes from
its relationship with other concepts.
SENSOR PERCEPTUAL฀DOMAIN CONCEPT
D
DD D
D
D
DOMAIN
DOMAIN
DOMAIN
DOMAIN
CONCEPT
Figure 2.10: A sensor produces data that creates dimensions d1,d2 and d3. The three
dimensions together create a perceptual domain, domain1. A concept, concept1, brings together
regions in different conceptual spaces.
2.3.3.2 Similarity in conceptual spaces
Concepts are now represented geometrically, and distance measures can be used to establish both
membership of concepts and similarity to other concepts. Distance can be measured in many
ways, such as Euclidean distance, Equation 2.1, or a city block metric, Equation 2.2. Both of
these are examples of Minkowski metrics, Equation 2.3.
dE(x, y) =
√∑
i
(xi − yi)2 (2.1)
dC(x, y) =
∑
i
|xi − yi| (2.2)
dK(x, y) = k
√∑
i
|xi − yi|
k
(2.3)
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concept: banana 
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Figure 2.11: A concept is represented as a convergence zone of points in conceptual space.
This involves two regions in the shape domain that correspond to two different types of banana,
and three regions in the colour domain that correspond to colours. This convergence zone
represents a region in conceptual space.
This use of a distance measure implicitly suggests that the distance from concept C1 to concept
C2 is the same as from C2 to concept C1. However, people do not have this kind of symmetry
when judging similarity between concepts. For example, people tend to judge the similarity
of North Korea to China to be greater than the similarity of China to North Korea (Tversky
1977). For this an attention-weight wi is given to dimension i based upon its salience, such
that large values of w will stretch and small values shrink the dimension, with corresponding
changes to distance (Ga¨rdenfors 2000). This results in a revised distance measurement, such as
the Euclidean weighted distance given in Equation 2.4.
dE(x, y) = k
√∑
i
wi|xi − yi|
k
(2.4)
Similarity is then a function of distance, with smaller distances indicating more similarity. The
psychological literature suggests that similarity is an exponentially decaying function of distance
such as that given by Equation 2.5 (Nosofsky 1988, Ga¨rdenfors 2000).
sij = e
−c·d2ij (2.5)
Conceptual spaces provides a framework that can be used to represent concepts. By extending
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this framework to explicitly account for situations we can demonstrate the effect of situations
upon constructive interpretation. Measures of distance provide a means of assessing similarity
within conceptual space. This framework is used in developing a framework for constructive
interpretation Chapter 4.
2.4 Summary
This Chapter has provided background research for constructive interpretation with attention
given to: (i) cognitive studies of designers interpreting; (ii) computational models of interpreta-
tion; (iii) situated design as a description of the kind of knowledge system in which interpretation
occurs; and (iv) models of concept formation systems from the literature that fit with situated
design and constructive interpretation.
Design has been described as an activity that occurs inside the head of a designer. A number
of cognitive studies have been surveyed that look at designers interpreting their own sketches.
These studies, in particular the studies of Scho¨n and Wiggins (1992) and Suwa et al (2000),
describe the way that designers observe the unintended consequences of their design actions.
This has been used to suggest that interpretation is bi-directional, in that the expectations of a
designer change the interpretation produced, and the production of an interpretation can change
the expectations of a designer.
In order to show computational approaches to interpretation in design some tools and models
of design have been described. It has been shown that computational tools can support the
way that designers reinterpret design elements. Computational approaches to analogy have been
shown to support a constructive view of interpretation where the source of an analogy changes
the way a system looks at the target of an analogy. Approaches to computational creativity have
been surveyed, showing that such models do not typically interpret in a constructive way during
synthesis.
When approaching a design task a designer brings together the parts of their knowledge relating
to this task in a design prototype. This has been described as a type of situation, a focussed set
of expectations about the world based upon the designer’s notion of the design problem. These
expectations change the way that the designer experiences the world through the way they
interpret. This shows that a model of interpretation for design needs to address the relationship
between interpretation, expectation and knowledge. The paradigm of situated design presents a
framework within which to explore this.
Models of concept formation in the literature have been drawn upon to develop a notion of the
kind of knowledge system that can support constructive interpretation. The conceptual spaces
framework has been outlined as the basis for a computational system in which knowledge arises
from experience.
This Chapter has surveyed the research into interpretation in design. It has provided a back-
ground for an enquiry into constructive interpretation, both conceptually and computationally.
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Finally, it has outlined the existing ideas that will guide the research: situated design as a
paradigm and conceptual spaces as a framework.
Chapter 3
Conceptual Model
This Chapter presents a conceptual model of constructive interpretation as a pull from expecta-
tion and push from a source within a number of different layers of abstraction. Chapter 2 has
described the way designers reinterpret their work and explore design ideas through the tacit
knowledge of the situation. The conceptual model shows how this tacit knowledge is explored
by bringing together the knowledge structure for situated design with a model of interpretation
that starts with expectation. The layers within an agent are labelled sensation, perception, con-
ception, and situation and interpretation arises from the interaction between these layers. The
relationship between each of the layers (and between sensation and the environment) is similar
for all layers. Within each layer, pull begins with an expectation which uses a source to con-
struct interpreted data. Push produces interpreted data directly from the source. Expectations
are sent from layers of higher abstraction to layers of lower abstraction. Situation is described as
different from other layers in that it has no layer above it, and relies upon grounded knowledge
and learning through push to deal with unexpected data. The symbols used in the description
of constructive interpretation are found in Table 3.1.
The Chapter is concerned with: (i) characterising interpretation as the construction of inter-
preted data from a source; (ii) making an argument for expectation-driven interpretation (pull);
(iii) characterising the expectations that drive pull; (iv) describing the effect of push and pull
within different layers of abstraction to create an interpretation; (v) describing the way that
the situation layer is different; and (vi) showing how designers explore their knowledge through
constructive interpretation in conceptual design.
3.1 What is interpretation?
Interpretation is taken to be the creation of an internal representation of a source. Interpretation
occurs through pull (expectation-driven interpretation) and push (source-driven interpretation).
In interpretation of an external source, a stimulus is interpreted to produce ‘an interpretation’.
The result of interpretation is a set of interpreted data within each layer of the agent’s knowledge
system. The term ‘an interpretation’ refers to this interpreted data.
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Symbol Description
A A set of actions upon the environment
C Conception
C A set of concepts
c A concept
D A set of source elements
d An element of the source
E A set of expectations
e An expectation
f A feature in a vector
H Push
I Interpretation
I A set of interpreted data
λ A layer within the agent
P Perception
P A set of percepts
p A percept
S Sensation
S Sense data (senscepts)
s A senscept
S Situation
s A situation
t Time
U Pull
v A vector
Push-pull signifier
Table 3.1: Symbols used to describe constructive interpretation.
Interpretation begins with pull, an attempt to construct what is expected from what is available.
The output of pull is interpreted data of the type described by the layer. The interpreted data
from pull in sensation, perception, conception and situation respectively are senscepts, percepts,
concepts and situations, column three in Table 3.2. Pull tries to construct expectations from the
source for the layer.
Push is the part of interpretation that begins with the source. There will be times when expec-
tations are not able to be constructed, when there are incorrect expectations or when something
new is encountered. Push is the part of interpretation that allows for the unexpected to be
recognised and allows for new knowledge to be learned.
An example can be used to show the difference between push and pull. A stimulus can demand
attention, ‘pushing’ its way into sensation, such as the way that regardless of your expectations
when your mobile phone rings, you notice it. Pull shows the way that expectations can change
an experience. Consider that you are attempting to meet up with a friend in a crowd. Based
upon the back of somebody’s head you think that you see your friend and rush to catch up with
them. However, as you get a bit closer you realise that they look nothing like your friend. This
is an example of pull because the expectations of seeing the friend have changed the way that
the world is seen: the interpretation has been constructed from expectations.
The term source is used because it recognises that from any source it is possible to pull many
different kinds of interpreted data. It is possible to internally represent a single source in many
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different ways. For example, a stimulus will yield different senscepts depending upon which
sensors are pointed at it and how those sensors are primed. An ear pointed at a lawnmower
and an eye pointed at the lawnmower produce different senscepts, and an ear expecting the
lawnmower produces different senscepts to one that is not. The same construction from the
source is present in all of the layers. The sources of sensation, perception, conception and
situation respectively are the environment, senscepts, percepts and concepts, column two in
Table 3.2.
Layer Source Interpreted data
situation concepts situations
conception percepts concepts
perception senscepts percepts
sensation environment senscepts
Table 3.2: Layers with type of source and interpreted data.
This model uses layers of sensation, perception, conception and situation. This does not imply a
claim that there are four layers; what is important is that there are different levels of abstraction
and that the situation is co-ordinating the topmost layer. In this Chapter we will refer to these
layers as if they were four discrete layers in a hierarchy. This is not to suggest that when designers
interpret they have these same four layers (indeed, most evidence points to many more layers
than this in a cortical hierarchy (Hawkins 2004, Mountcastle 1998)) but these four layers are
used in constructing this conceptual model for the sake of clarity. Another limitation of this
model is that it imposes a rigid hierarchy between layers and does not address the possiblity of a
more ‘loosely wired’ structure. Each layer has processes that: (i) produce interpreted data from
expectations and a source; and (ii) produces expectations from memory.
The layers are all similar in that data moves upwards towards layers of higher abstraction and
expectations move downwards towards layers of lower abstraction. Whilst the number of layers
is not important, it is important that there is a bottom-most layer, which pulls data from the
external world rather than another internal layer, and a top-most layer, which does not have a
layer above it and hence cannot receive expectations from another layer. This top-most layer is
situation.
Situation is different from the other layers because it alone does not receive expectations from a
layer above it. For example, perception knows what to expect of sensation because conception
passes expectations down to it. In contrast, situation relies upon grounded experience alone.
When a situation can be pulled (i.e. the concepts expected by a situation are being found) then
the situation is being successful. However, when the expected concepts are not being found, a
new situation is required. Sometimes this is from a switch to a situation that experience suggests
will be useful here (that is a good match with the concepts being found) and sometimes this
will be a change to the current situation (and in this way situations change). The important
point is that situations are different from other layers as they do not have a layer above them to
construct their expectations.
Figure 3.1 shows push and pull within a layer. The pull process is constructing from expectations
using the source to create interpreted data. When pull is not able to construct the expectation,
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push from the source can occur. Where an expectation cannot be constructed in a certain
situation, push can lead to changes in the agent’s knowledge so that, over time, expectations
become better able to predict the environment.
source 
expectations interpreted data 
pull push
Figure 3.1: The pull process within a layer.
Interpretation I is often formalised as the construction of a set of interpreted data I from a
source of external data D, Equation 3.1:
I : D  I (3.1)
The aim of this conceptual model is to portray interpretation as a pull from expectations E that
is assisted by push. This dual effect of push-pull is denoted by a double arrow where
the top arrow is the layer pulling what it expects from the source. This requires a revision
of the equation representing interpretation to include the effect of pull, Figure 3.2. This new
‘push-pull’ arrow can be defined using Z notation (Spivey 1992) as the function mapping a set of
expectations and source data to a set of interpreted data. Equation 3.3 is equivalent to Equation
3.2:
I : D
E
I (3.2)
I : E×D −→ I (3.3)
The interpreted data produced by interpretation I consists of the data produced within each
layer, the senscepts S, percepts P , concepts C and the situation s, Equation 3.4:
I = {S, P,C, s} (3.4)
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3.2 Characterising constructive interpretation
Pull has been described as the construction of interpreted data from a source using expectations.
Constructive interpretation can be distinguished from other types of interpretation in which this
construction does not occur. Constructive interpretation recognises that there are many ways in
which any source can be represented and given meaning. The outside world holds no inherent
meaning; the interpretation is entirely imposed by the agent. This Section gives examples of the
way that designers impose interpretations upon the world based upon expectations.
It is a common occurrence for two people to look at the same source and give it an entirely
different meaning. An example of this can be seen in the image shown in Figure 3.2. There are
two obvious ways that this picture can be interpreted. One is as a young lady with her ear in the
foreground, and the other is as an old lady with a large nose. Whilst there are the two ‘obvious’
interpretations, many others are also possible - perhaps it is a landscape drawing that has been
rotated 90◦ anticlockwise. There is an open set of possible interpretations for any source; any
limits to possible interpretations arise from the limitations of knowledge structures of the agent
interpreting the source.
Figure 3.2: An image with two obvious interpretations (Bootzin et al 1986).
Another way to make the same point is to consider the ways in which a computer can interpret
a binary string, e.g. 001010010100101011110.... Depending upon the program that is used to
interpret this string an entirely different result can be produced. For example, the image shown
in Figure 3.2 is a file that, when opened by an image editor, produces the image displayed. Yet
when the same file is opened with a text editor, the image shown in Figure 3.3 is produced.
Exactly the same binary string has produced a very different result because of what the program
is doing with the source.
Figure 3.3: The previous image opened with a text editor
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The layers at a higher level of abstraction give order to the lower levels of abstraction, as shown in
Table 3.2. These examples consider the way that an external source can be represented internally
in different ways. Yet this possibility of representing a source in multiple ways is occurring within
every layer within the agent. The final interpretation emerges from the interplay between layers.
This can be demonstrated with some specific examples of construction from a source within each
layer. Figure 3.4 shows an example of perception giving order to senscepts in two different ways.
In a similar way, conception gives order to percepts, and this can be done in many possible
ways. Figure 3.5 shows an example of what are potentially two instances of a floor plan being
constructed from percepts. However, these exact same percepts could be used to create other
concepts. The image in Figure 3.5(b) actually originated from a photograph of a circuit board
and could also be constructed as a circuit board.
sense data
(senscepts)
expectations
construction
construction
from
expectations
construction
from
expectations
expectations
construction
Figure 3.4: Senscepts can be ordered in more than one way to create percepts. In the example
we see two different ways to order the same senscepts into percepts. In a similar way, the same
set of percepts can be ordered to create different concepts, and the same set of concepts can
be ordered to create differ situations.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.5: Two images that can be interpreted as a floor plan: (a) a floor plan of the
world trade center; and (b) a circuit board that looks like a floor plan
The point of the examples is that there are many possible interpretations from any source, and
this applies to each layer within the model. Each layer gives order to the source that it finds. The
recognition that a source can be interpreted in many different ways begs the question: Why do
designers interpret in one way and not another? This question is addressed through the notion
of push and pull from expectations.
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3.3 Constructive interpretation through push-pull from ex-
pectations
It is not enough to recognise that designers construct their world from their expectations. By
giving a description of push and pull within each layer of the agent a detailed model of interpre-
tation can be built that can be used to look at why designers reach the interpretations that they
do and the way that this kind of interpretation affects the early stages of conceptual designing.
3.3.1 Pull from expectations
Pull attempts to construct what a layer is expecting from what is available. Each layer is
constructing from data that is at a lower level of abstraction than the expectations. There are
some sources that can be pulled as a floor plan and some that cannot. If pull cannot construct
then it changes the expectations of the layer below. Some examples of pull within each layer of
the agent’s knowledge system are given in Table 3.3.
One way to characterise pull as opposed to push is to consider an agent that can only pull from
expectations and cannot push from the source and to consider the inverse. An agent that can
only pull is incapable of realising that it has been wrong in its predictions of the world. For
example, if it expects it to be a sunny day outside then it is unable to revise this belief even as it
is being drenched with rain. An agent that can only push from the source and cannot pull from
expectations has different problems, in that is unable to reuse its knowledge about the world,
and sees everything as if for the first time.
It is suggested that layers within the cortex all operate in the same way, that there is a hierarchy
of invariance with abstract concepts at the top and sensory input at the bottom (Mountcastle
1998, Felleman and Van Essen 1991). Feedback occurs from higher layers to lower layers (Hupe´
et al 1998). This description of interpretation as the pull from expectations has been previously
articulated as a memory-prediction framework (Hawkins 2004). The kind of pull from a layer
of higher abstraction is captured in this scenario which refers to columns of neurons within the
cortex, where the pull from expectations meets with the push from the source:
Say your region of the cortex has been told to expect the musical interval of a fifth.
The columns of your region represent all possible specific intervals such as C-E, C-G,
D-A, etc. You need to decide which of your columns should be active. When the
region above tells you to expect a fifth, it causes layer 2 cells to fire in all the columns
that are fifths, such as C-G, D-A and E-B. Cells in layer 2 of columns representing
other intervals are not active. Now you have to select one column from all the possible
fifths. The inputs to your region are specific notes. If the last note you heard was a
D, then all the columns representing intervals involving a D, such as D-E and D-B,
have partial input. So now in layer 2 we have activity in columns that are fifths, and
in layer 4 we have partial input to all columns representing intervals involving a D.
The intersection of these two sets represents our answer, the column representing the
interval D-A (Hawkins 2004).
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Layer Examples of pull from the layer
Sensation Sensation pulls data from the source based upon what it expects to sense,
through control of its sensors. Expectations of sensation during interpreta-
tion are driven by the requirements of perception. For example, people turn
so that their eyes are facing towards something that they want to see, or
act to touch something that they want to feel. As well as controlling the
orientation of their sensors people control the functioning of their sensors,
such as the opening of an eyelid or the flaring of nostrils.
Perception Perception pulls from senscepts to construct percepts, based upon what it
expects to see. Expectations of perception during interpretation are driven
by the requirements of conception. Gestalt perception provides some exam-
ples of some perceptual constructions based upon expectation (Zusne 1970).
An agent constructs the illusory triangle seen in Figure 3.6 by the contin-
uation of the lines suggested by the sectors cut out from the three black
circles. In another example, people are played an audio track, consisting of
a continuous musical note interrupted briefly by white noise before the note
resumes. People are able to hear the note continuing through the middle of
the white noise (Riecke et al 2007). This is an example of perception in the
auditory system pulling out of the noise what it expects to be finding.
Conception Conception pulls from percepts to construct concepts, based upon what
it expects to see. Expectations of conception during interpretation are
driven by the requirements of situation. There are two aspects to pull from
conception: (i) an attempt to pull percepts that are expected to occur
within the expected concepts; and (ii) changing the use of percepts to fit
the concepts.
Examples of pull from conception can be seen in conceptual priming
experiments (Schacter 1987), such as the one performed by Graf et al (1985)
where subjects were primed with a list of words and performed a task of
identifying eight exemplars for a category. It was demonstrated that the
primed words had influenced the spoken words.
Situation Situation pulls from the available concepts to construct the expected situa-
tion. Unlike the other layers, situation does not have a layer above it. When
the expected situation cannot be constructed from the available concepts
the situation changes either through: (i) a switch to another situation that
experience suggests will be useful; or (ii) a change to the current situation.
Through experience, agents come to expect concepts to be co-ordinated in
a certain way. There are two aspects to pull from situation: (i) an attempt
to pull concepts that are expected to occur together; and (ii) changing the
use of concepts to fit the situation.
An example of this can be seen in the ‘runway width illusion’ encountered
by pilots, Figure 3.7 (Parmet and Gilligham 2002). In this illusion, the
pilot is accustomed to a certain runway width. When approaching a runway
that is narrower than they are accustomed to, the pilot thinks that they
are higher than they really are, scenario (b) in Figure 3.7. In terms of
pull, the pilot is expecting the runway on approach to have certain visual
characteristics. The perceptual expectations of the pilot are being met,
but this is only because of the frame of expectations within which they are
operating. If an instructor sitting next to the pilot were to tell them that
the runway was narrower than they expected, then the concepts available to
situation no longer fit with the concepts expected. As a result, the situation
changes to another situation. Within this new situation, exactly the same
perceptual data leads the pilot to a safe landing.
Table 3.3: Examples of pull within each layer
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The specific input of the note D is an example of push whilst the expectation of an interval
is an example of pull. This quote also shows the way that experience makes the connection
between expectations (which are at a higher level of abstraction) and input. The expectation
of an interval of a fifth leads to expectations of all such intervals. If we were to extend this
example then an expectation of a cat would lead to the expectation of all cats that experience
has taught us can be found. As a result of the fact that expectations are at a higher level of
abstraction than the source, we expect there to be more information moving down through the
layers as expectations than there is data moving up through the layers from push. This kind of
activity is observed in the human brain (Hawkins 2004).
Figure 3.6: A Kanisza triangle (after Kanisza 1955) demonstrates Gestalt perception of form,
where a triangle is perceived through the continuation of the lines implied by the missing sectors
in the three black circles
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 3.7: The effect of runway width on the pilot’s image of the runway (left) and the
potential effect on the approach path flown (right): (a) accustomed width results in normal
approach; (b) narrow runway makes the pilot feel higher than they actually are, leading to
an approach that is too low; and (c) a wide runway gives the illusion of being closer than it
actually is, leading to an approach that is too high (source: Parmet and Gillingham 2002)
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Pull within a layer Uλ constructs a set of interpreted data specific to that layer Iλ, where Iλ ⊂ I,
from a set of expectations Eλ, where Eλ ⊂ E, with reference to the source D. Pull is the top
arrow in the push-pull double arrow and is represented by Equation 3.5:
Uλ : Eλ
D
 Iλ (3.5)
The set of expectations can be categorised as: (i) those that are held prior to interpretation; and
(ii) those that are changed during interpretation. Pull uses expectations that are held before
interpretation begins. As each layer attempts to pull, and uses push to fill in gaps, a layer causes
the expectations of the layer below it to change.
3.3.2 Expectations
The experiences that an agent has in the world leads it to have expectations that are useful
for that world. An agent uses its memories constructed during past events to construct useful
expectations. These memories are constructed within a situation (Liew and Gero 2005). For
the purposes of this model we will talk of there being two types of expectation: (i) relating
to the course of events Ecoe (COE); and (ii) relating to the state of affairs Esoa (SOA)(after
Gero and Fujii 2000). These two types of expectation have a lot in common with the notions
of episodic and semantic memory. Expectation begins with COE expectations and is guided by
SOA expectations. Where not explicitly referred to, the set of all expectations E refers to both
types of expectation, Equation 3.6:
E = {Ecoe,Esoa} (3.6)
3.3.2.1 Course of events (COE) expectations in pull
When we see a hand heading towards a keyboard, Figure 3.8, we know even before a noise occurs
what kind of sound will be heard. In this example our experiences have lead us to have useful
expectations of what to expect when something that looks like a hand hits something that looks
like a keyboard. In the model, each layer has predictions about what the source in the future
will look like. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict COE expectations to an immediate episode,
defined as where an interpretation of a source at time t leads to an expectation of what the
source at t′ will be.
COE expectations are the learnt expectations of the order in which events occur, and this applies
at all layers within the agent. Some concepts tend to follow each other, such as the way that
marriage often follows love or a carriage is often seen immediately after a horse.
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In perception, we learn about the way that objects move, such as the way that when a ball
is thrown we know where it will land based upon the expectations of perception. Figure 3.9
shows three sequences over time, two of which are common. After the first two frames have been
seen, there is perceptual expectation of what will continue to occur. The uncommon sequence is
unlikely to happen with an object moving across the field of vision, and as a result will not be
expected.
Figure 3.8: Expectations of the course of events lead us to know what kind of sound will be
made, even before the hand hits the keys
common sequence
common sequence
uncommon sequence
time
Figure 3.9: Three sequences over time. Two are common, showing a line or shape moving
across sensors. One is uncommon, because the shape changes as it is moving. Expectations
reflect common sequences over time (after Hawkins 2005)
COE expectations in layers of lower abstraction are more to do with syntactic connection, whilst
layers at a higher level of abstraction tend to be more semantic. In the two examples given
above, perception gives COE expectations of where the ball will be moments from now, whilst
conception links the ideas of love and marriage.
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In the model, COE expectations at time t, Etcoe, where E
t
coe ⊂ E
t, are a set of expected future
interpreted data, It
′
ex, given by Equation 3.7:
Etcoe = I
t′
ex (3.7)
The set of COE expectations is made up of expectations within each layer. In perception for
example, a percept at time t may, through a construction of memory, create an expectation of
a percept at time t′. From Equations 3.4 and 3.7 the set of COE expectations is then the set of
expected senscepts, percepts, concepts and situations at time t′, Equation 3.8:
Etcoe = {S
t′
ex, P
t′
ex, C
t′
ex, s
t′
ex} (3.8)
3.3.2.2 State of affairs (SOA) expectations in pull
SOA expectations are expectations about the way that different layers of abstraction relate to
each other. For example, the way that the concept cat can call to mind many different visual
or auditory expectations of cats or the way that an expectation of a whisper can cause one to
‘prick up their ears’. SOA expectations are a part of implicit memory in the sense that for the
most part we are unaware of them, even though they are being used for interpretation all the
time.
The knowledge learnt from experience about the way that the layers relate to each other are a
kind of semantic memory. A concept has a connection to percepts. A percept has a connection
to senscepts. These connections have come about through experience. Semantic memory creates
expectations about the state of affairs (SOA). For example, if we have an expectation that we will
see a cat then this creates expectations of what will be perceived (say, the smell and the sound),
and these perceptual expectations create expectations of sensation. In this way expectations are
propagated down through the layers, from situation to conception to perception to sensation.
Figure 3.10 is a photograph of part of a creature. Once the creature has been identified from
these visual cues we have ideas about how this creature looks, sounds, feels, and behaves from our
experiences. The establishment of a concept in conception triggers expectations in perception to
be revised. State of Affairs expectations are about the way that each layer affects the expectations
of the layer below it.
An example of the effect of this is the way that if an agent has a broken sensor then perception
is able to construct from its expectations, and conception will not even be aware that the sensor
is broken. This is comparable to the way that we perceive the world as a continuous visual field
despite having a blind spot in each eye.
A layer has expectations of the layer below it, where lower refers to a lower level of abstraction.
Each layer does not have direct access to the layer below it. In pull there are many expectations
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Figure 3.10: Semantic memory co-ordinates layers, such that recognising this image as a
rabbit allows inferences about how it will feel, sound and act
of the source that are expected. SOA expectations are the means by which an expectation is
able to be constructed from data. We see if the perceptual information matches with what is
expected. SOA expectations are the means by which pull is carried out, by providing a link
between the expectations of a layer and the expected source that relates to it.
SOA expectations are a mapping from a set of COE expectations to a set of source data, Equa-
tion 3.9. This takes the form of a set of tuples mapping COE expectations of what might be
encountered to what SOA expectations suggest might cause it, Equation 3.10.
Esoa = Ecoe → D (3.9)
Esoa = {
〈
e1coe, d
1
〉
, 〈e2coe, d
2〉, ..., 〈encoe, d
n〉} (3.10)
In layers that are not sensation, the source D in Equation 3.10 is a lower layer, leading to
connections between layers. In the example given, a rabbit is concept. Using this concept in
interpretation leads to SOA expectations in perception based upon past experiences with rabbits.
Through SOA expectations interpreted data in layers of higher abstraction lead to expectations
at layers of lower abstraction.
3.3.3 Push from the source
Push occurs when pull within a layer is unable to construct what is expected. It is a push from a
lower layer of abstraction into a higher layer of abstraction, say, from perception to conception.
We can identify two different types of push: (i) push from an unexpected source; and (ii) push
from a novel source. An example of the first is the way that an ambulance driving past in the
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street causes you to stop what you are thinking about and look. An example of the second is
the way that you try to make sense of the strange new gadget that your friend is showing you.
At the time of interpretation, an agent has a certain set of expectations. During the process of
interpretation, data moves both up and down the hierarchy of layers. When the expectations of
pull cannot be met, push occurs into a layer above. This can lead to a revision of expectations
based, from which pull can subsequently occur. Learning occurs when expectations do not change
and pull cannot construct from expectations.
Many machine learning techniques use supervised learning followed by a means of finding a ‘best
match’ (Russell and Norvig 1995). This technique is an example of push from data, where there
is no use of the knowledge about the relationship between different levels of abstraction (Harnad
1989).
The issue with constructing from expectations is that sometimes the expectations are not a
good fit for the source. Pull tries to construct the interpreted data from the source based upon
expectations. There will be cases where construction cannot occur. Given a set of expectations
and a source a number of things can happen: (i) the expectations can be entirely constructed
from the source; (ii) the expectations cannot be constructed from the source at all; and (iii) the
expectations can only be partially constructed from the source.
Learning through push also occurs, as in the loosely wired model where neurons that fire at
the same time become ‘coupled’ (Clancey 1999). This is an example of Hebbian learning, as in:
“what fires together wires together” (Russell and Norvig 1999). These then form the semantic
connections that are the basis for implicit expectations within the situation.
Push Hλ can be formalised as the production of interpreted data within a layer Iλ from a source
D, Equation 3.11:
Hλ : D Iλ (3.11)
Through push a layer can pass data to a layer above it even if it is unable to find an interpretation
within the situation. This holds true all the way up to the situation layer, at which point a change
of situation is required if the current situation cannot be used for construction.
3.3.4 Constructive interpretation through push-pull
The picture of interpretation can now be filled in with the relationships between layers using
two arrows, one for pull from expectations and one for push from the source, giving us Figure
3.11. Interpretation is about making invariant expectation meet with source data within each
level, and producing a coherent interpretation that fits for all layers.
This meeting point in the middle of push and pull can be characterised by an example of a
crossword. The letters on the page are a push from what is there and where the gaps are. At
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Figure 3.11: Layers in the agent with push and pull of interpretation
the same time the conceptual pull from the clue is sending feedback down the network. Where
the two meet, the network settles and an interpretation has been reached.
Figure 3.12 shows where the two types of expectation occur during interpretation. COE expec-
tations are the link from a source at time t to a source at time t′. SOA expectations are the link
between layers during interpretation. The process of producing interpreted data and propagat-
ing expectations continues to occur until an interpretation is settled upon. The Necker Cube,
Figure 3.13, is commonly described as a Gestalt phenomenon, where the image spontaneously
changes from one interpretation to another as the viewer looks at it based upon a switch of
foreground and background. This framework of pull from expectations fits well with this kind
of phenomenon, as if both interpretations are equally able to be pulled then interpretation can
continue to switch between them.
What situatedness makes explicit is the challenge of creating agents that have a situation that
changes based upon its experiences. By giving it a name - the situation - we are now able to
talk about how it is that agents change their situation during interaction with the world. So,
for example, there are many models in which the concepts of an agent change (e.g. Fisher and
Pazzani 1991, Butz 2002) and there are models in which concepts have a means of affecting each
other (e.g. French 1995) but there is a scarcity of models in which: (i) the concepts affect each
other; (ii) the way that the concepts affect each other changes; and (iii) the way that this changes
is driven by the agent’s experiences. As Gero and Smith (2007) describe it, a situated agent has
the behaviour of ‘that which determines situations changes how that which determines notions
does so’.
We can now specify the processes occurring in each layer during interpretation:
• Interpretation in sensation is the construction of senscepts using expectations of sen-
sation through push-pull from an external source, Equation 3.12
IS : De
Es
S (3.12)
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description source sensation perception conception situation
I at t DE IS IP IC IS
expectations Ecoe(S) Ecoe(P ) Ecoe(C) Ecoe(S)
production of I DE IS IP IC IS
expectations Esoa(S) Esoa(P ) Esoa(C) Esoa(S)
production of I DE IS IP IC IS
expectations Esoa(S) Esoa(P ) Esoa(C) Esoa(S)
production of I DE IS IP IC IS
...
...
...
...
...
...
I at t′ DE IS IP IC IS
Figure 3.12: The production of expectations as a part of interpretation. The feedback
through the propagation of expectations from layers of higher abstraction to layers of lower
abstraction can lead to the situation indirectly affecting the expectations of sensation. The
process of producing interpreted data and propagating expectations continues to occur until
an interpretation is settled upon.
Figure 3.13: The Necker cube has two obvious interpretations in three dimensions. Over
time our perception of the figure spontaneously reverses from one interpretation to the other
(Frith and Dolan 1997)
• Interpretation in perception is the construction of percepts using expectations of per-
ception through push-pull from a source of senscepts, Equation 3.13. This is followed by
an update of the expectations of sensation so that the expected senscepts are the senscepts
that would create these percepts (according to perception), Equation 3.14, where the arrow
denotes a conversion from interpreted percepts to expected senscepts that would produce
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these through a query of memory.
IP : DS
EP
P (3.13)
ES = IP → Sex (3.14)
• Interpretation in conception is the construction of concepts using expectations of con-
ception through push-pull from a source of percepts, Equation 3.15. This is followed by
an update of the expectations of perception so that the expected percepts are the percepts
that would create these concepts (according to conception), Equation 3.16.
IC : DP
EC
C (3.15)
EP = IC → Pex (3.16)
• Interpretation in situation is the construction of a situation using expectations of
situation through push-pull from a source of concepts, Equation 3.17. Situation differs
from the other processes in that expectations for all other processes originated in situation,
whereas situation gets its expectations from modifications of the situation or from a change
in situation where the current situation does not work. This is followed by an update of
the expectations of conception so that the expected concepts are the concepts that would
create this situation (according to situation), Equation 3.18.
IS : DC
Es
s (3.17)
EC = Is → Cex (3.18)
Interpretation is then the result of all four of these layers producing interpreted data and propa-
gating expectations back down to lower layers. This produces a dynamic system, as the output
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from one layer is the input of the next, Equation 3.19:
I : De
Es
S
Ep
P
Ec
C
Es
s (3.19)
If the system has useful expectations then the system moves towards a state where both the
expectations are a good fit with the data.
3.4 Effect of constructive interpretation upon conceptual
design
This description of constructive interpretation within a situated framework provides a process
by which an agent organises and navigates through its own knowledge through the conversation
of design.
The seeing-moving-seeing of conceptual designing can be represented as Equation 3.20. A set of
interpreted data is being used to take some action A upon the environment, which then becomes
the source for interpretation. Through constructive interpretation a new set of interpreted data
I ′ is produced.
I
A
 De
E
I ′
A′
 D′e
E
′
I ′′ (3.20)
Within a situation there is a great deal of tacit knowledge as a result of expectations propagating
from higher layers of abstraction to lower layers of abstraction. Designers make unexpected
discoveries within their sketches. One place that these discoveries may come from are these
implicit expectations, through constructive interpretation from what is available in the design
medium.
To put this another way, in the protocol studies in Section 2.1.1 designers said what they were
doing as (or after) they designed. Through unexpected discovery a designer creates new goals
for the design task. The hypothesis is that these discoveries come from expectations that the
designer is not explicitly aware that they even had until interpretation of the design medium
triggered it. This hypothesis suggests two areas of enquiry: (i) to describe the process by which
this triggering of implicit expectations occurs (constructive interpretation) ; and (ii) to describe
the way that knowledge is developed to understand why a designer might have some expectations
and not others.
In the early stages of conceptual design, a designer frequently reinterprets their own work.
Constructive interpretation can affect the situation in the ways seen in Figure 3.14. The phe-
nomenon described of constructing from an implicit expectation can make implicit concepts
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explicit, changing the designer’s conception of what they are doing. This is typically a case
of (3), an enlarged situation (i.e. a situation that is the same as the previous situation but
arises from more concepts; takes up a larger region in conceptual space), or (4), a change to the
situation with intersection. Within each of these changes to the situation, change can occur at
the level of conception, perception or sensation. A different situation without intersection, (5),
typically only occurs when the situation itself changes, when at the highest level of abstraction
the system can no longer construct from what is expected and push occurs.
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Figure 3.14: The situation before interpretation (solid circle) and after interpretation (dotted
circle) can be different in five ways: (1) unchanged; (2) reduced; (3) enlarged; (4) different
with intersection; and (5) different without intersection
One characterisation of design activity is the search within a space of possibilities, e.g. optimiza-
tion. In conceptual design, this space of possible designs changes. Each of the changes to the
situation described entails a change to the space of possible designs. In the case of a senscept
or a percept changing, this may be a small change to the space of possible designs. In the case
of a situation changing, it may open up an entirely different space of possible designs. Within
a situated framework a designer organises and attends to the knowledge that they have in dif-
ferent ways in order to produce different spaces of design. Constructive interpretation describes
a means by which this change of situation can occur in a fluid way that fits well with what is
observed in designers.
The situation includes both explicit and implicit knowledge. During the early stages of concep-
tual design designers change their situation frequently. The knowledge that is being explored is
implicit because: (i) the agent is not aware of its own expectations; and (ii) the construction
of an interpretation depends upon what is available to be pulled from the environment. The
implicit knowledge in the situation manifests itself through the interaction between agent and
environment.
Implicit expectations arise from explicit notions in two ways, Figure 3.15: (i) some concepts are
related to explicit concepts through similarity (e.g. inhabiting a region that is nearby in concep-
tual space); and (ii) some concepts are related to explicit concept through a semantic relationship
(via SOA expectations from a higher level of abstraction). In constructing interpretations from
expectations, some interpretations will be more interesting to the designer than others.
There are two sides to constructive interpretation. On one hand it is a model of how a system
changes in response to unexpected events, by changing expectations or by learning. On the other
it is a model of how a system explores implicit expectations in a situation. These two sides are at
odds in the sense that one is concerned with maintaining stability where possible and the other
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is concerned with a way to break out of fixation. Constructive interpretation helps to explain
both of these but they are difficult to reconcile within the one model.
One possible way to achieve this is through the notion of curiosity. Designers appear to be more
open to ‘novel’ interpretations at some times than at others, a switch between divergent and
specific exploration (Berlyne 1971). One guide to how interested the designer might be in its
implicit expectations is curiosity, how interested (or bored) a designer is with its current explicit
concepts (Saunders 2004). The suggestion of curious design is that in conceptual design designers
want to maintain notions that are novel but not too novel. The Wundt curve, Figure 3.16
(Saunders 2000 after Berlyne 1971), is a graphical representation of this desire for a certain level
of novelty, plotted as a line that combines the hedonic reward from novelty and the punishment
from excessive complexity. The effect is that novelty peaks at a certain point after which the
reward drops away. This provides a potential guide for how interested a designer is in their
implicit expectations.
Legend
explicit
concept
implicit
expectation
semantic
relationship
Figure 3.15: Explicit knowledge held by the agent has implicit expectations based upon
semantic relationships
Figure 3.16: The Wundt Curve (Saunders 2004 after Berlyne 1971) shows the relationship
between hedonic reward and novelty. There is a peak after which point the punishment from
excessive novelty overcomes the initial reward from novelty.
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It has been established that interpretations are constructed from the internal world of the de-
signer. And the phenomena have been observed of designers making leaps of insight, where their
explicit notion of what they are doing changes. A hypothesis has been made that these unex-
pected discoveries ought to come about through the triggering of implicit expectations. This
work has outlined some of the ways that implicit connections become established - within differ-
ent layers of hierarchy, through connections via more abstract layers, as well as through similarity
within conceptual space. The focus of this work is upon how these implicit expectations are used
during designing through interpretation.
3.5 Summary
This Chapter has outlined a conceptual model for constructive interpretation that is built upon
the notions of push and pull. A four-layered system has been used to show the effects of push
and pull occurring at different layers within a hierarchy of abstraction. Within this hierarchy
expectations are passed to layers of lower abstraction and interpreted data is passed upwards.
Pull occurs when a layer can construct from expectations and push when it cannot. Situation is
described as the topmost layer in this hierarchy, at which point there is no higher layer to push
to. Situation is required to either change to another situation or to learn from the source.
Expectations have been described as relating to the course of events (chronological sequences)
and the state of affairs (the links between layers of abstraction). Through the nature of ab-
straction, more expectations are passed downwards than there is data passed upwards. This
results in implicit expectations, that only become activated when they are used in constructing
an interpretation.
Implicit expectations are described as a basis for changes to the situation, leading to changes in
the space of possible designs. This description leads to a tension between the two modes of con-
structive interpretation: (i) maintaining a stable situation until it proves unusable, in which case
changing it; and (ii) attending to interesting constructions from implicit expectations. Curiosity
has been described as one possible control over these two modes of constructive interpretation.
Through push and pull a system produces an interpretation that is relevant to its current view
of the world, that fits with its current situation. Constructive interpretation can lead to changes
in this view of the world through either an inability to explain what is coming into the system
or an interest in the construction that it has made.
Chapter 4
Computational Framework
This Chapter moves from a conceptual model of constructive interpretation to a computational
framework. It commences with a framework in which the notion of conceptual spaces is extended
to include situations. This is explored through a thought experiment in which a blindfolded
subject interprets objects from a bag. The framework is further developed through a focus upon
the processes occurring within each layer and the relationship between layers. The Chapter
maintains an abstract description of how to compute constructive interpretation which will then
be demonstrated with concrete examples in Chapters 5 and 6.
4.1 Extending conceptual spaces
A symbolic description of constructive interpretation (CI) can now be articulated as interpreta-
tion through push-pull within the conceptual spaces framework. Section 2.3.3 describes the orig-
inal conceptual spaces framework (Ga¨rdenfors 2000). The original framework includes salience
weighting as an effect that distorts conceptual space depending upon the salience of domains.
This effect is described, Section 4.1.1, and the framework extended, to show how salience affects
the use of concepts within a situation, Section 4.1.2.
A situation guides both: (i) which concepts are used; and (ii) how these concepts are used. The
way that a concept is used is changed by the other concepts being used. Some concepts are
more important to a situation than others. Some domains are more important to one concept
than they are to other concepts. The effect of this is that the expectations within the situation
distort conceptual space. There are many ways in which this could potentially be done. The
extension of conceptual spaces described here is one possible implementation that fits with CI.
It should be taken as indicative rather than prescriptive of the effects of situation and pull from
expectations.
Conceptual spaces as a theory describes the way that abstraction from experiences results in
concepts. A concept is a convergence zone that brings together regions in perceptual domains.
The description of conceptual spaces (Ga¨rdenfors 2000) includes the way that the geometry of
56
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a domains are changed by the concepts that are being used. What the framework does not do
is describe the way that concepts themselves are co-ordinated by a situation. This Section uses
Ga¨rdenfors’ (2000) notion of domain salience as a starting point for extending the framework. It
applies a similar principle to represent the way that situations change the geometry of the space
occupied by a set of concepts.
4.1.1 Salience of dimensions
Within a concept, dimensions can be scaled on the basis that some dimensions are more salient
within a concept than others. Goldstone (1994) suggests that dimension x is more sensitised
when categorisation depends only on dimension x than when it depends on both dimensions x
and y. In other words, it is not simply that concepts bring together dimensions within domains
to create a concept, but that the categorisation is more sensitive to some of these dimensions
than others. The asymmetry of similarity is an indicator of this (Tversky 1977). For example,
people say that Tel Aviv is more like New York than New York is like Tel Aviv (Ga¨rdenfors
2000). Following on from Goldstone we can suggest that this is because some of the dimensions1
that are used to categorise Tel Aviv also apply to New York, whilst the dimensions that are
used to classify New York are not held by Tel Aviv. The point of the example is that despite all
concepts being based upon similar dimensions, a concept will be more sensitive to some of these
dimensions than to others, and a good indicator of this is the spread of exemplars within that
dimension. For example, the number of sides is a very sensitive dimension in the concept of a
square.
This is represented in the conceptual spaces framework as a distortion of measurements in the
space through the scaling of a dimension based upon salience. When a dimension is more
salient within a concept (i.e. more important to that concept) then it causes the dimension to
be scaled. This is achieved by measuring distance within the space as a weighted Minkowski
metric, Equation 4.1, where a higher degree of salience corresponds to a higher weighting. The
result is that the same dimensions are used differently within different concepts.
dE(x, y) = k
√∑
i
wi|xi − yi|
k
(4.1)
In this way dimensional scaling distorts the way that measurements within the conceptual space
are carried out, and, because similarity is based upon distance within the space, can change the
way that a source is interpreted. Figure 4.1 shows an example of three concepts in conceptual
space before and after dimensional scaling. The conceptual space has been partitioned using
Voronoi tessellation to indicate which regions of the space are associated with each concept
(Ga¨rdenfors 2000). In the partitioning of space before scaling, the point q would be interpreted
as an example of the concept at p1. However, if the x dimension is scaled due to a greater salience
1The term dimension is used to denote that this is a variable but this is not the same as a perceptual dimension
as described by Ga¨rdenfors (2000)
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than the y dimension then it leads to a different partitioning of space, such that the same point
q would now be classified as an example of the concept defined by p3.
y y
x x
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q q
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1
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2
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3
Figure 4.1: The effect of different dimensions being more salient within a concept is shown by
the way that the point q is classified as an example of p1 before salience changes the weighting
of dimension x and p3 after weighting has taken place.
This example shows the way that salience weighting of dimensions can change the result of inter-
pretation. Some dimensions are more important than others when using a concept. Knowledge
from experience, of some domains being more important than others, can be captured by assign-
ing a weight to each of the perceptual regions being brought together by a concept, Equation
4.2. These weights are then used in establishing similarity within conceptual spaces using the
weighted Minkowski metric.
c = {p1w1, p2w2, ..., piwj} (4.2)
4.1.2 Situational effects
A similar effect is seen in the relationship between situation and conception. A situation brings
a number of concepts together, some of which will be more salient than others. The examples
provided in Chapter 3 suggest that this salience of concepts ought to affect the distortion of the
conceptual space. Concepts change the way that other concepts are used. This is done through
the salience of concepts within a situation.
Some concepts are more important to the situation than others. For example, in a situation of
designing a house, the concept of a house is particularly salient. The salience of concepts within
a situation can be captured by assigning a weight to each of the connections to concepts from
the situation, Equation 4.3:
s = {c1w1, c2w2, ..., ciwj} (4.3)
The effect of salience is the warping of conceptual space, such as that seen within Figure 4.1, for
all of the concepts being used. Multiple concepts within the situation distort the space in different
ways. An example is the way that one might have the colour domain salient (e.g. classifying a
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highlighter) whilst another might have the shape domain salient (e.g. classifying a square).
When multiple concepts are brought together within a situation these effects are combined
according to how salient the concept is within the situation. The same concept then comes to
be used differently within different situations. This demonstrates the way that expectations are
constructed from memory within a situation.
An example of the way that salience is calculated can be seen in Figure 4.2 where there are four
concepts within a situation and a conceptual space made up of two perceptual domains. Each
of the perceptual domains is scaled within this situation by using a formula where the weighting
of each percept is multiplied by the weighting of each concept, given by Equations 4.4 and 4.5.
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Figure 4.2: The salience of concepts within the situation changes the salience of perceptual
domains. There is a cumulative effect of all concepts within the situation effecting each other.
p1 = c1w1 ∗ p1w1 + c2w1 ∗ p1w2 + c3w1 ∗ p1w3 (4.4)
p2 = c2w1 ∗ p2w1 + c3w1 ∗ p2w2 + c4w1 ∗ p2w3 (4.5)
One of the effects of situating concepts in this way is that inferences can be made that come
from the situation. Consider a lady that lives in a pink house, with a pink carpet, and a pink
dog. She wears pink glasses, buys pink roses and eats only pink foods, such as salmon and fairy
floss. She drives a pink car, wears pink clothes and has her nails painted pink. If I were to ask
you “what colour is the keyboard on her computer?” it would not be unreasonable for you to
answer that you expect her keyboard to be pink; even if all of your previous experiences with
keyboards have shown them to be only black, white or beige in colour.
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In terms of the framework, the situation has been constructed such that certain regions within
the perceptual space are extremely strongly weighted. If a nonsense concept were used, about
which you had no experience, such as a figgledegoop, and you were asked what colour the
lady’s figgledegoop was, it would not be unreasonable to induce that this too would be pink.
Whilst the example itself might be trivial, the point is that the situation has provided a basis for
knowing something about the concept figgledegoop even though you have had no experience
with this concept whatsoever. This has occurred because of the salience of colour within the
situation.
4.1.3 Conceptual design in conceptual spaces
The framework adds to our picture of how a designer navigates the implicit knowledge within
the situation. There are two sides to this framework for constructive interpretation in that: (i)
expectations are constructed from memories within a situation2; and (ii) an interpretation is
constructed through push-pull between layers at different levels of abstraction. A hand-worked
example of how both of these can be computed within this framework have been described.
The framework provides a model for understanding the way that designers explore their own
knowledge. Designers engaged in design activity change their notion of what they are doing
whilst designing. The framework suggests that in doing this designers are exploring the meeting
point of a source (the design medium) and a situation, where the early stages of conceptual
design are more focussed upon the implicit parts of this situation.
4.2 Construction of expectations and interpretations
In this Section a thought experiment is described to demonstrates the effects of constructive
interpretation using the extended conceptual spaces framework.
In the experiment, a person, the subject, has been blindfolded and is given the task of using
their sense of touch to identify objects. The objects are contained within a bag and the subject
removes them one by one. As they remove each object they attempt to identify it through the
sense of touch. The bags that are used in the experiment belong to university students and are
randomly selected. Each time the subject is presented with a bag they are told which university
faculty owner of the bag is studying in, e.g. medicine or computing. After they have interpreted
each object in the bag the blindfold is removed and all objects are shown to the subject with
labels.
The experiment serves a number of purposes: (i) to work through a hypothetical example in
detail to see the effects of constructive interpretation through explanation; (ii) to model the way
that expectations are developed using the extended conceptual spaces framework; and (iii) to
observe an interpretation being constructed through push-pull within the different layers.
2Situations, as the topmost layer, are a different kind of ’memory’ to which this description does not apply
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4.2.1 Describing some cases
When the subject is presented with the first bag in the experiment they might not know what to
expect. Let us assume that the subject has no experience with university students at all. They
interpret the objects that they find as best as possible. Perhaps they are quite likely to say “I
don’t know what this is” to a number of objects. Identifying, say, a computer mouse, by touch
is difficult the first time.
However, over time, as the subject is given more bags to identify, they start to learn which kinds
of objects are found within each different faculty. They start to learn the different situations
that are appropriate for the tasks.
Within this experience we can observe a number of things. Even before the subject reaches into
the bag, as soon as they are told the faculty of the student that owns the bag, they start to
construct a number of expectations. These expectations then change the act of interpreting the
objects.
The same object being touched in the same way might result in different a interpretation from
the subject through expectations. For example, a long cable feels like the cable of a stethoscope
in the bag of a medicine student and a power cord in the bag of a computer science student.
4.2.2 Constructing expectations
The perceptual domains used to construct a conceptual space are texture and shape. Texture
is made up from the dimensions of roughness, hardness and stickiness (Yoshiokai et al 2007).
Shape is made up of size, roundness and complexity. The point of identifying these domains is
that as the subject runs their hands over an object, the sense data that is being pushed and
pulled are in these dimensions.
As the subject touches each object we can observe that: (i) the perceptions vary as their hands
move across the object, e.g. are rough in some places and smooth in others; meaning that (ii)
interpretation of an object is something that occurs across time.
An extended conceptual spaces model suggests a view of concepts as prototypes within a con-
ceptual space that bring together regions in perceptual space. Figure 4.3 gives an example of
an idealised knowledge structure that might arise in the subject during the experiment. The
two boxes represent the perceptual domain, where each has three dimensions. Each concept
references at least one region within each domain from where touch has occurred.
The point of the model is that prior to interpretation the situation constructs expectations. From
Equation 4.4 and 4.5 each perceptual domain takes on a different geometry within a different
situation, similar to the way that the Voronoi tessellation repartitioned the space in Figure 4.1.
The principal things that this framework for constructing from expectations shows are that:
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• The salience of perceptual domains is affected by the importance of concepts within situ-
ation and the domain within concepts. A change in salience changes the geometry of the
space, affecting all similarity measures that occur within it
• The specific regions that are activated within a space become attractors within that space.
It is these attractors that represent the pull from expectations. For example, in Figure 4.3
an IT student’s bag typically has only a laptop and a mouse in it. In the conceptual layer
these would be the only two attractors attempting to pull.
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Figure 4.3: An idealised view of the kind of knowledge structure developed through concep-
tual spaces. The two domains of texture and shape are the basis for object concepts through
invariance over perception. These concepts then become the basis for situations which co-
ordinate the concepts.
4.2.3 Push-pull from expectations
How then does push-pull construct an interpretation from these expectations? There are many
mathematical models that could be used to implement this process, but one that is a good fit
with the description is to implement pull as energy minimisation (Koenig 1998). This can be
visualised as a landscape within which each attractor is a valley. The source data defines where
a ball is dropped into this landscape. The ball rolls until it stops moving. In this way the system
arrives at a state where the energy in the system is minimised. An example of this is shown
in two-dimensions, Figure 4.4, where the landscape is set up with a basin (or attractor) which
Computational Framework 63
represents a specific expectation (a prototype in the perceptual domain, e.g. a specific texture
or a specific shape).
(a) (b)
Figure 4.4: Energy minimisation in a two-dimensional environment where: (a) the ball
represents data from the source and the basin represents the distortion of the landscape by an
attractor; and (b) the system in a state of minimum energy.
Multiple attractors lead to more complex landscapes, where the size of the basin is determined
by the weighting on the attractor. This can produce some non-intuitive results, such as in Figure
4.5, where the ball can end up in a state of minimum energy that is a local minimum rather
than a global minimum.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.5: Energy minimisation in a two-dimensional environment where: (a) the ball
represents data from the source and the basin represents the distortion of the landscape by
an attractor; and (b) the system in a state of minimum energy which happens to be a local
minimum.
This represents pull from expectations within the model and the way that source data is changed
during construction. Push in the model occurs when the ball doesn’t move - when there are no
attractors sufficiently close or influential to perturb it. In this case the data is pushed into the
next layer of abstraction.
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4.2.3.1 Implementing extended conceptual spaces
Rather than continue down the path of energy minimisation systems, the rest of this Chap-
ter looks towards the way that multiple layers work together to create the effects of push-pull
required for constructive interpretation. In Chapters 5 and 6 self-organising maps (SOMs or
Kohonen networks (Kohonen 1990)) are used to implement CI. Ga¨rdenfors (2000) suggests that
this technology fits well with the dimensional reduction required for conceptual spaces and pro-
vides examples of their use for push-only interpretation. SOMs lend themselves to modification
of the type required by CI as they have the stability required for making a multilayer system
and allow control over individual nodes to implement expectation within each layer.
Initial experiments towards implementation of push-pull through energy minimisation were car-
ried out using a physics simulation package with a Runge-Kutta integrator. Prototypes exerted
a force upon source data, potentially causing them to move. Through the addition of forces,
situational effects can be observed. Future work could be carried out in this direction by modi-
fying Hopfield networks (Hopfield 1982), networks that exhibit push-only interpretation through
energy minimisation. Experiments using touch, such as interpreting objects in a bag, could be
further explored with a haptic system for sensation such as a robotic arm (Ziemke 2001).
4.3 A framework for a constructive interpretation system
This Section develops a framework from the conceptual model that focuses upon the development
of knowledge through experience. The ideas are drawn from a number of existing frameworks
and cognitive theories (Gero and Smith 2009, Hawkins 2004, Gero and Fujii 2000, Ga¨rdenfors
2000 and Barsalou 1999).
A computational framework for CI is developed using these ideas in which: (i) expectations are
grounded in experiences; (ii) learning occurs within situations; (iii) construction of expectations
occurs within situations; and (iv) constrction of an interpretation from expectations occurs
through push and pull. The purpose of this Section is to describe the entire framework as
a consistent whole. Whilst the framework is not implemented in its entirety in this thesis,
Chapters 5 and 6 contain implementations that use the framework, focussing upon particular
parts of it.
The description of the framework in this Section is as a loosely wired hierarchy of layers. There
are no limits upon the number of possible layers and layers can be put together in many ways
and still lead to a system that constructively interprets. This description of the framework looks
at what happens within each layer as well as how the layers are put together. Some of the
examples refer to the four layers of sensation, perception, conception and situation as indicators
of what is occurring.
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4.3.1 Conceptual space: prototypes as vectors
Within a layer each prototype can be described as a vector v with features f , Equation 4.6.
Section 2.3.3.1 gave examples of the way that the dimensions in the sensation layer are brought
together to create dimensions of percepts in the perceptual layer. The description of a prototype
as a vector maps onto this description, with each sensory dimension becoming one of the features
of perception, Equation 4.7. In a similar way, concepts bring together percepts, Equation 4.8.
Finally, situations bring together concepts, still represented as a vector, Equation 4.9.
v = {f1, f2, f3, ..., fn} (4.6)
p = {s1, s2, s3, ..., sn} (4.7)
c = {p1, p2, p3, ..., pn} (4.8)
s = {c1, c2, c3, ..., cn} (4.9)
This provides a description of a hierarchy of layers in which a higher layer has more features con-
tained within each vector in the layer. The presence of multiple layers distributes the abstraction
that is occurring. For example, percepts bring together senscepts that occur together in per-
ceptual domains, such as dimensions of hue, chromaticity and brightness which occur together
to create colour (Ga¨rdenfors 2000). With multiple layers there is abstraction at the perceptual
level (resulting in a subset of recognisable colours) as well as at higher levels, e.g. some birds
are robins and some are not.
Not all prototypes are equal. For example, a prototype can represent a thousand different
instances and a prototype can represent a single instance. A way of representing this difference
is for each prototype to have some indicator of coverage included in its vector based upon the
standard deviation of vectors that it represents (Ga¨rdenfors 2000). Representation of coverage
is not implemented in this thesis.
4.3.2 Representing expectations within each vector
Within a layer each prototype has been described as a vector. Expectation is represented in the
system by creating another feature within each vector for expectation fe. At its simplest this
feature can be boolean such that each vector is either expected or unexpected, Equation 4.11. A
more complex model could include degrees of expectation as a weighting rather than a boolean.
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The addition of an expectation feature to each vector results in a modified equation for each
vector of Equation 4.10.
v = {f1, f2, f3, ..., fn, fe} (4.10)
The set of explicit expectations in a layer can be represented as the set of all vectors that are
currently expected, Equation 4.11.
E = {v : fe = 1} (4.11)
4.3.3 Abstraction
Abstraction in the model is defined as the production of summary representations where a single
vector comes to represent multiple vectors. This can be achieved in two ways: (i) abstraction
through clustering of vectors; and (ii) abstraction through dimensional reduction of vectors.
An example of the first is K-means clustering (MacQueen 1967), in which a number of observa-
tions (in this case vectors from the layer below) are partitioned into a smaller number of clusters.
The centre of each cluster can then be used as a summary representation over all vectors in that
cluster. Figure 4.6(a) gives an example of the result of this kind of abstraction.
An example of the second is dimensional reduction through multi-dimensional scaling (Cox and
Cox 2001). Figure 4.6(b) gives an idealised example of the result of this type of abstraction.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.6: The two types of abstraction are used to create a summary representation: (a)
approximation within conceptual space, where greyscale indicates weighting, with the number
of vector features maintained; and (b) where the resolution in the abstraction is reduced by
reducing the number of vector features.
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Abstraction type (i) as seen in Figure 4.6(a) leads to a reduction of the number of vectors such
that the more abstract layer has fewer vectors with the same number of features in each vector.
Abstraction type (ii) as seen in Figure 4.6(b) leads to a reduction in the number of vectors as
well as a reduction of the number of features in each vector.
4.3.4 Structuring: relationships between layers
The description has so far described each layer as a collection of vectors. Each vector is a
prototype that represents some kind of abstraction from the layer below. There are two types of
relationship between layers: (a) abstraction over a single layer as a source; and (b) abstraction
over multiple layers as a source with structuring. The difference between the two is that (b)
brings together multiple sources during abstraction.
Computationally, in relationship (a) the higher layer of abstraction holds fewer prototypes. This
is the nature of a knowledge hierarchy, that the higher layers hold fewer members. For example,
in biological taxonomy there are more Families than there are Orders. Knowing the Order of
a particular animal provides less information about it that knowing the Family, but the trade
off is more stability. Figure 4.7 shows an example of relationship (a) as two connected layers.
The higher layer X is smaller, in that there are fewer prototypes, and each prototype is linked
to multiple prototypes in the lower layer Y.
X
Y
Figure 4.7: An example of relationship (a) where the higher layer X holds summary repre-
sentations over sources from the lower layer Y. Lines are drawn to show linking of a single
prototype in X to multiple prototypes in Y.
Relationship (b) differs from (a) in that structuring is occurring. In the conceptual framework:
multiple senscepts are given structure in a single percept; multiple percepts are given structure
in a single concept; and multiple concepts are given structure in a single situation. For example,
a square, is made up of multiple lines. In this example line might be a percept in some
cases and a concept in others. The labelling is not so important as the fact that the square is
bringing together multiple lines.
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In relationship (b) the abstraction is over the structured combination of representations from a
lower level. There is a combination occurring, which means that there may be more prototypes
in the higher layer than in the lower layer. Figure 4.8 shows an example of relationship (b) where
layer X is bringing together sources from four places in layer Y. Figure 4.8 could be an example
of conception creating abstractions over structured data from four perceptors.
For example, in Figure 4.8, Y can be said to be made up of four parts, Y1, Y2, Y3 and Y4. One
way that X could be structuring these parts is in exactly this order as: Y1, Y2, Y3 and Y4. Yet
it could also structure them in 23 other different ways, e.g. as Y4, Y2, Y1 and Y3.
X
Y
Figure 4.8: An example of relationship (b) where the higher layer X holds summary repre-
sentations over structured sources from the lower layer Y.
In the implementations described in Chapters 5 and 6 there is a limitation in that only a single
method for structuring data is ever used: percepts are always put together in the same way in
conception, and concepts are always put together in the same way in situation. There are many
possible ways this data could be structured3. The structuring of concepts into concept schemata
is a well known, difficult problem (Barsalou 1999, Barsalou 2005b), that lies outside the scope
of this thesis.
4.3.5 Possible hierarchies through abstraction and structuring
The description has provided: (i) a model of layers as a collection of prototypes; (ii) two types of
abstraction; and (iii) two types of relationship between layers. The point of the framework is not
to prescribe any single hierarchy with any one type of abstraction or one type of relationship.
Figure 4.9 shows three possible ways of structuring a hierarchy given this framework where: (i)
there is no structuring; (ii) there is structuring in every layer; and (iii) a combination of the two.
3A detailed description of some methods for structuring and how they can be learnt are given by Barsa-
lou (1999). Ga¨rdenfors (2000) gives some suggestions for mathematically representing both structures and the
behaviours within a structure, such as the rate of change when a person is walking.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.9: Three types of hierarchy: (a) structuring at some layers; (b) abstraction with no
structuring; (c) structuring at all layers.
4.3.6 The processes carried out within each layer
The description so far has outlined the way that layers are structured and prototypes as vectors
within each layer. This Section adds a description of what is occurring within each layer that
allows for CI to occur. Each layer in the framework (with the exception of the topmost and
lowermost most layers) carries out five processes of:
1. Constructing from expectations using the source: The layer attempts to construct
interpreted data from the source using expectations. Whether or not pull can occur is
based upon a similarity measure within conceptual space that has been weighted within
the situation.
2. Pushing a source that cannot be constructed: Where no construction from expec-
tations has been possible from a source then the layer produces interpreted data through
push, where no construction occurs and the source is made available to the layer above.
3. Learning when required: The system can create mismatches at any layer of abstraction,
where neither the expectations nor the source are changing. This results learning where
either a new prototype is created or an existing prototype is updated.
4. Constructing a link to a prototype in the layer below: When an expected proto-
type is used to construct from a source in the layer below a connection is made between
the prototypes in each layer. This results in the development of SOA expectations from
prototypes in different layers of abstraction that experience shows are used at the same
time.
5. Updating expectations of the lower layer: Whenever expectations in a layer change,
the expectations of the lower layer are updated based upon SOA expectations.
4.3.6.1 Construction from expectations using the source
A layer holds expectations prior to interpretation. Pull attempts to construct from these expec-
tations using the source. Throughout Chapter 3 there is a reference to ‘being able to pull’. This
is determined by a threshold of similarity within weighted conceptual space.
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A variable of minimum similarity for pull within each layer determines this threshold. It is
hypothesised that this threshold needs a basis. One suggestion is a function of the standard de-
viation of prototypes within the layer. Each prototype is a vector that can represent a data point.
A greater spread of prototypes indicates that pull ought to be less sensitive (after Ga¨rdenfors
2000).
Let the similarity between two elements a and b be denoted as ζ(a, b). Construction from
expectations operates with a source element d, an expectation e and the minimum pull from
similarity variable, φ. Construction occurs when Equation 4.12 is satisfied.
ζ(d, e) ≥ φ (4.12)
There is typically a set of expectations E within a layer when attempting to construct from
a source. The process of construction from expectations is a search within this set for an
expectation that satisfies Equation 4.12. If such a construction can occur then the sentence
given by Equation 4.13 holds true, otherwise it is false, referred to as Φ (in the absence of
construction either a change of expectations or learning occurs).
Φ = ∃e ∈ E • ζ(d, e) ≥ φ (4.13)
Figure 4.10 shows two scenarios where an explicit expectation is attempting to construct from a
source D. In Figure 4.10(a) the source lies outside the radius implied by φ and no construction
can occur. In Figure 4.10(b) the source lies inside the radius and construction can occur.
φ
D
φD
(a) (b)
Figure 4.10: A graphical representation of two scenarios in which an explicit expectation is
trying to construct from a source D represented in two dimensions isometrically where: (a)
the source lies outside the radius implied by φ and no construction can occur; and (b) the
source lies inside the radius implied by φ and construction can occur.
4.3.6.2 Push from a source that cannot be constructed
Push occurs when Equation 4.13 is evaluated as false. Push takes the source (from the layer
below) and presents it (to the layer above) as interpreted data. This is a vector with the same
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number of features as a prototype within the layer. In this way push allows a layer that has
inadequate expectations to pass data into the layer above. This may result in the layer above
changing the current layer’s expectations so that pull can occur.
4.3.6.3 Learning when required
This conceptual model of constructive interpretation requires learning from experience within
a situation. Learning is a result of experience. A situated agent holds expectations prior to
interpreting. Any learning that occurs does so within this view of the world. The same experience
within a different situation can result in different learning occurring.
There are three ways in which prototypes change within a layer and hence learning occurs: (i) a
prototype can change its location within conceptual space; (ii) a new prototype can be created;
and (iii) a prototype can be ‘forgotten’.
Learning occurs when triggered by the layer of higher abstraction. A layer triggers learning in
the layer below it when there is a mismatch because: (i) it cannot construct through pull from
its expectations; and (ii) the expectations of the layer above it are not changing when it pushes
from the source. Connections between layers are created when a layer of higher abstraction
successfully pulls from a layer of lower abstraction.
This can be formalised to say that learning occurs when Equation 4.13 is false at time t and
time t‘ (where t‘ represents an arbitrary point further in time that t) as well as the set of
expectations remaining unchanged between t and t‘. These are represented by Equations 4.14
and 4.15 respectively.
Et = Et‘ (4.14)
Φt = Φt‘ = ⊥ (4.15)
This describes the kind of mismatch found in circumstances where: (i) the layers below are unable
to construct from expectations; and (ii) the layers above are able to construct from expectations.
Through learning a prototype is either changed or created such that pull (Equation 4.12) is
satisfied.
A graphical example of the two types of learning within a layer is shown in Figure 4.11. Figure
4.10(a) provides an illustration of the layer prior to learning occurring. In Figure 4.11(a) a new
prototype has been created at the location of the source. In Figure 4.11(b) a prototype has been
updated based upon the location of the source.
The learning in the model is situated in that it is dependant upon the expectations of the system
at the time that learning is occurring. A prototype can come to be updated even if it is not the
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.11: Two examples of learning within a layer when triggered by a higher layer: (a)
the creation of a new prototype; and (b) updating a prototype.
best match for the source if it is an explicit expectation. In order to illustrate the point, consider
somebody encountering a platypus for the first time. If they are expecting a mammal (perhaps
because they are in the mammal section in a zoo) then they learn it as a new type of mammal.
But if they were in a bird enclosure and expecting to see a bird then they would learn it as a
new type of bird. This shows that learning dependent upon expectations. In both cases the
platypus is a new instance, but the concept for which a new instance is being learnt is different
in the two cases.
4.3.6.4 Construct a link to the layer below (learn SOA expectations)
When an expected prototype is used to construct from a source in the layer below, a connection is
made between the prototypes in each layer. This results in the development of SOA expectations
from prototypes in different layers of abstraction that experience shows are used at the same
time.
For example, Figure 4.12 shows two layers with connections between them. These connections
arose when the prototypes in layer X were used to construct from a source that was a prototype
in Y.
4.3.6.5 Updating expectations of the lower layer
Whenever the expectations of a layer are changed, the expectations of the lower layer are up-
dated based upon the SOA expectations that have been constructed through experience (Section
4.3.6.4).
Let the current layer be X and the layer of lower abstraction be Y. Two things can occur in X to
affect the expectations of Y: (i) it can pull something from expectations; or (ii) its expectations
can be changed. In either case the expectations of Y are updated. Referring back to 3.12 this is
sufficient to propagate expectations all the way from situation down to sensation.
Expectations are updated through connections between layers, which are the SOA expectations.
An example of this is when situation cannot pull from what it is expecting. This leads to a
change in situation, which triggers the expectations of conception to be updated. This is done
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X
Y
Figure 4.12: Two layers with SOA expectations shown as connections learnt through expe-
rience.
through the relationship between the situation and concept, in which some concepts are expected
in the new situation and some are not. An update occurs on all concepts setting expectation
only where connections to situation exist.
Figures 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15 show one scenario where expectations are updated. In Figure 4.13
there are expectations in layer X and Y. The expectations of layer X are changed, resulting in
Figure 4.14 where the connections to layer Y are no longer a match for the expectations. The
update in layer X triggers layer Y to update expectations, resulting in Figure 4.15.
4.3.7 Situation and sensation
Situation and sensation are different to other layers. Situation has no layers above it meaning
that push cannot occur. It also means that the conditions for learning and expectation updates
are different. Sensation is different to other layers as it has no layers below (only sources in the
external world) meaning that is does not update expectations of the layer below it nor create
links to a layer below.
In the situation layer there is only ever a single expected situation. In situation the expectations
change when pull cannot occur. If pull fails in situation then one of three things can happen: (i)
the situation changes to a previously experienced situation that can be constructed; (ii) learning
occurs that changes the current situation; or (iii) a new situation is created.
4.3.8 Summary
The framework is made up of a number of layers that are connected to each other. A layer
is made up of a number of prototypes, where a prototype is a vector. Each prototype is an
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X
Y
Figure 4.13: Two layers, X and at a lower level of abstraction Y, both have active expectations
marked by black circles. The two layers are linked by the SOA expectations in layer X and
the expectations in Y match with these SOA expectations.
X
Y
Figure 4.14: Two layers, X and at a lower level of abstraction Y, where the expectations of
X have changed so that the SOA expectations no longer match with the expectations in Y.
X
Y
Figure 4.15: Two layers, X and at a lower level of abstraction Y, where the expectations of
Y have been updated by X to fit with SOA expectations.
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abstraction over source data from the layer below. Each layer (with the exception of situation
and sensation) carries out processes of pull, push, learning, constructing links to prototypes in
the layer below and updating expectations of the layer below.
The goal of the framework is to capture the ideas from Chapter 3 in preparation for computational
implementation. The framework is defined by its use of vectors to represent prototypes and the
processes performed using these vectors.
4.4 Conclusions
This Chapter has moved from a conceptual model of constructive interpretation to a compu-
tational framework. It has described the extended conceptual spaces framework as a way of
constructing expectations from knowledge such that the geometry of the conceptual spaces were
changed by the situation. Push-pull was discussed in this model through an analogy with an
energy minimisation system. The effects of this model have been discussed.
Another computational framework is described that places the emphasis upon being able to learn
from experience. The model has been used to describe relationships between layers of increasing
abstraction. It has described the way that expectations are propagated from layers of higher
abstraction to layers of lower abstraction.
The framework has been inspired by considering phenomena observed in cognitive studies of
designers, particularly those of Scho¨n and Wiggins (1992) and Suwa et al (2000). Returning to
these studies provides a way of showing what has been accomplished through this framework.
Consider a designer engaged with sketching activity, and the observed phenomenon of seeing-
moving-seeing. This framework provides a means of representing situations (within which moving
occurs), changes to situations (from interpretation) and the resulting situation. The framework
represents situations as a schema of concepts within which the use of each concept is changed by
the totality of concepts. This maps onto what we see of designers making unexpected discoveries
within their work that are useful to the design task. That this occurs at multiple levels of
abstraction suggests that such discoveries from the situation can range from the perceptual level
to the abstract conceptual level. This fits with what we observe in designers that can make
observations that are both syntactic and semantic.
The Chapter provides a guideline for the computation of constructive interpretation. It makes
a contribution towards a model of knowledge that is suitable for situated design.
Chapter 5
Implementing and Demonstrating
Constructive Interpretation
This Chapter presents a number of computational implementations of constructive interpreta-
tion (CI). The ideas in Chapter 3 and parts of the computational framework in Chapter 4 are
implemented in this Chapter. The development of a system capable of CI through push-pull is
described here as an adaptation of an unsupervised learning system. A push-only interpretation
system is described and is built upon to create a system capable of push-pull interpretation.
This latter system is then implemented and tested.
In this Chapter parts of the conceptual framework are implemented to demonstrate some effects
of interpretation through push-pull. Models are made up of layers organised in a hierarchy of
abstraction. Each layer is implemented as a self-organising map (SOM) modified to include
expectation. Layers are composed of a network of nodes, and experiences1 lead to connections
between layers. The word ‘network’ is used to refer to a SOM within a system. Systems are
described that learn from experience in an unsupervised manner and are observed interpreting
different sources.
The Chapter is organised into two Sections: (i) describing and testing the implementation of CI;
and (ii) exploring the effects of CI through a number of demonstrations.
5.1 Using SOMs to implement push-pull interpretation
This Section uses modified SOMs to produce three types of interpretation: (i) push-only; (ii)
pull-only; and (iii) push-pull interpretation. The purpose of this Section is to: (i) describe push-
pull as one of three types of interpretation; and (ii) introduce SOMs as a way of representing
knowledge that can be used for constructing expectations.
1The word experience here refers to the history of all data that the network’s processes pull as input
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5.1.1 Using SOMs to represent knowledge
An interpretation in a CI system arises from the relationship between knowledge, expectations
and the source. The experiments with CI described here make use of modified SOMs to represent
knowledge. Each of the layers described in Chapter 3 is represented by one of these modified
SOMs, and the layers are connected, as shown in Figure 5.1. The basic architecture and usage
of SOMs is described and demonstrated. This is built upon to produce the multiple layers of a
constructive interpretation system.
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Figure 5.1: Constructive interpretation in the conceptual model, (a), is modelled using a
modified SOM for each layer of interpretation, (b). Layers are connected in a hierarchy of
abstraction, where the increasing number of black circles (going from the top down) indicates
an increasing number of prototypes within each layer.
5.1.1.1 SOMs and conceptual spaces
SOMs are unsupervised learning networks that use vector quantization to produce an abstract
representation of input data (Kohonen 1990). SOMs have variables of size and number of fea-
tures. The size of a network determines the number of nodes. The number of features determines
the number of dimensions held by vectors coming into the network. Each node is a vector. During
experience learning can occur when pulling from source data - the vector comes to be changed.
As the network has experiences (in the form of input vectors), the node vectors change so that
they come to represent the vectors that the system has encountered. This is the essence of SOMs,
that a number of vectors are produced that approximate the experiences of the network. This
is a good fit for the cognitive model outlined in Chapter 2, as each node in the system can be
described as a prototype within conceptual space2. The knowledge is grounded as it is a product
of the experiences of the network, an abstraction over regularities of inputs.
2The ability to expand a SOM to accommodate new prototypes is required to claim a ‘good fit’. To achieve
this, traditional SOMs can be modified to expand, as explored by Budinich (1996), Al-Mulhem and Al-Maghrabi
(1998) and Leung et al (2004)
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A conceptual space is created through the feature vectors of a SOM. Similarity can be established
through the distance between two vectors. Figure 5.2(a) and Figure 5.2(b) show examples of the
distance being measured between a source and a prototype in two and three dimensional space.
The dimensionality of the SOM can be increased to n dimensions but they become more difficult
to represent graphically.
z
x
y legend
prototype
source
distance
measure
(a) (b)
Figure 5.2: A SOM is used to represent prototypes within a conceptual space: (a) a two-
dimensional space with a prototype and a source, that have two vector features as the values
for the two dimensions; and (b) a three-dimensional space with a prototype and a source, that
has three vector features as the values for the three dimensions. Distances can be measured
within these spaces.
Typically, SOMs do not represent expectations and hence do not model CI. However, through
modification they become a computational basis for a situated CI system that uses push-pull
interpretation. Knowledge for interpretation is represented in these experiments as a number
of connected SOMs, each one representing a different layer of abstraction. The modifications
are summarised as: (i) holding expectations within the network; (ii) constructing from these
expectations through pull or learning through push; (iii) having expectations updated from the
layer above; and (iv) at the topmost layer, being able to move from one situation that does not
work to one that does.
5.1.2 Instantiating the framework for implementing with SOMs
This Section has been concerned with an abstract computational framework for constructive
interpretation. The ideas described here are used in Chapters 5 and 6 to implement CI with
modified self-organising maps (SOM)s representing the knowledge held within each layer. This
Section links the two by outlining the way that this framework can be used to construct a CI
system based upon SOMs. The elements of this CI system are: (i) the four layers of the system
(sensation, perception, conception and situation); (ii) the connections between layers formed by
experience; (iii) the learning that occurs within each layer from experience; (iv) expectations in
each layer and (v) the process of push-pull from these expectations within each layer.
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The distinguishing property of these maps is that they are able to describe the topo-
logical and similarity relations of the signals in the input vector, exploiting something
like a conceptual space with a small number of dimensions (Ga¨rdenfors 2000).
The layers together form a hierarchy, and the further up the hierarchy the greater the number of
features but the fewer the number of elements; there are fewer but more abstract prototypes. This
description refers to the specific number of features within each layer. The numbers of features
in each layer are an example of values for the framework that provide a low resolution (and
hence simplicity) but can still be used to demonstrate what is occurring during interpretation
effectively.
• Sensation is limited in this model by determining the state of the senscepts currently
being looked at. Each sensor determines whether the senscept that it is pulling from is
either on or off. The system has 256 sensors all performing the same function, arranged in
a 16x16 grid. The framework can accommodate any numeric perceptual data even though
these demonstrations only use binary data.
• Perception brings together 4x4 chunks of sense data. The system has 16 perceptors each
performing the same function, arranged in a 4x4 grid. This is implemented in the system
as a SOM with 16 features in each node. All perceptors reference the same perceptual
knowledge but each has different expectations. Explicit expectations within the layer are
nodes that have been activated by conception. Implicit expectations are the nodes within
a radius of conceptual space around each of these nodes. Pull occurs through an attempt
to construct from these expectations. In this implementation this is represented as a test
for similarity within conceptual space. If no construction occurs then the data is pushed
into the next layer.
• Conception brings together 16 percepts into a single concept. This is implemented in the
system as a SOM with 256 features in each node. Explicit expectations within the layer are
nodes that have been activated by situation. Implicit expectations are the nodes within
a radius of conceptual space around each of these nodes. Pull occurs through an attempt
to construct from these expectations as a test for similarity within conceptual space. If
no construction occurs then the data is pushed into the next layer. If construction from
expectations occurs then the expectations of perception are changed.
• Situation brings together a number of concepts into a single situation. In this system
situation brings three concepts together. This is implemented as a SOM with 768 features
in each node. Situation only ever has a single explicit expectation, ‘the situation’. Pull
attempts to construct from the situation as a test for similarity within conceptual space.
If no construction occurs then situation attempts to find another situation that can fit the
data. If no other situation can fit the data then learning occurs, creating a new situation.
The models in Chapter 5 move the focus to different parts of the framework. There are a number
of effects that only become explicit through demonstration of this framework.
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5.1.2.1 Learning in a situated SOM
Learning in a traditional SOM is not situated as it holds no expectations. Table 5.1 shows a
comparison of learning in a traditional SOM (Kohonen 1990) and learning in a CI SOM, a layer
of a CI system. The essence of learning in a traditional SOM is that it finds the ‘best match’
within a layer and changes its position. Two major differences between this and a CI SOM are
that: (i) a CI SOM only finds a best match within a restricted set of expectations; and (ii) a CI
SOM only learns when a layer at a higher level of abstraction triggers this.
Traditional SOM learning CI SOM learning
• Find the best matching node within the
entire network
• Move this node so that it is better able
to represent the source (i.e. move it
towards the source within conceptual
space)
• Move a neighbourhood of nodes around
this node towards the source
• If there is a trigger to learn from the
layer above, then:
• Find the best matching node within the
expected nodes
• Move this node so that it better repre-
sents the source
• Move neighbours around this node to-
wards the source
Table 5.1: A comparison of learning in a traditional SOM to learning in a CI SOM
Learning is triggered by the higher layer of abstraction. In constructive interpretation the expec-
tations that are held by a layer will often not be a good fit for the source (pull cannot construct).
One response to this would be to learn through push. However, this is not appropriate, as often
the layer above will change the expectations. That is, expectations will have been propagated
down the layers such that the source can be constructed from expectations. It is for this reason
that the learning needs to be triggered from the layer above, effectively saying ‘these are the
most useful expectations that can be found’.
5.1.3 An ontology for computational interpretation
Constructive interpretation suggests an ontology for computational interpretation based upon
the notions of push and pull, where a system for interpretation can be one of: (i) push-only; (ii)
pull-only; or (iii) a mix of push and pull. These three types of interpretation are represented in
Figure 5.3, where expectations are used in only (ii) and (iii) and where CI requires push-pull:
• Push-only interpretation - A system is an example of push-only interpretation if it
holds no expectations prior to the interpretation that affect the production of an internal
representation. In push-only interpretation the same knowledge (in the system) with the
same source will produce the same interpretation.
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• Pull-only interpretation - A system is an example of pull-only interpretation if it relies
solely on the expectations of the system in producing an internal representation. In pull-
only interpretation every source is constructed from the expectations held by the system,
regardless of how good a fit for the source these expectations are.
• Push-pull interpretation - A system is an example of push-pull interpretation if it cre-
ates internal expectation through an attempt to construct from expectation, but where
push can occur in the absence of useful expectations, when producing an internal repre-
sentation.
Constructive interpretation is an example of push-pull interpretation, but push-pull interpreta-
tion alone is not sufficient. CI also requires that expectations be grounded in experience (i.e.
that the system be situated).
source
system
push only pull only push-pull
Figure 5.3: Three different types of interpretation systems
5.1.4 Implementing the three types of interpretation
5.1.4.1 Implementing push-only interpretation
Push-only interpretation is used as a control against which other types of interpretation can be
compared. SOMs as they are used in the literature (e.g. Kohonen 1990) provide an example of
push-only interpretation. Push-only interpretation is shown in Figure 5.4, where interpretation
occurs through a search to find the best match from all possible prototypes within the knowledge
base. This results in there being only one interpretation available for any one source.
The other two types of interpretation, pull-only and push-pull, can be produced by modifying
SOMs (for pull-only) and creating relationships between modified SOMs (for push-pull).
5.1.4.2 Implementing pull-only interpretation
Pull-only interpretation is implemented by introducing modified expectations to a SOM. This
is done by changing the behaviour of nodes so that each node can become ‘expected’ making
all other nodes ‘unexpected’, Figure 5.5. Unexpected nodes have a distance in conceptual space
from expected nodes. In this experiment, expectations are produced by randomly selecting
nodes in the network. The system differs to push-only in that it can only use expected nodes in
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source
best
match
Figure 5.4: Push-only interpretation uses a SOM as it is used in the literature, finding a best
match for the source using the prototypes in the layer
constructing an interpretation: push-only was able to use any of the nodes, and looked for the
best possible match. It operates by taking expectations and trying to construct an interpretation
from the source that best matches these expectations. In pull-only, the expectations will always
be used to construct an interpretation from the source, regardless of the similarity of the source
to the expectations.
source
expected
node
unexpected
node
legend
Figure 5.5: A layer in interpretation with expected nodes shown in black and unexpected
nodes in grey
5.1.4.3 Implementing push-pull interpretation in a two-layer network
Push-pull interpretation is implemented by: (i) taking pull-only interpretation and creating the
possibility that sometimes pull is not possible; and (ii) creating a second layer, at a higher level
of abstraction, that controls the expectations of the lower layer. It is this control of expectations
from the higher level that demonstrates some of the effects of situation. Push-pull interpretation
uses a balance of push and pull, distributed between the different layers of abstraction. Figure
5.6 shows a two layer push-pull interpretation system, with each step of interpretation numbered.
Prior to interpretation both layers hold expectations about what will be encountered.
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This is a relationship where the higher layer of abstraction is guiding the expectations of the
lower layer of abstraction. The relationship between the two layers described here could stand
for any of the two layers in Figure 5.1.
Push-pull interpretation can be explained as a sequence of steps, Figure 5.6: Step 1 shows an
attempt to pull from expectations in layer 1. If pull cannot occur, then step 2 is push from the
source, where the layer passes what it finds up to the layer above, layer 2. Step 3 is an analog for
step 1, where layer 2 attempts to pull from expectations using the data available from layer 1 (be
it from push or pull in that layer). Because layer 2 is the topmost layer, push into layer 2, step 4,
is different to push in layer 1. If pull is unsuccessful then a push results in either: (i) a change to
different expectations that are more suited; or (ii) the construction of a new expectations based
upon the data. If the expectations change in layer 2, the expectations of layer 1 are updated,
shown in step 5. Step 1 is now repeated, but with new expectations, shown in step 6. This cycle
can be iterated.
layer 1
layer 2
1,6 2
35 4
source source
Figure 5.6: Push-pull in a two layer system with numbered steps of: (1) pull from expecta-
tions in layer 1; (2) push from the source into layer 1; (3) pull from the expectations of layer
2; (4) push from layer 1 into layer 2; (5) an update of layer 1 expectations by layer 2; (6)
interpretation through pull from layer 1 with the updated expectations.
Event 5 cannot occur without further modification of each SOM such that the connections
between layers are stored in memory. Each time a node in layer 2 successfully pulls from data in
layer 1 the experience is suggesting that the two nodes are connected. The kind of connection
created is shown in Figure 5.7. It is through this connection in memory that the more abstract
expectation (in layer 2) is able to trigger a number of more concrete expectations (in layer 1).
For this reason there will always be more data flowing from level 2 to level 1 (in the form of
expectations) than the other direction in the form of interpreted data.
5.1.5 Demonstrating push-only interpretation
The implementation of a push-pull interpretation system using SOMs is demonstrated by first
testing push-only interpretation to provide a control. The three types of interpretation are then
compared through experimentation.
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Figure 5.7: Connections between layers create a memory of which nodes are activated to-
gether.
5.1.5.1 Push-only experiment setup
A demonstration of a push-only system serves to: (i) demonstrate the use of a SOM to interpret
shapes; (ii) introduce the calculation of similarity measures within conceptual space; and (iii) to
introduce the datasets that will be used in this Section. The design medium for these experiments
is a two-dimensional pixel world. This is discussed in more detail in Appendix B in Section B.1.
Push-only interpretation is tested with:
1. A network primed using repeated exposure to sources in a dataset. Examples from the
shapes dataset are shown in Figure 5.8.
2. Gradual reduction of the size of the network. The size of the network determines the
number of instances that each prototype represents, where the smaller the network becomes
the more instances each prototype represents.
3. The similarity measure. The similarity between the source and the internal representation
can be measured as Nosofsky similarity, Equation 2.5. This demonstrates the way that
distance and similarity is calculated within the conceptual space created by the SOM.
5.1.5.2 Effects of changing the size of the network
As the size of the network is reduced, each node comes to represent more instances. In the
reduced network each prototype stands for more instances. This creates abstraction through the
development of summary representations (Barsalou 2005b).
The way in which each node in a SOM comes to represent more than one instance is can be seen
in Figure 5.9(a) with an 8x8 network and in Figure 5.9(b) with a 4x4 network using the shapes
dataset. This same effect is seen with the letters dataset in Figure 5.10(a) and Figure 5.10(b).
These examples show that in the 8x8 network the prototype is an exact match for the source
and is not a summary representation. In the 4x4 network the lack of clarity in the prototype
shows that some abstraction has occurred.
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Figure 5.8: A sample of six of the inputs used in the set of shapes for both learning and
testing.
input vector closest node input vector closest node
(a) (b)
Figure 5.9: Reduction of network size with shapes dataset showing input vector and best
matching node: (a) the input and output vectors in an 8x8 network (no abstraction occurring);
and (b) in a 4x4 network (abstraction occurring).
The push-only experiment was run with the network size gradually reduced. It used two different
datasets. Figure 5.11 shows the results, where the same pattern is seen in both datasets, with
reduced similarity as the network is shrunk. This is as expected in a SOM.
5.1.5.3 Significance
The experiment has introduced a SOM as a way of representing conceptual space. It has used
SOMs as they are described in the literature to produce push-only interpretation. Using this type
of interpretation network size, dataset and similarity measures have been introduced as notions
related to implementing SOMs. Push-only interpretation can now be used as the control against
which the other types of interpretation can be compared. This experiment has demonstrated
the expected behaviour of a SOM and provides a basis for implementing the other types of
interpretation.
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(a) (b)
input vector closest node input vector closest node
Figure 5.10: Reduction of network size with letters dataset showing input vector and best
matching node: (a) the input and output vectors in an 8x8 network (no abstraction occurring);
and (b) in a 4x4 network (abstraction occurring).
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Figure 5.11: A comparison of the similarity of the source to the interpretation in a push-
only interpretation system with two datasets (shapes and letters) and a network size that is
gradually reduced with error bars showing standard deviation. Results are from a Monte Carlo
set of 100 runs with 1000 interpretations in each run.
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5.1.6 Comparing types of interpretation
5.1.6.1 Interpretation comparison experiment setup
Experimentation with the three different types of interpretation described provides insights into
their differences. From this we gain a better understanding of how CI differs from existing
computational techniques.
Whilst there is no specific metric that can be used to establish that CI is ‘working’, it is expected
that CI produces new interpretations that are: (i) relevant to the source; (ii) different under
different circumstances; and (iii) in keeping with expectations. This interpretation comparison
experiment addresses the first two of these behaviours, (i) and (ii). The experiment uses random
expectations to explore the two metrics of similarity and reinterpretation frequency:
1. Similarity is a measure based upon the distance from the source to the interpretation. This
the distance between the source (represented as a vector within conceptual space) and a
node in the network (as another vector). The aim here is not simply to achieve the highest
similarity, as push-only will do this best. However, similarity is important to ensure that
there is still relevance to the source.
2. A reinterpretation frequency can be established as the frequency with which a system
interprets the same source differently. This is calculated as a percentage of the number of
times that each source is interpreted differently, Equation 5.1. This is the sum over each
unique source D of the ratio of the number of unique interpretations minus one to the
number of times interpreted. For example, a system that sees two different sources ten
times each and interprets each one in two different ways, would have a reinterpretation
frequency of ((2 − 1)/10 + (2 − 1)/10) = 20%. The same system that interpreted the
two sources in only one way each would have a reinterpretation frequency of 0%. In this
experiment this is calculated by recording a table matching environment states along with
the interpretations produced.
reinterpetation freq =
∑
D
unique interpretations− 1
number of times interpreted
(5.1)
The variables in this interpretation comparison experiment are: (i) the type of interpretation
used; (ii) the radius of expectations; and (iii) the minimum similarity for pull to occur. These
three variables are discussed in more detail in Section 4.3. The three types of interpretation are
push-only, pull-only and push-pull and will be referred to as treatments A, B and C, Table 5.2.
The radius of expectations refers to the radius of implicit expectations around each explicit
expectation that is being used to pull. It is expected that increasing the radius of expectations
makes the interpretations more similar to the source.
The minimum similarity for pull is the similarity required for pull to construct from an expecta-
tion. It is a value between 0 and 1. If it is set to 1 then only a perfect match between expectation
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Interpretation type Symbol Figure
push-only A 5.4
pull-only B 5.5
push-pull C 5.6
Table 5.2: The three types of interpretation being tested, the symbol used to refer to them,
and the Figure that illustrates the architecture.
and source will result in construction. If it is set to 0 then any expectation can be constructed,
no matter how distant from the source it is.
In this interpretation comparison experiment, the source is a randomly constructed 4x4 canvas of
pixels, meaning that there are 65536 different possible sources. In all three types of interpretation
layer 1 is a 100x100 SOM which has been trained on random sources. In treatments B and C
expectations are randomly selected nodes within the SOM. In both of these layers, interpretation
pulls from the expectations.
An example of what is occurring in treatment C in the interpretation comparison experiment is
shown in Figure 5.12. In this example, layer 1 cannot construct from the source. This causes
a push into layer 2 where a change of expectations occurs. These expectations are propagated
down in level 1, which leads to a successful construction from these updated expectations. In
terms of push and pull this sequence can be described as: (i) push into layer 1; (ii) push into
layer 2; (iii) change of expectations in layer 2 (the topmost layer, where there is nowhere else to
push); (iv) updated expectations in layer 1; (v) pull from layer 1. In some cases pull from layer
1 is successful, in which case layer 2 is not used in interpreting.
source level two
best match
new level one
expectations
pull is
successful
cannot pull
from level one
expectations
push
create
exp
pull from
new exp
level one level two level one level one
Figure 5.12: The construction of an interpretation in a two-layer network with random
expectations. Layer one attempts to construct from the expectations. If it cannot, the source
pushes into the second layer, which updates the expectations of layer one. Layer one then
constructs an interpretation from the updated expectations.
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5.1.6.2 Interpretation comparison experiment results
All three interpretation types were used and the interpretations produced were assessed for
similarity. This was done whilst changing the number of expectations (in B and C) and the
similarity required for construction (in C). The knowledge held by the system for all three types
of interpretation is identical in layer 1; what differs are the structures around the knowledge. A
summary of the results is seen in Figure 5.13. Because interpretation A does not use expectations,
a change in the radius of expectations does not change the similarity in the results. In B and
C however increasing the radius of implicit expectations increases the similarity. The improved
similarity in C as the radius is increased is due to the second layer updating expectations of the
first layer and re-interpreting with these expectations.
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Figure 5.13: The effects upon average similarity over 1000 runs for each type of interpretation
as the radius of expectations is increased from zero to twenty.
For treatment C the interpretation is affected by the minimum similarity for pull variable. Layer
1 is able to construct from expectations if there is sufficient similarity between the expectation
and the source for the layer. Figure 5.14 shows the effect of changing the similarity required for
construction upon the final similarity of the interpretation.
The reinterpretation frequency for A was 0%, for B was 46.62% and for C was 12.94%. This is
as expected, where A, the push-only system, is always interpreting with the ‘best match’ from
everything it knows and hence there being no scope for reinterpretation. The pull-only system,
B, is using random expectations and pulling even if a good fit cannot be found. This results
in a high reinterpretation frequency, but there is often a lack of similarity between the source
and the interpretation. The push-pull system is able to reinterpret because it is pulling from
expectations. However, in push-pull the construction only occurs if there is sufficient similarity
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Figure 5.14: The effect upon average similarity of changing the similarity required for pull
in layer 1
between the source and interpretation, and push occurs if there is not. The result is that a push-
pull system has the capacity for reinterpretation whilst maintaining similarity between source
and interpretation.
5.1.6.3 Conclusions from interpretation comparison
A model of constructive interpretation is not about finding the most similar match to a source
within all that the system knows but rather about finding the best match within a set of ex-
pectations. This experiment compares the difference between push-only, pull-only and push-pull
interpretation and shows the effects of some of the variables involved: radius of expectations and
similarity required for pull. The experiment demonstrates how CI through push-pull interpreta-
tion is different to either push-only or pull-only interpretation.
Both treatments B and C have an increased reinterpretation frequency, but only C is accompanied
by a high degree of similarity. This is indicative of the way that situation is changing the
interpretation produced, even though the knowledge held by the agent is not changing. The
significance of this is that push-pull interpretation has both re-interpretation (which push-only
does not) and relevance to the source (which pull-only does not). These are both necessary
ingredients for constructive interpretation.
One feature of CI is that it requires less computation than push-only interpretation. Consider
this particular experiment, with a 100x100 network for layer 1 and a 40x40 network for layer
2. In push-only interpretation, with just the first of these layers, a search of all 10000 nodes
is required, whereas in push-pull either: (i) pull works first time; or (ii) a search of layer 2 is
required. In the worst case, which is (ii), this results in a search of the number of expectations,
(based upon the radius of expectations), and layer 2, which is only a search of 1640 nodes. Whilst
these numbers may be unremarkable, the point is the way that the system scales, with push-only
Implementing and Demonstrating Constructive Interpretation 91
increasing the search required at a quadratic rate and push-pull increasing at a closer-to-linear
rate.
5.2 Implementing the effects of situation
The rest of this Section will deal with: (i) the way that the situation can change through CI;
and (ii) some of the effects of CI and changing situations.
5.2.1 How do situations change?
There are three ways in which the situation comes to be changed: (i) intrinsically - the situation
can no longer be constructed from the available source; (ii) intrinsically - the situation is not
interesting to the agent, such as during conceptual design activity; (iii) extrinsically - another
activity or another system creates a change in the situation from the outside.
To an external observer it is not always entirely clear which of these has occurred when a designer
changes their situation. Consider Figure 5.15 which shows a simple example of a change of
situation. An agent is drawing using a rectangle and then constructing an interpretation. The
agent producing the representations in Figure 5.15 has an explicit concept when drawing (the
rectangle in (a)) that is placed on a medium in a pattern, (the representation in (b)). All that
an observer sees is that between drawing and interpreting something has changed, because the
designer has drawn a rectangle and is now declaring that they see two L-shapes, (c). This
example is inspired by the phenomena described by Scho¨n and Wiggins (1992). The point of the
following demonstration is to highlight what is happing internally when a designer changes their
situation.
explicit concept expected concept construction from interpretationused for drawing
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 5.15: An example of construction from expectation, where an agent is (a) using a
concept with the shape of a rectangle and (b) drawing using this shape in a pattern. An
outsider observing the agent sees actions that indicate that the agent made an interpretation
seen in (d). One explanation is that the agent produced expectations of the shape seen in (c),
an L-shape. Each of the three types of change of situation could produce this example.
The three different ways that situations change can be used to explain what has happened in
this design scenario:
1. The situation changes when it no longer works: the agent realises through interpretation
that it has notions (i.e. senscepts, percepts, concepts and situation) that do not work
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together. Expectations of a higher layer of abstraction are not being met by the data
coming from the layer below. In the example described by Scho¨n and Wiggins (1992) one
possibility is that the agent has notions about the size of the objects in the design that do
not fit with the concepts that it is constructing (the rectangles). In this case, the situation
might create an expectation of conception that relates to size, which results in the two
L-shapes being constructed. This type of abstract expectation is not present in the models
in this thesis, but it could be in future work. This kind of change of situation fits with
the verbal description given by the designer during the activity in the Scho¨n and Wiggins
(1992) study.
2. The situation changes when the agent is no longer interested in it: the agent becomes
‘bored’ with the concepts that it is using. This is really a subset of (1) in that the reason
why the agent is bored is that an expectation of novelty is a part of the situation. However,
this is such a common occurrence during the early stages of conceptual design (as suggested
by models of curiosity, Saunders 2004) that it has been given its own explanation. In this
case a possible explanation for the reinterpretation is that the agent is bored with the use
of the rectangle and is looking for something within the representation that is novel. This
leads the agent to be more interested in the implicit concepts than the explicit concepts,
and in this case the L-shape is an implicit concept that is both similar to the source and
implicitly expected within the situation.
3. The situation is extrinsically changed: finally, another agent has made the suggestion to
‘try seeing it using L-shapes’. In this case the expectations of the agent have been changed
by some external influence. Given a computational agent, another possibility is that an
experimenter has simply changed the internal state of the agent such that it now expects
to see an L-shape, and it follows that the interpretation represented in D is constructed.
Again, this can be described a subset of (1), as the agent has to interpret what the third
party says and it is in constructing this interpretation that the situation changes by no
longer working with the changed expectations.
5.2.2 Demonstrating changing situations with push-pull interpretation
The focus is now changed to the ways in which situations change through constructive inter-
pretation. The two-layer push-pull interpretation architecture is used to focus upon ways that
the topmost layer comes to have its expectations changed. In the framework shown in Figure
5.1, the topmost layer is the situation. In this experiment, the top layer performs some of the
functions of the situation. A demonstration can be made using push-pull interpretation to show
the way that the situation changes.
The experiment is set up with a two layer push-pull interpretation system. The system holds
expectations prior to interpretation that are related to the representation being used as the
source (the medium that has been drawn upon). The course of events in the experiment is:
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1. The system selects a random concept (a node in layer 2) to serve as the explicit concept
that the system is working with. An analogy in design might be a designer working with
the concept of ‘L-shaped buildings’.
2. The systems selects an associated percept (a node in layer 1) to serve as an instance of the
concept that the system is working with. To extend the analogy, this is like the designer
having an explicit L-shaped building to work with.
3. The system draws using this explicit notion. In this case, it uses a pre-defined pattern,
drawing with a concept and then drawing with the same concept above, below and to either
side of it.
4. The system interprets using push-pull interpretation.
The order of events within the demonstration are shown in Figure 5.16. The images in Figure
5.16 are typical of the results from model.
Figure 5.17 shows two possible scenarios, one where the explicit concept can still be constructed
and another where the explicit concept cannot be constructed. The result of this second scenario
is that the situation changes to one in which the source makes sense.
5.2.3 Situations co-ordinate concepts
It is useful to show what is occurring inside the system when it constructively interprets. The
following descriptions make reference to two agents, where each agent is a system that interprets:
(i) α interprets through push-pull, Figure 5.6; and is compared to (ii) χ which interprets through
push-only, 5.4. The point of including χ is to provide a control to show the effect that CI is
having upon the system.
The two agents, α, a two-layer push-pull system, and χ, a one layer push-only system, are
located within an environment. In α layer two is co-ordinating three concepts together at a
time. This differs from the previous demonstrations where the push-pull system was concerned
with interpreting a single concept. When the situation is co-ordinating three concepts some
other effects of the situation can be observed
Results from the experiments are presented in a number of rows, where each row takes the form
of Figure 5.18. Because COE expectations are involved, time becomes important. The results
then are labelled for time, t, where each row represents a discrete moment in time. Figure 5.18
shows an example of a row of results, where t = 0. The second row would then be at t = 1, the
third at t = 2 and so on. Within each row there are three canvasses on the left, Ae, Be and Ce
and three on the right, Ai, Bi and Ci. The canvasses on the left show the source that the agent
is interpreting. The canvasses on the right are a representation of the agent’s interpretation.
On the interpretation side, each canvas is a representation of the use of a single concept. For
example, in the first canvas of the interpretation in Figure 5.18 a use of the square concept has
been represented.
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(1) an explicit concept
(2) layer 1 and layer 2
expectations prior
to interpretation
(3) drawing using the
explicit concept
in a pattern
prior to interpretation
interpretation
(4) drawing is the source
for interpretation
(5) cannot construct from
expectation in layer 1
as too dissimilar
(6) a change of situation
occurs in layer 2
(7) layer 1 expectations
are changed
(8) the new expectations
are used to construct
an interpretation that !ts
the source
Figure 5.16: A demonstration of the way that push-pull interpretation can lead to a change
in the situation through: (1) explicit expectations; (2) in layers 1 and 2; (3) are used to draw in
the design medium; (4) which is the source for interpreting; (5) where layer 1 cannot construct
from expectations; (6) a change of situation occurs; (7) the expectations of layer 1 are changed;
and (8) the new expectations are used to construct an interpretation.
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explicit concept
drawing with
concept
interpretation
same concept
in top layer
new concept
in top layer
Figure 5.17: Two possible scenarios where: (i) the explicit concept is constructed from what
is available; and (ii) the explicit concept cannot be constructed from what is available resulting
in a new situation.
source interpretation
t = 0
A B Ce e e A B Ci i i
Figure 5.18: In these demonstrations, a source is made up of three separate canvasses, Ae,
Be and Ce. Each agent interprets all three canvasses together and produces a representation
of the interpretation, Ai, Bi and Ci
In these experiments concepts are learnt in a supervised manner, whilst situations are learnt in
an unsupervised manner. Concepts are labelled when presented to the system in the training
phase, developing a notion of the concepts square, triangle and cross. In training, these
concepts always occur in the patterns of either ‘all the same’ or ‘all different’, Figure 5.19. The
situations that the system develops through training then hold expectations of these configura-
tions, represented in Figure 5.20 where each situation holds an SOA expectation of three specific
concepts.
!฀!฀! !฀"฀#!฀"฀"!฀!฀!
Figure 5.19: Sample arrangements of shapes in the training phase, in the patterns of either
all the same or all different.
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SQUARE TRIANGLE CROSS
situations
concepts
Figure 5.20: Situation learns through experience which concepts occur together. Sets of
three shapes that are experienced together are learnt as situations; in the environment either
all three shapes are the same or all three are different, resulting in the situations seen here.
5.2.3.1 Demonstrating situations co-ordinating concepts
In the first test, α and χ are interpreting the same sequence of environment states. The differences
between the agents in these experiments are: (i) α has expectations about the course of events
(COE) that cause it to expect continuity over time; and (ii) α has expectations about the state
of affairs (SOA) that cause it to expect certain internal states to occur together (specifically,
situation is creating expectations of concepts).
The interpretations of α can be seen in Figure 5.21. The interpretations of χ can be seen in
Figure 5.22. The difference between the interpretations is due to the expectations held and
interpretation from push-pull. The knowledge held in both systems (the values of the nodes in
layer 1) is the same in both agents.
At t = 0 the interpretations in Figures 5.21 and 5.22 are different. Here α has interpreted
using square, cross, triangle whereas χ has interpreted using square, cross, square. A
comparison of the two sets of results can be seen in Table 5.3 for simplicity of comparison. This
difference at t = 0 is caused by the pull from situation. Agent α is constructing a set of concepts
that is congruent with grounded experience (primed situations) as well as the source, whereas
agent χ is representing the source as best it can using the concepts that it holds.
What is happening in agent α to cause this difference? At t = 0 the system hold no expectations.
Conception pushes the best matching concept that it can find into situation. The situation
layer then finds the situation that best matches this input data and changes its expectations
of conception. In agent α at t = 0, conception pushes square, cross, cross into situation.
This is not something that situation has experience of, so it creates expectations of the nearest
situation (in conceptual space), which is square, cross, triangle. The change in situation
triggers SOA expectations to change in conception. Conception then attempts to pull from these
new expectations. For each expected concept, it attempts pull to construct the expected concept
from what is available in the source. The result is that situation is able to construct the situation
of square, cross, triangle from what is available, leading to line one in Table 5.3.
At t = 1 interpretation in α is different, as there are now COE expectations. The agent expects
the concepts that it sees to be the same as the concepts that it saw previously. The two agents
produce identical representations at time t = 1 when interpreting the source but they arrive
there in different ways. In α conception attempts to construct from its expectations of square,
cross, triangle, but pull cannot construct from what is available. The same thing happens
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t = 0
1
2
3
source interpretationα
Figure 5.21: Agent α interpreting an environment of random shapes over time using push-pull
interpretation with expectations of persistence over time.
t = 0
1
2
3
source  interpretation χ  
Figure 5.22: Agent χ interpreting the same environment seen in Figure 5.21 but without any
expectations and interpreting through push-only.
t interpreted concepts in α interpreted concepts in χ
0 square cross triangle square cross square
1 square square square square square square
2 square square square triangle square triangle
3 cross cross cross cross triangle cross
Table 5.3: Comparison of α and χ interpreting the same sequence of environment states.
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in situation, leading to a search in situation for something within its experiences that is a fit
for this data. This leads to changed expectations in conception, and now conception is able to
construct from what is expected as square, square, square. Although the representations
of the interpretations are identical in Figures 5.21 and 5.22 the interpretation inside the agents
are different. To an observer watching the two agents the interpretation appears to be the
same. What is actually happening is that agent α is situated, and has failed to pull from its
expectations. The result is a change of situation and pull from within the new situation.
At t = 2 the interpretations of α and χ are different once more. Looking at Figure 5.21 and
seeing two triangles and one square it might be intuitive to expect that α would see this as
triangle, triangle, triangle. The reason that it does not is because of COE expectations.
At t = 1 the interpretation was square, square, square. When it begins interpreting at t = 2
it holds these as expectations of what it will find. Conception is able to pull part of what it is
expecting, in this case two of the squares. This is sufficient for situation to be able to construct
from expectations. These expectations in conception lead to the result of square, square,
square, which is again different to that found by χ.
At t = 3 none of the expectations from COE can be constructed, but the situation that fits push
from conception can be constructed, similar to the way that it occurred at t = 1. In this case
something that agent χ has seen as a triangle is seen by agent α as a cross because of the
situation and the effect that it has through propagation of expectations.
To summarise, agent α has constructed interpretations that are a balance between the source,
the COE expectations and the SOA expectations. It has done this through push and pull. This
has been compared to agent χ which interprets through push-only
5.2.3.2 Expectations of stability in a changing environment
A test that can show the effects of situation is to have an agent with an expectation of stability
(an unchanging environment) yet where the environment is changing. In this demonstration,
the environment begins in one state and gradually changes from one state to another over time.
Agent α (primed with the same knowledge as in Figure 5.20) then interprets the environment
through time as it changes. The model shows the way that expectations create stability in an
ever changing environment; the agent maintains its situation until it is unable to construct from
its expectations, at which point the situation changes. A pattern is then observed of static
situations followed by large changes.
Figure 5.23 gives an example of the kind of results produced by the system. At t = 0 the system
has produced an interpretation that is cross, cross, cross. It maintains this situation as
the environment changes, until t = 2 at which point it can no longer construct this situation.
Through CI it changes to an interpretation of cross, triangle, square. It then maintains this
situation but at t = 4 and t = 6 the specific concepts can no longer be pulled, although different
concepts can be pulled within the same situation.
Implementing and Demonstrating Constructive Interpretation 99
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6
source interpretation
Figure 5.23: A changing environment is interpreted by α where the situation only changes
when it can no longer be constructed through pull.
This demonstration has been included as it outlines an interesting experiment that can show the
effects of situations. It has presented preliminary results within the implemented system.
5.2.4 Constructing something useful within the situation
A situated framework leads to the construction of interpretations that are useful to what an
agent is doing. This Section uses the letters dataset to make a variation on the demonstration
in 5.2.3 showing situations co-ordinating concepts. It shows the way that a situation sets up
expectations that will be useful to what the agent is currently doing - in this case reading letters.
When it constructively interprets from these expectations it constructs something that is useful
rather than something that may be more similar but less useful.
The environment contains different shapes that form the letters a, e, h and t. Agent α has been
primed to expect either all letters to be the same or all letters to be different. Figure 5.24 shows
agent α interpreting sources from the environment and constructing from the situation. This is
as expected given the results already shown in previous experiments.
Agent α is then primed not on patterns of letters but rather on experiences where the letters
that occur together are real words, specifically the and hat. An environment is devised to
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5
source interpretationα
Figure 5.24: Agent α is trained upon shapes made up from letters and then interprets a
random set of letters in order to demonstrate the data set of letters.
demonstrate a use for this construction from situation, Figure 5.25. Agent α is constructing the
words that it expects to see through the effects of the situation.
An example of this construction is in the third row at t = 2, the letters appear to be hht but the
agent interprets it as hat. This has occurred for two reasons: (i) from t = 1 the agent has COE
expectations of seeing the letters hat; and (ii) the expectations of situation have been passed
through SOA expectations to conception. The result is that the centre h is constructed as an a.
At t = 4 the same effect is seen but the other way around, where a letter a is constructed as a
letter h as a result of the situation. The situation is expecting to find the letters t, h and e and
it sends expectations to conception to this effect. The result is that conception is able to pull
the a as an h in order to construct the word the.
This is in contrast to agent χ, Figure 5.26, which interprets the exact same environment in a
different way. An agent without CI creates an explanation for the world that it finds, but does
not co-ordinate its concepts based upon its experiences.
These results show one way in which CI leads to an interpretation that is useful to an agent.
An agent that holds useful expectations and then constructs from a situation defined by those
expectations will produce an interpretation that is useful to it. This may not necessarily be an
interpretation that is similar to the source, but will be ‘similar enough’ through the threshold
required to pull. This is the kind of phenomena that we see in design when designers see some-
thing within a representation that is useful to the design task but not necessarily immediately
apparent within the representation.
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source interpretationα
Figure 5.25: Results from agent α in a prepared environment to show the effects of expecta-
tion
t = 0
1
2
3
4
5
source interpretationχ
Figure 5.26: Results from agent χ in a prepared environment to show what happens without
expectation.
5.2.5 Summary of demonstrations of the effects of situation
These studies have demonstrated some of the effects of construction through push-pull from the
situation. A CI agent produces an interpretation that is affected by: (i) the SOA and COE
expectations; (ii) the source; and (iii) the experiences that the agent has to draw on where
expectations cannot be constructed. This is in contrast to a push-only agent which: (i) has
knowledge from experience that is not organised through expectation; and (ii) always produces
the same interpretation of the same source. This section has shown:
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1. A description of how situations change was presented. Construction from implicit expec-
tations was demonstrated. This shows one way that the situation changes during design
activity.
2. The co-ordination of concepts by situations was shown in a CI system that interpreted three
concepts at once. This system showed: (i) COE expectations having an effect upon inter-
pretation with expectations from t affecting the interpretation at t‘; and (ii) SOA expecta-
tions having an effect upon interpretation with the situation changing the expectations of
conception. This showed how CI produces an interpretation from multiple expectations.
3. A demonstration has been presented of an agent with expectations of stability in a chang-
ing environment. This showed how the construction from expectations leads to a stable
interpretation of the world even when it is constantly changing. However, this stability is
only maintained for as long as the situation is able to construct from expectations. There
comes a point at which the system needs to change its expectations of the world.
4. An agent primed to expect letters to occur in meaningful words was demonstrated inter-
preting a nonsense ordering of letters. It was seen that the agent was able to construct
something useful from what it was expecting. This is significant as it shows the way that
a model with useful expectations comes to make a useful interpretation out of the many
interpretations possible. This is something that is observed often in designers, that of all
of the possible interpretations they produce one that is useful to the current design
Chapter 6
Constructive Interpretation in
Design
This Chapter builds upon the implementations in Chapter 5 through the implementation and
analysis of three systems that show how CI relates to design thinking. This is done using two
data sets: floor plan layouts and country growth indicators.
Firstly, results are presented from a system that is interpreting a randomly generated represen-
tation. Results show that: (i) a ‘meaningless’ representation has meaning imposed upon it by
the system; and (ii) the representation constructed changes depending upon the situation the
system is in when interpreting.
Secondly, results are shown from a system that learns from experience (of a set of floor plans)
and is engaged in a design conversation with a medium. The system is able to see things in
what it draws that it is not explicitly aware of that are triggered by CI. This system provides a
model for unexpected discovery through constructive interpretation, where implicit knowledge is
explored through the design conversation, changing the trajectory of design activity. A variation
on the model implements the notion of curiosity, where the model switches between divergent
and specific exploration.
Finally, a model looks at the interpretation of country growth indicators during a design task.
This model is based upon the second experiment but utilises a different data set. This is then
extended to demonstrate the effects of salience weighting upon interpretation.
Results from the three models provide a set of computational phenomena resulting from CI that
are a fit with the phenomena of designers interpreting observed in the cognitive studies in Section
2.1.1. Through CI the situation changes the interpretation produced and the interpretation
produced can change the situation.
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6.1 Experiment 1: Situations guide interpretation of a
source
A well known phenomenon was explained in Chapter 1, Figure 1.1, where one person scribbles
some marks upon a page and another person looks at the scribble and turns it into a picture.
This example showed that a seemingly meaningless representation was given meaning through
constructive interpretation. The same effect has been implemented through CI in a system that
has experience with floor plans and interprets a generated design.
This Section presents two runs from a system to show: (i) that a random representation is given
meaning by the system through construction from expectations; and (ii) that the same system
with the same source and the same knowledge produces different interpretations depending upon
the situation it is in when interpreting. The system is primed through experience of a number
of floor plans, a sample of which are shown in Figure 6.1. It then looks at a randomly generated
set of marks upon a page, such as that seen in Figure 6.2(a), and constructs an interpretation
using its expectations. In doing this the system pulls an interpretation that is both relevant to
where it is at cognitively and the source that is visually available.
Figure 6.1: Sixteen floor plans representative of the set that the agent experiences whilst
learning about the domain in which it will be designing (refer Appendix B for the complete
set).
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6.1.1 Setup: learning and seeing
The experiment is primed with a set of floor plans, a sample of which are shown in Figure 6.1
(see Appendix B for the full set). The development of situations is supervised; floor plans are
labelled with the architect responsible for them. Prior to interpreting the source, the system
holds expectations from the situation. For example, if it is expecting a Palladio floor plan then
it holds conceptual expectations related to this.
A source is randomly generated as a set of pixels on a canvas, Figure 6.2(a), and the system
saccades across the canvas, interpreting as it perceives, Figure 6.2(b).
(a) (b)
Figure 6.2: A randomly generated source (a) is perceived by saccading across the image in a
pattern from left to right, (b), with the system only ever perceiving 16x16 squares at a time.
The system attempts to construct from the available source data as it saccades, using its expec-
tations. Figure 6.3 shows two examples of where a construction has occurred in two different
runs of the experiment. The two runs have the same source and the same knowledge, but the
situation that the system is in is different in the two runs. As a result, the constructed interpre-
tation is very different - not only is the system constructing something different, but it is using
a different part of the representation for construction.
The constructed representations are canonical representations of the initial floor plans that the
agent was primed with. Figure 6.4 shows what the system has ‘seen’ within the randomly
generated source - it has constructed something that looks like a floor plan from what is available.
It has made this construction because of the expectations that it held. At this point in the saccade
there was sufficient similarity for the system to be able to construct an interpretation from what
it was expecting.
6.1.2 Analysis
The results in this Section addressed the two aims, that an interpretation is constructed by the
viewer and that the viewer uses knowledge within situations:
• Interpretation is situated: Two different interpretations are produced by runs in the
system, but neither the knowledge held by the system nor the source has changed. The
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6.3: Two different constructions from the same source have resulted from two runs of
the system with different expectations: (a) expecting a Frank Lloyd Wright; and (b) expecting
an Andrea Palladio. The squares are black where construction from expectation has occurred.
interpreting as a Lloyd Wright
interpreting as a Palladio
(c)
(a)
(b)
(d)
Figure 6.4: The two constructed representations are compared to the original representations
that were part of the training set from: (a) a Frank Lloyd Wright; and (b) an Andrea Palladio.
The images labelled (c) are representations of the concepts within the system that have been
constructed. The images labelled (d) are the original representations used in the training set.
reason why the interpretation is different is that the system is within a different situa-
tion. This demonstrates that the expectations that the system holds are important in
constructing an interpretation.
• Interpretations are constructed: The source being interpreted is a randomly generated
bitstring; objectively, it is completely meaningless. But because the system knows about
floor plans, it is trying to construct what it is seeing as a floor plan. Often it is not able
to construct anything meaningful, but sometimes it does, constructing its own world from
what is available.
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A limitation is that the system uses supervised rather than unsupervised learning in order to
produce more intuitively meaningful results. The system was supervised in constructing layer
2 by labelling each floor plan with the architect that designed the building. For this reason
the system can be said to be expecting a Palladio or a Lloyd Wright. The same system run
with unsupervised learning produces the same results, in terms of how the system constructed
interpretations from expectations. The difference is that it is much harder to explain what
the system is doing in a meaningful way, because the situations are unlabelled, are organising
unlabelled concepts, and the abstraction occurring is not intuitive to an outside observer. In a
model of situated learning from experience unsupervised learning would be crucial to the point
of the model. However, because the goal here is to show how CI constructs through push-pull
and the relevance for design the use of supervised learning is acceptable.
Another way to analyse the model is to introduce a theoretical notion of a space of possible
interpretations. Each of the three types of interpretation suggest a different space of possible
interpretations. Push-only interpretation has the possibility of all interpretations within the
space, Figure 6.5(a). This is reduced in pull-only interpretation to just those interpretations
within the situation, Figure 6.5(b). Push-pull interpretation blurs the lines between the two,
where there is an attempt to construct an interpretation within the space defined by the situation,
but the space can be extended and moved depending upon the relationship between the source
and the expectations, Figure 6.5(c). This model provides an example of this third type of
interpretation through CI.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6.5: Three spaces of possible interpretations: (a) push-only; (b) pull-only and (c)
push-pull in CI.
6.2 Experiment 2: CI for exploring implicit knowledge in
situations
Constructive interpretation provides one explanation for the way that designers navigate their
own knowledge, moving between different interpretations. The system models the way that un-
expected discoveries can occur during the conversation of moving and seeing. The term ‘agent’
will be used in this description to refer to an encapsulated system that is located in an envi-
ronment and that is capable of flexible autonomous action in that environment (Jennings 2000).
The three metrics of constructive interpretation can all be seen in these results: reinterpretation
of elements; similarity to the source; and the use of knowledge learnt from experience.
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The setup for the system is designed to mimic the seeing-moving-seeing of Scho¨n and Wiggins
(1992). When a run of the system begins, the agent is within a situation - it has certain explicit
concepts that it is working with, which in this case are the elements from floor plans that it has
experience with. The agent ‘moves’ by drawing using these explicit design concepts. It ‘sees’
through CI. Constructing from its implicit expectations can result in a change of situation. In
terms of design, this represents a change in the agent’s notion of what it is doing. Once the
situation changes, the entire design comes to be seen within the new situation, which can lead
to the agent seeing old elements in new ways.
6.2.1 Setup: learning from experience with design plans
The system learns connections between a conceptual layer and a situation layer through expe-
rience with floor plans. The system is tabula rasa when it begins. It saccades across a number
of floor plans and learns from what it sees. In this way it learns from experience. The system
learns from a set of floor plans taken from sketches by the architects Andrea Palladio, Frank
Lloyd Wright and Louis Khan. A sample from the floor plans used are shown in Figure 6.1 (the
full set can be found in Appendix B).
In experiencing each plan the system perceives by saccading across an image after: (i) sharpening
the image; (ii) reducing to black and white; and (iii) applying a mosaic filter to reduce the
resolution. Figure 6.6 shows the transformation from the architect’s sketch. Figure 6.7 shows
the way that the floor plan is perceived by saccading across the image, from the top left corner
to the bottom right corner.
Figure 6.6: The floor plans are perceived by reducing the image to a canonical representation
(sharpening, reducing to black and white and applying a mosaic filter)
Figure 6.7: The system saccades across the floor plan to perceive it
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The system is learning about the domain within which it will be designing. It learns the concepts
that make up the plans and how they relate to each other in layer 2. A limitation present is that
the concepts the system is learning are simple segments of the perceived image, Figure 6.7. In
any human-like constructive interpretation system there would be some kind of shape-detection
or ability to perceive Gestalts (e.g. Desolneux et al 2004).
Through these experiences the system learns both: (i) the type of concepts that are encountered
when looking at architect’s sketches; and (ii) how they are related to each other in situations.
Figure 6.8 shows the way that the two layers hold different information. Constructive interpre-
tation makes use of the fact that although the situations and concepts differ, they all inhabit
the same conceptual space.
layer 1
layer 2
Figure 6.8: As the system saccades across a floor plan it learns: (i) in layer one the concepts
as points within conceptual space in layer 1; and (ii) situations that bring these concepts
together.
6.2.2 Description: A conversation with the design medium
In the system, the agent is having a conversation with the design medium. Figure 6.9 shows
the sequence of moving-seeing-moving, where the agent draws using its explicit expectations and
then constructively interprets the medium within a situation. When an implicit expectation is
constructed, it changes the agent’s notion of what it is doing - not only at the level of conception,
but at the level of situation. This means that not only have the explicit expectations changed
(perhaps only by a single concept), but the implicit expectations have changed (often quite
significantly), making it more likely that the system will reinterpret existing elements in a new
way.
6.2.2.1 Drawing in the design medium
This process can be demonstrated using an example from the system. In Figure 6.10 the agent is
drawing using concepts that it knows about from experience. In this diagram each of the small
boxes depicts an explicit concept. The drawing canvas is the design medium upon which the
Constructive Interpretation in Design 110
design notion 
interpretation 
EXPECTED WORLD INTERPRETED WORLD EXTERNAL WORLD 
explicit concepts
representation 
altered
representation
altered
representation
interpreted
representation
(explicit concepts)
interpreted
representation
(explicit concepts)
interpreted
representation
(explicit concepts)
altered 
representation 
altered 
representation 
interpreted
representation
(implicit concept)
changed
design notions
change of expectations 
design actions 
push-pull of interpretation 
persistence over time 
Figure 6.9: The agent draws using its explicit expectations. Through CI implicit expectations
come to be constructed, changing the agent’s notion of what it is doing and the space of possible
designs
agent has drawn. The drawing canvas seen in this Figure has come about through a random
placement of the concepts being used.
This example shows the agent ‘playing’ with the concepts that it is working with. Consider the
way that the designer of a house knows the elements that they want to include in a floor plan
and knows the site that they are working with. In conceptual design they play around with
configurations that fit their conception of the design problem. This is a classic space layout
design problem, where a designer might know that they want, perhaps, to have two bedrooms,
a kitchen, a bathroom and a living room in the plan, but there is still a large space of possible
designs available even if each element is taken to be unchanging.
In the model, the agent has four explicitly expected concepts. With these elements there is
space of possible designs by laying out them out in different ways (this notion is explored fur-
ther in Section 6.3.3.2). Construction from implicit expectations combined with constructive
interpretation leads to the space of possible designs changing through unexpected discovery.
In the experiment, the agent is drawing using its explicitly expected concepts and constructively
interpreting. This can be described as a cycle of generation and interpretation. In this experi-
ment, the agent generates designs by drawing with concepts in the design medium, structuring
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explicit
concepts
drawing
canvas
situation
indicator
Figure 6.10: The agent draws using elements from a floor plan in its experience
them in a stochastic manner. It then constructively interprets the design medium creating a
cycle within which there is a bi-directional relationship between the situation changing the in-
terpretation, and the interpretation changing the situation. A change of situation also changes
the designs that are generated.
The experiment described in this Section uses an agent that has experience with floor plans. It
begins designing within a situation and generates designs until CI causes a change in situation.
This is represented in Figure 6.11 where the loop of generation and interpretation through push-
pull can occur many times before either a push or a pull from implicit expectations causes the
situation to change.
situation design
medium
generation
push-pull
construction
from implicit
expectations
Figure 6.11: Changes to the situation through CI during design
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The ‘situation indicator’ represents the agent’s notion of what it is doing, in this case drawing
using ideas inspired by a specific Palladio floor plan. What is important here is that although
this is the agent’s notion of what it is doing, there is also a web of implicit expectations when
the agent is within this state. Figure 6.12 represents this internal state of the agent, showing the
implicit as well as the explicit concepts as locations within the SOM. This has been represented
as a 2-dimensional grid with nodes at each intersection, but each node actually represents a point
in 256-dimensional space.
layer 1 layer 2
explicit
implicit
expectations
Figure 6.12: The explicit and implicit expectations prior to drawing held in each layer of the
system
6.2.2.2 Interpreting from the situation
When the agent is interpreting the canvas, it constructs an interpretation using both the implicit
and explicit expectations. In Figure 6.13 the agent is interpreting the drawing that it has just
created (the ‘seeing’ part of the design conversation) and has only constructed from explicit
concepts.
The assumption in this model is that during conceptual design the designer is open to the
reinterpretation of elements through implicit expectations, and the system will always attend to
constructions from implicit concepts when they occur. In the case seen in Figure 6.13, the agent
does not construct any implicit expectations, as none are a good match for what is available.
The explicit expectations can be constructed, and so the agent sees the same elements and
relationships that it drew with. This is the ‘typical’ case, where the agent sees nothing unintended
within its work.
This playing around with elements and the relationships between them occurs until the system
constructs from implicit expectations. Figure 6.14 shows the next step in the conversation,
where the same concepts are being drawn with, but this time with different relationships. This
time, however, when the agent looks at what it has drawn it constructs from one of its implicit
expectations, Figure 6.15. The reasons for this construction are: (i) that the expectations are
such that this specific interpretation is implicit within the situation; and (ii) that the perception
of the scene is a fit with these implicit expectations (out of all possible implicit expectations).
Constructive Interpretation in Design 113
explicit
concepts
representation
of interpreted
concepts
boxes indicate
constructed concept
during saccade
Figure 6.13: The agent constructs an interpretation using its explicit and implicit concepts.
The agent sees the same elements that it has used to draw with.
Figure 6.14: The agent draws using the same elements with different spatial relationships.
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The implications of this construction are that: (i) the agent has useful expectations based upon
its experiences; (ii) the interpretation is relevant to these expectations; and (iii) the interpretation
is relevant to what is happening visually. To somebody watching the agent, the construction
appears as a moment of insight; perhaps if this were a cognitive study an agent might have just
said, ‘why don’t we try some ideas inspired by Khan in this sketch?’. In this case, because we
know what is going on inside the agent we can describe the genesis of this idea. It comes from
implicit expectations, which arise from a combination of similarity in conceptual space and from
semantic connections in a hierarchy of knowledge.
At another level of abstraction what the model is doing is juxtaposing two types of similarity: the
similarity that occurs through experience, such as perceptual elements and concepts that occur
together in experiences; and the similarity that occurs through proximity within conceptual
space. Constructive interpretation allows the design agent to utilise both types of similarity.
In the model described here, similarity from experience has been used in creating a situation
through propagation of expectations; and similarity in conceptual space is the cue for changing
situations.
Interpretation is a two-way process, where the situation that the agent is in changes the inter-
pretation given to a representation, and the act of interpreting changes the agent’s situation. In
this case it has changed the agent’s notion of what it is doing. It has changed from design by
‘laying out a floor plan using ideas from inspired by Palladio’ to ‘ laying out a floor plan using
ideas inspired by Palladio and Khan’.
In this model all of the changes to ideas happen at the same level of abstraction, but in cognitive
studies we see this occurring at different levels of abstraction for designers. The implication of this
change in situation is that the space of possible designs has changed. Where previously the agent
was concerned with laying out certain elements in different patterns (a limited, routine design
task) the space of possible designs has widened through the construction of an interpretation
(turning this into conceptual design). It is hypothesised that this kind of construction occurs
during conceptual design activity.
Figure 6.16 shows the next step in the design conversation, where the agent draws within the
changed situation. It is now able to produce design actions that it could not have contemplated
within the previous situation. As well as change to the explicit concepts that the agent is
working with, the new situation brings into the design a different set of implicit concepts. This
is represented in Figure 6.17 where only one of the explicit concepts has changed, but many of
of the implicit concepts have changed, from viewing the work as inspired by Khan.
The relevance of this is that the system is pulling from the representation (the design medium)
something that it finds interesting which has led it to change the notions of what it is working
with. There are many possible concepts that the system could have pulled from the represen-
tation using what it knows. The reason that it has constructed this concept is that it is both:
(i) relevant to the current design ideas; and (ii) able to be constructed from the available per-
cepts. The point of the exercise is to present one possible explanation for the phenomenon of
unexpected discovery observed in designers.
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Figure 6.15: The agent constructs from three of its explicit concepts and one of its implicit
concepts.
explicit
concepts
changed
situationconcept
not available
in previous
situation
Figure 6.16: The agent’s conception of what it is doing changes. Instead of drawing inspired
by the work of Palladio it is drawing inspired by the work of both Palladio and Khan.
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Figure 6.17: Following the construction of an interpretation from an implicit expectation the
situation changes, as do the implicit and explicit conceptual expectations.
6.2.3 Analysis
In this conversation the agent is exploring its own knowledge in a way that is guided by CI.
Consider a system with many concepts attempting a layout problem. An attempt to use all
of them at once results in a combinatorial explosion and the classic problem of search in a
large space. Constructive interpretation looks towards a system that maintains a focussed set
of concepts (and hence a smaller space of designs) and exploits its knowledge from experience
(in the form of implicit expectations within memory) in order to change this space of possible
designs.
Figure 6.18 shows explicit and implicit expectations within conceptual space in two layers. The
layer is unable to construct an interpretation from the explicit expectation, but an implicit
expectation in a semantically related area is able to be constructed. This previously implicit
expectation is now made explicit through interpretation.
The system can be analysed by observing the frequency with which it is constructing from im-
plicit expectations, something that is controlled by the minimum similarity for pull variable. The
minimum similarity for pull variable was changed with a Monte Carlo set of 1000 run for each
value. Within each run, within each set, CI occurs 40 times. Figure 6.19 shows the frequency
with which the system changed the situation through construction from implicit expectations,
expressed as a percentage - the percentage of interpretations in which pull from implicit expec-
tations occurred.
The system has the same knowledge in every run (it has been primed with experience of the
same floor plans), but its starting state is stochastically determined. Figure 6.19 shows that an
increase in the minimum similarity for pull results in a decrease in the occurrence of construction
from expectations. The standard deviation bars in Figure 6.19 show high standard deviation
which indicates a strong influence of the starting conditions.
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Figure 6.18: Two layers at different levels of abstraction with implicit and explicit expecta-
tions shown. There is a semantic connection to another region in the lower layer through the
higher layer.
6.2.4 Formalising the conversation
The method for generating and the method for interpreting are not particular to those used in
the experiment. Generation occurred in the experiment throughout random layout of elements
upon a canvas. Interpretation occurred during a saccade across the canvas. This can be described
in a more abstract sense as the effect of two processes: (i) generation from expectations; and
(ii) interpretation from expectations and experiences where pull cannot occur. This iteration of
generation and constructive interpretation are given by Equations 6.1 and 6.2 respectively:
E
generation
−→ D (6.1)
D
E
I (6.2)
The agent sees the world within situations. Concepts are structured into situations through
experience. Design occurs within a situation and the space of possible designs is limited by this
situation. Generation produces novel designs from existing designs. CI provides a means by
which a system can move from one space of designs to another based upon both its experiences
and the ideas that it is working with in the design medium. Through CI, Equation 6.2, the
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Figure 6.19: The relationship between percentage of constructions from implicit expectations
and the variable for minimum similarity for pull (vertical bars represent standard deviation).
expectations can be changed, such that Et 6= Et
′
. This in turn means that the generation of a
design, Equation 6.1 is now changed.
6.2.5 Achievements of the model
Amodel of constructive interpretation in the design conversation has been implemented and
tested. An agent learns about the domain of floor plans through unsupervised experience with a
set of labelled floor plans. It engages in a design conversation of generation and interpretation.
Generation in the model occurs through layout of design elements, the expected concepts within
a situation. Interpretation is constructive, with pull from the concepts within situation.
The explicit expectations within a situation are surrounded (in conceptual space) by implicit
expectations, which by definition the agent is not aware of. Through construction from these
implicit expectations the situation is changed. The agent is exploring the implicit expectations
within the situation by play with design elements (through generation) and then interpreting
the result constructively. The result is that the space of possible designs is changing during the
design process through constructive interpretation. This phenomenon will be further clarified
through the description of another model.
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6.3 Experiment 3: CI in synthesising a set of country
growth indicators
6.3.1 Experiment setup
CI was applied to another design task with the goal of showing how general the framework is.
In this model the task is to design a set of growth indicators for a country. The model is based
upon the framework described in Section 6.2.2. It differs in the sense that the previous model
used an agent that experienced floor plans; the agent in this model has experience with data
about growth indicators for different countries within the world. The raw data were obtained
from the World Bank1. Table 6.1 gives a sample of the type of data used in this experiment.
The experiment is motivated by a desire to show: (i) that the framework applies to any source
that an agent can sense; and also (ii) that even seemingly ‘concrete’ data such as a statistic is a
source that gets constructively interpreted, and that what the agent sees in the data comes from
its situation. The first is shown through a repeat of the experiment in Section 6.2.2 with more
detailed analysis. The second is shown through the addition of salience weighting to the model.
Country
Name
Electricity
production
from oil
sources (%
of total)
CO2 emis-
sions (met-
ric tons per
capita)
Population
density
(people per
sq. km)
Armed
forces
personnel
(% of total
labor force)
Mortality
rate,
under-5
(per 1,000)
Population,
female (%
of total)
Canada 1.539086802 16.88755556 3.626322509 0.348642576 6.1 50.48478833
Angola 15.51860649 1.40948886 14.08084142 1.505909814 170.8 50.70381055
Eritrea 99.30555556 0.121081685 47.33830693 10.15182462 61.3 50.88991834
Oman 18.00180018 13.6773335 8.808726979 4.579823033 13.7 43.43586546
Albania 2.517482517 1.353329558 114.3232847 1.032752683 17.4 50.57561862
Cote d’Ivoire 0.31965903 0.317004854 63.2792327 0.240143783 123.7 48.96938278
Nigeria 4.948211333 0.644416439 162.1944541 0.342498931 148.1 49.91798606
Sudan 68.04668575 0.284730009 17.0169596 1.000127348 109.6 49.65588649
United Arab
Emirates
1.86450477 31.03379192 52.19991627 1.868048276 8.1 32.27623111
Table 6.1: Some examples of the type of data used in the experiment
The model iterates through the conversation of design using the framework shown in Section
6.2.2. This involves: (i) the initial situation sets expected concepts and percepts; (ii) the system
generates designs using the expected concepts; and (iii) the system constructively interprets
the generated designs. This can lead to (iv) a change of situation and hence; (v) a change of
expectations.
6.3.2 Representing concepts and situations in the model
6.3.2.1 Representing concepts
Table 6.2 shows an example of the growth indicators used for a country, in this case Norway. This
data is held for each country in the model, and the 45 variables are features in a 45-dimension
1http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog, last accessed 10th October 2010
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conceptual space. Similarity to other concepts can be determined as a distance measure within
the resulting conceptual space.
Category Value Category Value
Agricultural land (% of land area) 3.394899 Road sector energy consumption (% of to-
tal energy consumption)
13.54853
Arable land (hectares per person) 0.181349 Armed forces personnel (% of total labor
force)
0.743095
Permanent cropland (% of land area) 0.016432 Military expenditure (% of GDP) 1.516063
Forest area (% of land area) 30.96293 Household final consumption expendi-
ture, etc. (% of GDP)
41.20823
Agriculture value added per worker (con-
stant 2000 US$)
41269.42 Gross national expenditure (% of GDP) 84.01009
Electricity production from coal sources
(% of total)
0.105608 Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 45.88179
Electricity production from hydroelectric
sources (% of total)
98.22593 Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 29.89188
Electricity production from oil sources (%
of total)
0.019802 Trade (% of GDP) 75.77367
Energy imports, net (% of energy use) -696.415 Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 1.395724
Alternative and nuclear energy (% of total
energy use)
43.16989 Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 10.45332
Fossil fuel energy consumption (% of to-
tal)
54.79355 Industry, value added (% of GDP) 42.79789
Energy use (kg of oil equivalent) per
$1,000 GDP (constant 2005 PPP)
116.8773 Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) 55.80639
Electric power consumption (kWh per
capita)
24980.29 Adjusted savings: carbon dioxide damage
(% of GNI)
0.094264
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) 9.072171 Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 2.391434
Population density (people per sq. km) 15.47638 Ratio of girls to boys in primary and sec-
ondary education (%)
99.42189
Bank capital to assets ratio (%) 4.7 Primary completion rate, total (% of rel-
evant age group)
96.47805
Consumer price index (2005 = 100) 103.0781 Total enrollment, primary (% net) 98.41394
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 0.728997 School enrollment, secondary (% net) 96.55196
Real interest rate (%) 4.15651 Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) 3.7
Research and development expenditure
(% of GDP)
1.670322 Prevalence of undernourishment (% of
population)
5
Central government debt, total (% of
GDP)
47.22604 Population, female (% of total) 50.35063
Business extent of disclosure index
(0=less disclosure)
7 Urban population growth (annual %) 1.112264
Total tax rate (% of profit) 42
Table 6.2: Country data for Norway
In order to make the data for each concept more easily readable and comparable, the values
for each variable have been normalised and represented using shading, where a whiter square
indicates a higher value, Figure 6.20. The variables for Norway that were shown in Table 6.2 can
be seen in a different representation in Figure 6.20(a), where the 45 features are represented by
45 shaded squares. Figure 6.20(b) shows a representation of the data for Canada. The graphical
representations allow the differences between the countries to be observed. Figure 6.20(c) shows
Cote d’Ivoire and Figure 6.20(d) shows Singapore to allow for a comparison of four countries
with different values for each growth indicator.
Consider the variable in the top-right of each square at reference I0, which is the ‘Energy imports,
net (% of energy use)’2. This variable has four different values within the four countries shown.
2The World Bank calculates this as: Net energy imports are estimated as energy use less production, both
measured in oil equivalents. A negative value indicates that the country is a net exporter. Energy use refers
to use of primary energy before transformation to other end-use fuels, which is equal to indigenous production
plus imports and stock changes, minus exports and fuels supplied to ships and aircraft engaged in international
transport.
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The data has been normalised (relative to other countries) so that the highest value for any
variable is white and the lowest value is black. For this variable, black indicates a high negative
value, -890%, a net export of energy. Singapore is entirely white, indicating that this country
imports all of its energy. In contrast, Norway is a dark grey, indicating that it is a net exporter
of energy. Canada and Cote d’Ivoire fit in between the two, with Canada producing slightly
more of its own energy. The actual values for this field are: Singapore, 100%; Norway, -696.41%;
Canada, -53.39%; and Cote d’Ivoire, -12.70%. The purpose of this explanation is to provide a
way of understanding the designs produced by the system.
CanadaNorway
Cote d’Ivoire Singapore
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.20: A graphical representation of normalised data for four countries: (a) Norway;
(b) Canada; (c) Cote d’Ivoire; and (d) Singapore. Each square represents one dimension within
conceptual space (see AppendixC for a mapping from cell reference to dimension category).
6.3.2.2 Representing situations
Situations bring concepts together based upon experiences. In this case situations are constructed
during priming so that the agent expects to find countries together that are geographically co-
located. Some examples of situations are shown in Table 6.3. These have been established based
upon the average latitude and longitude of each of the countries used in the study, Appendix C.
These situations are indicative of the way that the agent has experienced the concepts occurring
together in its past experiences.
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Sample 1: Algeria Tunisia Spain Switzerland
Sample 2: Angola Namibia Zambia Gabon
Sample 3: Argentina Chile Paraguay Peru
Sample 4: Armenia Georgia Syrian Arab Republic Turkey
Sample 5: Australia Indonesia Malaysia Singapore
Table 6.3: Some examples of concepts grouped together through experience
6.3.3 A design conversation in the model
This model implements the framework seen in Figure 6.11 where there is a generation from
explicit expectations followed by the construction of an interpretation. This can lead to a change
of situation through construction from implicit expectations.
In the floor plan design model, Section 6.2.2, generation was carried out by random layout of
concepts. In this model, generation is carried out by a crossover of genotypes. Each concept in
the model (each country) can be considered as a genotype, with the value of each variable a gene.
By taking some genes from each of the explicit concepts within the situation, a new concept can
be generated.
In this system the design medium is the external representation of designs generated in this way.
The design medium is then constructively interpreted. This usually results in the construction
of one of the expected concepts. However, it sometimes leads to a change of situation, in which
case the explicit concepts being used by the agent change. In this way the agent progresses
through the design conversation of moving-seeing-moving.
6.3.3.1 Analysis: changing situations
The experiment was run in a Monte Carlo set of 10,000 runs in order to show the frequency of
each type of event during construction of interpretation in the conception layer. In each run the
starting situation is different. The results are shown in Figure 6.21. The minimum similarity for
pull is a variable in the experiment and is changed from 0.85 to 1, a range within which pull from
both implicit and explicit concepts occurs. These results show that as the minimum similarity
increases the occurrence of push into the situation increases and that construction from implicit
expectations peaks between 0.89 and 0.97
The situation changes when situation cannot construct what it is expecting from what is avail-
able. This can occur when: (i) there is push into situation; or (ii) when there is construction
from an implicit concept. The result of a change of situation is that there is a change in the
space of designs.
6.3.3.2 Analysis: changing space of designs
Generation in the experiment occurs through genetic crossover. If we took all 121 countries
in the experiment and allowed for genetic crossover at all points to create a final design then
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Figure 6.21: The rate of occurrences from pull and push in the conception layer from a Monte
Carlo set of 10,000 runs
each feature could be one of 121 possible values. There are 45 features, meaning that there are
12145 ≈ 5× 1093 possible designs, which is a very large space of possible designs.
Within a situation of 4 concepts (4 countries) there are 445 ≈ 1 × 1027 possible designs which
is a much smaller space of possible designs. Through changes of situation, this small space of
designs moves around within the larger space of designs. To an external observer this looks
like creative design: the system looks like it is operating within a constrained space and is then
breaking out into a new space. This is analogous to the way that somebody attempting the nine-
dot problem looks like they are constrained by the convex hull created by the nine dots until
they realise that they can draw outside this hull, at which point a space of possible solutions
opens up. Constructive interpretation gives a model for a method by which this space changes
that is inspired by the phenomena seen in human designers interpreting. A representation of
the changing space of possible designs within the model is shown in Figure 6.22, where there is
exploration within a small space of designs and then the space changes through CI.
The changing space of possible designs can be observed in this experiment. The situation consists
of four countries. A minimum similarity for pull of 0.92 is used as a point where there is a high
ratio of construction from implicit expectations to push into situation. A specific run of the
experiment is observed where the system changes situation through both push and pull from
implicit expectations. The run can be described as going through the steps of:
1. The agent begins with a situation that holds explicit concepts of Namibia, Botswana, South
Africa and Zambia.
2. The agent generates designs within the space created by the situation. These designs are
crossovers between the four countries in the situation, Figures 6.23(a), (b), (c) and (d).
This is an example of the change represented in Figure 6.22(i).
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Figure 6.22: The changing space of possible designs as the generation of designs within
situations with three types of change labelled: (i) the generation of a design within a situation
that does not change; (ii) interpretation changes the situation but with an overlap in the space
of possible designs and a new design is generated; and (iii) interpretation changes the situation
where the space of designs does not overlap and a new design is generated.
3. In the 8th design that it generates, Figure 6.24(a), none of the explicit concepts can be
constructed through pull. However, one of the implicit concepts is able to be constructed,
Bangladesh, Figure 6.24(b). The result is that the situation is changed. This change is of
the type represented in Figure 6.22(ii).
4. The agent generates designs within the space of the new situation, further examples of
type (i).
5. The 31st design that is generated, Figure 6.25(a), cannot be constructed within the sit-
uation. The interpreted data is pushed into situation, which finds the closest situation
(within conceptual space, based upon the primed experiences of situations) within which
it can be constructed. It can construct an interpretation of this source as Uruguay, Figure
6.25(b), within a situation of Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay and Bolivia. This is an example
of a change of situation represented in Figure 6.22(iii).
6. The agent continues to generate designs within the space created by the new situation.
6.3.4 Analysis: conclusions
The experiment with country data serves two purposes: (i) it supports the claim that the
framework for CI in design is general; and (ii) it shows the way in which the space of possible
designs changes through constructive interpretation.
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South Africa
Namibia
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Zambia
Botswana
Figure 6.23: Four explicit concepts within the initial situation: (a) Namibia; (b) Botswana;
(c) South Africa; and (d) Zambia.
Generated Design Bangladesh
(a) (b)
Figure 6.24: One of the designs generated, (a), cannot be constructed from explicit expec-
tations but can be constructed from implicit expectations, (b), Bangladesh.
• Generality: The application of the framework for CI in design to another set of data
(from that seen in Section 6.2.2), that symbolic rather than visual, supports the claim that
the framework can be applied to any source that can be represented as a vector through
sensation. Also, the experiment used a different type of generation - a technique based upon
genetic crossover. This supports the claim that the type of generation is not important for
the experiment, so long as existing designs are being used in the generation of designs that
are novel within the situation.
• Changing space of designs: The experiment has demonstrated the way that the space
of possible designs changes through CI. Within a situation a limited number of designs are
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Generated Design Uruguay
(a) (b)
Figure 6.25: A design (a) is generated that cannot be constructed through pull from con-
ception, and is pushed into situation, which finds a situation in which the data can be con-
structed, leading to a change of expectations in conception and pull from the concept shown
in (b) Uruguay.
possible. Through CI, the situation changes, moving the limited space to a different place.
To an external observer, it looks as though the agent is working within a confined space
and then has suddenly broken out of it to create designs that are no longer routine. CI
provides an explanation for this phenomenon.
6.3.5 The effects of salience weighting upon interpretation
Salience weighting (refer Chapter 4) changes the way that a concept is used within a situation.
For example, the same concept used within two different situations may result in constructing
different interpretations. In this Section a method for implementing salience weighting in the
model is described and demonstrated.
6.3.5.1 Implementing salience weighting
Salience weighting requires conception to be linked to a number of perceptual domains (refer
Section 2.3.3.1). The 45 features of conceptual space are each linked to one of four perceptual
categories. In this model four domains related to the data are identified as: agricultural, financial,
environmental and demographical (shown with their related categories in Appendix C, Table
C.1).
Within a situation there are four explicitly expected concepts. Each one of these concepts has a
link to all four perceptual domains. The suggestion of salience weighting is that the values within
perceptual domains can be a guide to where attention follows within the model. For example,
when an ambulance passes close by, the extreme volume of sound leads to attention being pulled
to sound. A full treatment of the way in which selective attention relates to perceptual domains
is outside the scope of this thesis, however the hypothesis is that values in perceptual domains
change the way that an interpretation is constructed.
In this model salience weighting is calculated using the average distance from the median for
the features within the domain. Each vector within conceptual space can be described as the
Constructive Interpretation in Design 127
convergence of four vectors from perceptual space, agriculture (ag), environment (en), finance
(fi) and demography (de), Equation 6.3:
v = {vag, ven, vfi, vde} (6.3)
Each of the four vectors in the perceptual domains have a number of features. For example,
agriculture is made up of six features, Equation 6.4. These six features are: agricultural land,
arable land, permanent cropland, forest area, value added agriculture (per worker) and value
added agriculture (% of GDP).
vag = {f1, f2, f3, f4, f5, f6} (6.4)
The median for each feature is represented as f˜ . The weighting w for each domain is calculated
by Equation 6.5:
w =
n∑
i=1
|fi − f˜i|
n
(6.5)
The salience within the situation is then a ratio of the relative weightings of the four domains
within the model, Equation 6.6.
salience = {wag : wen : wfi : wde} (6.6)
All measurements of similarity within conceptual space are then weighted depending upon the
perceptual domain that the features are related to, refer Equation 4.1.
6.3.5.2 Demonstrating the effects of salience upon interpretation
The interpretation of the designs produced within the model is affected by this salience weighting.
Consider two different situations that have a concept in common which is Switzerland: (i)
Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Switzerland; and (ii) Spain, Portugal, Ireland and
Switzerland. Both situations include Switzerland. Through salience weighting, the use of this
concept occurs differently in the two different situations. Table 6.4 shows the four perceptual
domains and the salience that each has within the two different situations using Equation 6.6
(the full vectors used for the experiment can be found in Appendix C, Table C.3).
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category Switzerland to Gen. Des.
situation
AG EN FI DE distance similarity
Spain, Portugal, Ireland
and Switzerland
0.252736 0.237908 0.294205 0.215152 0.326146465 0.899090559
Germany, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Switzerland
0.258768 0.246918 0.273833 0.220482 0.324084232 0.900296983
Table 6.4: An example of different salience weighting within different situations. Columns
are: situation description; salience of the agricultural perceptual domain; environmental do-
main; financial domain; demographic domain; the distance from Switzerland to a generated
design in each situation; and the similarity from this distance.
How does this affect interpretation? A generated design can be used as an example in a run with
the minimum similarity for pull set to 0.90. Figure 6.26(a) shows Switzerland and Figure 6.26(b)
shows a generated design. Within one situation the design can be constructed as Switzerland,
whilst in the other situation it cannot and push into situation occurs.
Generated DesignSwitzerland
(a) (b)
Figure 6.26: A representation of two vectors: (a) Switzerland; and (b) a Generated Design
This run shows the way that a concept is used differently within different situations. It has shown
the same source (the generated design) and the same concept (Switzerland). The situation has
changed the way that each concept is used when interpreting, resulting in a different outcome
from interpretation: in one construction from pull occurred and in the other it did not. This
experiment is inspired by the way that designers appear to use the same knowledge in different
ways within different circumstances. CI gives a framework within which the effects of situation
manifest themselves.
Consider the example shown in Section 2.1.1 where a designer made a judgement that a design
element was “too small to do anything with”. Salience weighting provides a basis for attending
to different parts of a concept within different situations - the same block element might be
considered in relation to size in one situation and colour in another. This effect can be explored
in future research.
6.3.5.3 Discussion: the effects of salience upon generation
In a similar way the generation that occurs within the experiment can be weighted based upon
salience within a situation. In the situations in Section 6.3.5.2 the financial perceptual domain
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was more salient than other domains. It follows that an agent that is attending to this domain
might be more likely to alter those elements of the design that relate to this domain.
More formally, this can be described with reference to Equation 6.1 by describing the set of
expectations used for generation as relating to a set of perceptual domains, Equation 6.7. The
generation equation can now be revised to include salience weights, resulting in Equation 6.8.
There are many possible ways in which these weights could affect generation, and it is outside
the scope of this thesis to describe them.
E = {Ep1 ,Ep2 ,Ep3 , ...,Epn} (6.7)
{wp1Ep1 , wp2Ep2 , wp3Ep3 , ..., wpnEpn}
generation
−→ D (6.8)
The implementation of this idea lies outside the scope of this thesis, but future research could
look at the way that an agent only alters the elements of a design that are salient.
6.4 Conclusions
This Chapter has presented three models that demonstrate the relevance of CI for design think-
ing. The first model constructed an interpretation from a representation based upon its ex-
pectations, showing that: (i) that a system can construct a meaningful representation from a
randomly generated source; and that (ii) two identical systems looking at the same source can
produce two different interpretations if their expectations are different.
The second model looked at the way that CI can result in the situation changing during the
conversation of design. The system begins with a focussed set of design concepts within a
situation, and explores these concepts by ‘drawing’ with them. When the system constructively
interprets it is able to reinterpret the elements in new ways. The model provides an explanation
for why this reinterpretation was produced and not another: (i) it is triggered by the visual
representation of the source; (ii) it is constructed from implicit expectations held within the
situation; and (iii) these expectations exist because of the experiences that system has had
(SOE expectations), as well as the immediate events that led up to this interpretation (COE
expectations). In this way the tacit knowledge within the situation is explored.
The third model showed another implementation of the framework for CI in design. It showed:
(i) the generality of the framework for CI in design; (ii) the effect of CI upon a changing space
of possible designs; and (iii) the effect of salience weighting upon interpretation. The possibility
of salience weighting affecting generation was also described.
Through these models the work has considered the effect that CI has upon design thinking. CI
gives a description that can account for the bi-direction effects of situation upon interpretation
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and interpretation upon situation. It contributes towards a model of design as an activity that
occurs within a sequence of situations.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Achievements
The work began with the goal of developing a computational model of interpretation that con-
structs from expectations within a situation. The following objectives were specified to achieve
this goal:
1. To develop a conceptual model of the construction of interpretations from expectations by
designers within situations
2. To develop a computational framework for constructive interpretation in which: (i) the
expectations are situated; (ii) the interpretation is constructed from expectations; and (iii)
the situation can be changed by interpretation
3. Implement a model of constructive interpretation in the design process and analyse and
evaluate results
7.1.1 A conceptual model of constructive interpretation
A conceptual model of CI was developed in which: (i) interpretation occurs through pull from
expectations and push where expectations cannot be constructed; (ii) interpretation is a process
distributed across multiple layers of abstraction; (iii) the expectations driving interpretation
originate in situations, which are formed by the experiences of the system, and are propagated
to lower layers of abstraction; (iv) the expectations of the system are changed by interpretation;
and (v) the system learns from experiences in a way that is situated in expectations.
The conceptual model contributed a description of the elements of constructive interpretation:
expectations, the construction of expectations from memory, the development of knowledge (as
memory or concepts) at different levels of abstraction, and push-pull to create an interpretation.
Examples provided anecdotal evidence of the effects of constructing from expectations at different
layers of abstraction: situation, conception, perception and sensation.
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Design is an activity that occurs inside the head of a designer. Interpretation is identified as
being relevant to an explanation of the way that humans design. The early stages of conceptual
design are discussed. In this stage of design, elements and the relationships between them are
often reinterpreted, leading the designer to change their notion of what they are doing. This is
identified as a bi-directional relationship in interpretation, where the expectations are used to
construct an interpretation through pull, but through the act of interpreting, the expectations
of a designer can change.
The literature review suggested that design can be described as a sequence of situated acts.
In the conceptual model it was hypothesised that constructive interpretation leads to a system
in which changes of situation are triggered by interpretation. This suggests that a system can
navigate its own knowledge via a design medium. It forms the basis for an explanation of the
kind of phenomena described in the literature, where designers appear to make leaps of insight
through unexpected discoveries within their own work.
In summary, the conceptual model of constructive interpretation is an argument for: (i) inter-
pretation as the construction of an interpretation at multiple levels of abstraction through pull
from expectation; (ii) interpretation as a process that changes the cognitive state of a designer,
potentially at different layers of abstraction; and (iii) interpretation as a model for a designer’s
movement through different situations during the early stages of conceptual design, regulating
the stability of specific exploration and the change of design space caused by divergent explo-
ration.
7.1.2 A computational framework for constructive interpretation
A computational framework for CI was developed, providing the basis for implementing the
conceptual model. The conceptual spaces framework was extended to include situations, and an
example of its use was given. This contributed a description of how to compute the construction
of expectations from memory and then interpret using these expectations. Another framework
was described to show CI in a system that developed situated knowledge in multiple layers
through experience. This showed a knowledge hierarchy developed through abstraction, as well
as the nature of the relationships between layers, and the way that interpretation and expectation
flow up and down through the knowledge structure.
7.1.2.1 The extended conceptual spaces framework for CI
The extended conceptual spaces framework described the situated construction of expectations
based upon an idealised knowledge structure. In the framework, each concept puts perceptual
domains together in a unique way such that some domains are more salient than others. A
situation puts concepts together such that some concepts are more salient than others. Salience
weighting distorts conceptual space, emphasising the importance of some dimensions and reduc-
ing others. The result is that the use of concepts and percepts within interpretation is situated.
The same concept produces different interpretations within a different situation.
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The contribution of the framework is towards a model in which: (i) learning is situated, such
that the expectations of the system change what is learnt; (ii) the use of knowledge is situated,
such that the construction of expectations from memory is changed by the current state of
the system; and (iii) the construction of an interpretation is situated, through the use of pull
from expectations. The framework represents one way that a situated system could be achieved
through the extension of conceptual spaces. An example of a blindfolded subject interpreting
within the framework contributed a theoretical demonstration of constructive interpretation.
7.1.2.2 The situated knowledge framework for CI
The framework was further developed into a model based upon multiple layers, where each layer
performed similar tasks of: (i) pulling from expectations; (ii) push where expectations cannot be
constructed; (iii) propagating expectations downwards; and (iv) learning from experience. The
exceptions to these were described as situation, the topmost layer, in which there can be no
push to a higher layer, only use of grounded experience; and sensation, the lowermost layer, in
which there can be no propagation of expectations downwards. These processes occurring across
multiple layers of abstraction were described as the basis for constructive interpretation.
Abstractions were described as summary representations over a variety of sources. A summary
representation was described as a prototype within conceptual space, where the dimensions of
this space are defined by the perceptual domains of the system. Experiences were described as
the originators of links between layers, where prototypes within a layer of lower abstraction link
to a prototype in a layer of higher abstraction.
The framework contributes a model of how a system comes to hold knowledge from experience.
In the hierarchy each layer structures the data from the layer below and creates summary repre-
sentations from it. In CI, interpretations are constructed from expectations. However, when pull
cannot construct from expectations the organisation of grounded knowledge from experience is
utilised to find expectations that do fit. This occurs through layers of higher abstraction propa-
gating expectations to layers of lower abstraction. Implicit expectations are a part of a situation
through connections that lie between layers (semantic) or within a layer based upon similarity
(similarity as distance in conceptual space).
It is hypothesised that some of the effects of the framework are: (i) the ability to deal with an
unexpected source; (ii) the ability to construct something from the ‘bursting blooming confu-
sion’ that is useful to what the system is trying to do; (iii) stability for interpreting a design
medium during the specific exploration of ideas; and (iv) fluidity for changing situations when
the situation is not longer working. The framework presents an idea of how situations come to
change during the design process.
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7.1.3 An implementation of constructive interpretation in the design
process
The computational framework for CI based upon a situated knowledge system was implemented
and used to give demonstrations of the effects of CI upon the design process.
7.1.3.1 Describing the implementation of CI
The computational framework for CI was implemented using modified self-organising maps
(SOMs). These modifications involved: (i) the implementation of expectations; (ii) changes
to the learning algorithm based upon expectations; and (iii) the construction of links between
multiple SOMs to represent layers of abstraction. The development of the system was made clear
through a comparison between push-only, pull-only and push-pull interpretation. A simple im-
plementation of push-pull with just two layers was used with randomly constructed source data.
This showed the first example of a way that a modified SOM can be used to create push-pull in
a multi-layer system. The system was further developed to show, through the interpretation of
shapes and letters, the co-ordination of concepts by the situation layer. The effects of situation
were seen to be that a balance between the source, COE expectations and SOA expectations
is reached in constructing an expectation. This was shown to result in multiple interpretations
from a single source, such as the construction of meaningful words from letters such that the
same form in a different situation is interpreted differently.
7.1.3.2 Implementing CI in the design process
A designer commences a design problem with a specific notion of what they are doing. In the
early stages of design it is observed that the designer’s own notion of what they are doing changes.
It is hypothesised that constructive interpretation is a process that can explain this construction
of goals, linking these moments of insight to the experiences of a designer. Situations can change
through construction from implicit expectations. As a result the designer navigates their own
knowledge (at different levels of abstraction) guided by interpretation from what is available in
the design medium.
The framework was implemented to explore this hypothesis in a number of ways. One demon-
stration used construction of a representation from a randomly generated image through inter-
pretation. This demonstrated in a CI system the kind of interpretation that was seen in Figure
1.1. This is significant because it demonstrates that meaning is something that is constructed
by a designer.
Another implementation showed a design conversation, in which a system held explicit design
concepts and worked with them by drawing in a design medium. Through construction of an
interpretation from what was available in the medium, it was seen that the system changed its
situation. This occurred in the system through construction of implicit concepts, at which point
the situation could not pull from expectations and changed. The effect of this is that the system
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explores the concepts that it is using by drawing with them in the design medium, but instead
of staying fixated on these concepts is able to change situation through CI when triggered by the
visual source. This provides a model in which the initial concepts represent a space of possible
designs, which is searched through drawing in the design medium. Through CI the situation
changes and with this the space of possible designs changes too. This is now a good fit with the
model of conceptual design, where the space within which search is occurring can change.
A third implementation showed a design conversation with a different set of data, based upon
growth indicators for countries. This model was used to show the way that a change of situations
leads to an agent navigating their own knowledge through the seeing-moving-seeing of design.
It implemented salience weighting to show the way that a concept comes to be used differently
within different situations and the effect of this upon design.
7.1.4 Summary of achievements
This work has achieved the objectives required for the aim. It has described constructive in-
terpretation and made an argument for why this kind of interpretation is needed for explaining
design. It has presented a model of what this kind of interpretation looks like based upon the
cognitive science available. It has described two ideas for how this model can be implemented
computationally. It has explored one of these ideas through a number of tests which have been
analysed. Whilst the work has achieved its aim, there are many ideas covered in this thesis that
require further exploration. This is discussed in Sections 7.2 and 7.3.
7.2 Discussion
The study of interpretation is circular in nature, Figure 7.1. This work began with a position on
interpretation, that designers construct from their expectations. It quickly became clear that a
model of interpretation is dependent upon a model of expectations. This leaves the researcher
with two options: (i) exploring the origin of expectations; or (ii) synthesising expectations. This
work looked to situated cognition to provide a basis for the development of expectations that
are grounded in knowledge.
In approaching the problem in this way, there was a constant pull upon the work to make it
more about the situated formation of concepts than about the construction of interpretations.
The program of situated design can be portrayed as the untangling of the circle described in
Figure 7.1. Previous work, such as that of Gero and Fujii (2000), Gero and Kannengeisser (2004)
and Peng and Gero (2006) provided a basis for a situated knowledge system. The work in this
thesis was motivated by a perceived need for focus upon the role played by interpretation and
has focussed upon the exploration of CI. It represents a step towards a fully situated model
that includes a more thorough treatment of constructive memory, the process of abstraction and
the structuring of relationships between layers. In particular, it shows the the implementation
of push-pull between multiple layers. The work presents a contribution to situated design by
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interpret?
where do
expectations
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how is
knowledge
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learnt
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from knowledge
Figure 7.1: The circular nature of studying interpretation. A study of interpretation is
dependent upon the construction of expectations from knowledge, which is in turn dependent
upon the development of knowledge from experience.
introducing interpretation into the framework and demonstrating its importance for the design
process.
Chapters 3 and 4 presented a rich set of ideas, and a single thesis was not enough to fully explore
them. This work on constructive interpretation should be a foundation for other work in situated
design that looks at the way that changes at the level of situation lead to a reconceptualisation
of what the system is doing.
7.2.1 Limitations of the implementations
The implementations in this thesis are limited as follows. This Section makes explicit these
limitations which can form the basis for future work:
• Meaningful abstractions - The production of creating useful abstractions through un-
supervised machine learning is a well known problem (Barsalou 2005b). The abstractions
produced in the implementations in this thesis had limitations that: (i) they were not
meaningful to somebody looking at the system; and (ii) they were often not at an appro-
priate level to facilitate the kind of co-ordination required. For example, the summary
representations of shapes in Chapter 5 looked very different to the abstractions of shapes
made by people. These problematic abstractions were then organised by situation and so
the interesting effects of the situation taking effect through CI were difficult to observe.
Future work could begin with a system primed with meaningful abstractions to make the
effects of CI more lucid.
• Generality of the model - The model based upon SOMs is generalisable to any set
of data that can be represented as input vectors. This work has applied the model to
two type of source, visual and symbolic. A visual sources, three datasets have been used:
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shapes, letters and floor plans. The work could be implemented across a broader range of
microdomains.
• Cognitive studies - Some of the cognitive notions expressed here are backed up by
anecdotal evidence in the absence of cognitive studies. The hypotheses could be tested
through empirical studies of people. An example of this is the thought experiment using
a blindfolded subject interpreting the items within bags. Would the data collected from
such a study match with the predictions of CI?
The discussion of these limitations has suggested some of the work that is required to make this
research into constructive interpretation fully realised.
7.3 Future work
Constructive interpretation and the knowledge framework that supports it provides a broad
platform for future research. This Section looks at two directions that this work can take: (i)
extending the constructive interpretation framework; and (ii) applying the ideas of constructive
interpretation.
7.3.1 Extending constructive interpretation
There are many enquiries that could enhance the model of constructive interpretation: different
types of abstraction can be explored; dynamic structuring of representations between layers can
be explored (making it possible for layers to change the way that they structure sources from
the layer below); situated learning can be further explored; types of controllers over minimum
similarity for pull can be explored; and the construction of expectations from memory can be
further explored. All of these points relate to the situated knowledge system as a whole rather
than specifically constructive interpretation, and this is the crux of any attempt to extend
constructive interpretation - a model of interpretation is only as convincing as the model of
knowledge formation from experience that it is based upon.
Future work focussing upon situated design as a whole would need to produce a model that
integrates these ideas. This work has focussed upon interpretation, and has benefitted from the
work of Peng and Gero (2006), Liew and Gero (2002) and Gero and Fujii (2000). Work is needed
to complete the loop seen in Figure 7.1, as currently the implementation of the ideas lags behind
the theoretical development. Future work devoted to bringing these strands together would help
to demonstrate the effects of constructive interpretation, as a model of situated design would
allow the dynamics of constructive interpretation to be focussed upon.
7.3.2 An applied CI model
The implementations of constructive interpretation in this work have looked at the development
of concepts from perceptual symbols. This has the problem that it needs the abstractions created
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Figure 7.2: A model for experimenting with CI based upon existing expectations
by the system to bridge the gap between the symbolic and the subsymbolic - that is, to get to
a level of abstraction where the symbols make sense to a person looking at the model. Future
work could look at CI in a system where the a priori knowledge is at a symbolic level, to show
how it works with fully formed concepts. This would help to show the fully formed ideas.
An example of such a system could be based upon WordNet (Miller 1995), a database of knowl-
edge that captures the semantic connections between words, and ImageNet (Deng 2009), a
database of images for these words. Using this ready-made hierarchy of abstraction a system
could potentially be constructed with layers of abstraction and connections between them. This
would be another implementation of the framework described in Chapter 3. The difference be-
ing that in this hypothetical system knowledge is obtained from an external source rather than
through experience. There are three layers in the proposed system: (i) concepts, through Word-
Net; (ii) percept-based symbols through ImageNet; and (iii) an impoverished form of situation
through a statistical word relationship model, Figure 7.21.
Within WordNet, a word is a hypernym if it is an abstraction from another word and a hyponym
if it is an instance. For example, the word colour is a hypernym of the word red and the word
red is a hyponym of the word colour. This maps well onto the conception layer within the
framework as a network of semantic connections. A word is an implicit expectation if it is close
to an explicitly expected word within the WordNet.
The model of CI requires that the similarity within a conceptual space can be assessed through
the grounding of concepts in perceptual information. ImageNet presents picture sets associated
with each word in WordNet with some corners and edges detected (Deng 2009). This could be
1source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/wwarby/, http://www.aasharks.com
Conclusions 139
used as the basis for the perceptual grounding of words when combined with computer vision
for extracting features. Similarity measures between images can then occur within conceptual
space. Finally, natural language processing utilises techniques for making statistical abstractions
of the way that words are put together into sentences (Manning and Schu¨tze 1999). This could
provide the basis for situation in a model as a way of co-ordinating of words that is grounded in
experience.
7.3.2.1 Changing situations in the model
Such a system is then operating with symbols that have meaning to human designers. For ex-
ample, the model of changing situations in conceptual design through construction from implicit
expectations in Chapter 6 could be revisited. The model could begin within a situation, ex-
pressed as an explicit expectation of words. The model could explore its own knowledge through
construction from implicit expectations at multiple levels of abstraction within the hierarchy.
The system would construct from its expectations. Two features of design could be explored
more thoroughly in such a system: (i) the way that concepts which are disparate in the situation
at the start of designing become connected through conceptual design; and (ii) the way that the
starting conditions of the system change the way that it explores its own knowledge.
An example of the first might be a designer trying to design ‘a chair for a shark’. By drawing
with both in the design medium it might see a connection between them through constructive
interpretation. Looking at a chair with expectations of both sharks and chairs might lead to
seeing something different, through implicit expectations, than looking at a chair when just
expecting a chair.
7.3.2.2 Analogy in the model
This has applications for analogy in design, as models of analogy typically assume a position
of attempting to construct some kind of a mapping between the source and the target. In the
example suggested the system is finding a ‘de-facto’ analogy between a shark and a chair by
looking at the chair within a situation that expects both shark and chair. The hypothesis is
that a situated system, with a hierarchy of abstracted knowledge and constructive interpretation
through push-pull from expectations, would be sufficient to find the kind of analogies that humans
are routinely able to make: relevant to the source, the target and to the situation of the designer.
The point is that the system is situated and constructively interpreting within a situation. To
an external observer it looks as though a complex analogy has been made. Looking inside the
system it can be seen that the analogy is the result of interpreting from a set of expectations and
can be explained by a model of how these expectations came about rather than a set of rules for
making analogies.
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7.3.2.3 Computational creativity in the model
A CI system is changed through the process of interpretation. Future work can look at what
a creative system would look like that searched its own knowledge in this manner. This is
technically more of a model of ‘creative generation’ than of creativity in that it does not consider
how novel or useful the product of its designs is. In a CI system there is both specific exploration
within a space of possible designs (in a situation) as well as a means by which the space is changed,
This occurs through changes to the situation at all of the levels of abstraction within a system.
The proposed model using WordNet is able to show the effects of a changing situation at three
levels of abstraction. Consider that the system begins by stochastically generating a sentence.
The implicit expectations in the system are the combined effects of all of the words. At the level
of perception the system might create a connection that arose out of: (i) the experiences of the
system (the specific way that the semantic net was constructed); and (ii) the expectations from
having these words in the sentence together; and (iii) the sentences in the design medium. The
result is the construction of an interpretation that may lead the words to change. To an external
observer this might look like a completely inexplicable creative leap, yet because we know the
internal workings of the system we can explain how CI has lead to this specific movement.
More generally, CI looks towards creative models where: (i) the model holds expectation about
the world; (ii) at multiple levels of abstraction; and (iii) where the model is constructively inter-
preting whilst creative generation is occurring and being changed by what it sees. This notion of
being ‘changed’ presupposes that the model is taking actions that are linked to expectations. As
a result a change of expectations during interpretation can result in a change of actions during
generation. The hypothesis is that such a model will exhibit some of the phenomena seen in
human designers.
7.4 Summary
The research presented in this thesis has introduced the notion of constructive interpretation as
a way of explaining the way that designers construct the world based upon their expectations.
Computational models demonstrated the effects of this, from models of the perception of letters
to models using floor plans during conceptual design. The conclusions that can be drawn are
that constructive interpretation has the ability to represent some things that designers do that
could not previously be modelled.
Future research into the applications of constructive interpretation has the potential to enhance
our understanding of the phenomenon of humans carrying out conceptual design activity. It looks
towards the possibility of computers modelling the richness of interpretation during conceptual
design and the support for humans in design activity.
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Appendix A
Publications Arising from the
Research
• Kelly N, Gero JS and Saunders R: 2010, Constructively interpreting floor plans, CAADRIA
2011 (under review)
Abstract: This paper presents three demonstrations using a computational system to
interpret floor plans. The work aims to characterise constructive interpretation as the use
of expectations to give meaning to the external world. Meaning is something constructed
by a designer. This paper uses three examples to: (i) demonstrate this construction of
meaning; (ii) provide a framework for how this is computed; and (iii) show its significance
for design activity. The system sees using its explicit and implicit expectations, which can
change the system’s notion of what it is doing. In this way the system navigates its own
knowledge, linking visual similarity to relationships from experience. The significance of
constructive interpretation is in its ability to explain some phenomena observed in design
cognition studies. Why does a designer construct this (sometimes ‘creative’) interpretation
and not some other? Constructive interpretation suggests that it arises from a combination
of the experiences of the designer (what they have been exposed to), the expectations of the
designer (their situation) and the representation being interpreted (the source). This work
presents a framework that brings together these elements and shows how they result in a
single interpretation. It presents the relationship between expectation and interpretation,
where the expectations that the system holds change the interpretation, and the act of
interpreting can change its future expectations, sometimes leading to a reinterpretation of
existing elements.
• Kelly N and Gero JS: 2009, Constructive interpretation in design thinking, in G Cagdas
and B Colakoglu (eds), Computation: The New Realm of Architectural Design, eCAADe
and ITU/YTU, Turkey, pp. 97-104.
Abstract: This paper presents a framework for modelling the way that designers interpret
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their world during design activity. Designers interpret the world through their expecta-
tions. Expectations are derived from situation. Agents form concepts in situations and use
concepts in situations. A model of concept formation based upon a geometric represen-
tation of conceptual space is described. In the model, expectations are constructed from
memory within a situation. In interpretation, the world is made to look like expectations.
Some preliminary explorations with an implementation are described.
• Gero JS and Kelly N: 2008, How can CAAD tools be more useful at the early stages of
designing? in W Nakapan, E Mahaek, K Teeraparbwong and P Nilkaew (eds), CAADRIA
2008, Pimniyom Press, Chiang Mai, Thailand, pp. 309-316
Abstract: This paper describes how designers can be supported in the early stages of
designing through more flexible representations. It presents situated agency as a means to
address this problem. Interpretation is a necessary process to give meaning to data before
creating a representation. A framework for situated interpretation agents is outlined, with
a focus on push-pull and the process of situation. An example for creating a CAAD
representation from a raster image is used to illustrate this framework. This research lays
a foundation for further work on situated interpretation agents.
• Gero JS and Kelly N: 2005, How to make CAD tools more useful to designers, ANZAScA
2005, Wellington, Available CD ROM: ISBN 0-473-10669-8
Abstract: This paper describes research that explores computational approaches to au-
tomatically developing multiple representations of objects, with the aim of overcoming the
limitation of fixed representations. The claim is that if CAD tools used a more fluid sys-
tem of representation they would be more useful to designers by preventing fixation and by
providing a means of resolving the ambiguity in internal representations. A method for pro-
ducing multiple representations has been developed and implemented to demonstrate that
simple sketches can be re-represented automatically. The method uses a neural network
to find features in an arbitrary canonical representation and to restructure a sketch based
upon groupings of similar features. The results demonstrate the feasibility of automated
computer-based re-representation. This research provides the foundations for support for
multiple representations in CAD tools that would make CAD tools more useful to designers.
Appendix B
Data Set for Floor Plans
Experiment
B.1 Design medium
In the experiments the agent is interpreting a visual design medium. The design medium is
made up of a number of pixels, where each pixel can hold any grayscale value: black, white or
any value in between. This is represented as a value between zero and one.
An agent takes actions within the design medium by changing the values of the pixels within
this world. Figure B.1 shows an example of a 2x2 pixel design medium. The agent takes actions
in the environment, causing it to move to other states. The number of possible states of the
an environment with n different pixel states is given by Equation B.1 where r is the number of
squares in the environment.
numStates(r, n) = nr (B.1)
Figure B.1: An example of a 2x2 square environment, showing all possible states given that
each square is bivalent. The number of the possible states is given by 24.
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B.2 Floor plans used in the experiments
Figure B.2: Andrea Palladio floor plans (source: Jupp 2005)
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Figure B.3: Louis Khan floor plans (source: Jupp 2005)
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Figure B.4: Frank Lloyd Wright floor plans (source: Jupp 2005)
Appendix C
Data Set for Countries
Experiment
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category description category description category description
AG Agricultural land (% of
land area)
EN Adjusted savings: car-
bon dioxide damage (%
of GNI)
FI Industry, value added
(% of GDP)
AG Arable land (hectares
per person)
FI Bank capital to assets
ratio (%)
FI Services, etc., value
added (% of GDP)
AG Permanent cropland
(% of land area)
FI Consumer price index
(2005 = 100)
FI Inflation, GDP deflator
(annual %)
AG Forest area (% of land
area)
FI Inflation, consumer
prices (annual %)
DE Population density
(people per sq. km)
AG Agriculture value
added per worker
(constant 2000 US$)
FI Real interest rate (%) DE Road sector energy
consumption (% of
total energy consump-
tion)
AG Agriculture, value
added (% of GDP)
FI Research and develop-
ment expenditure (%
of GDP)
DE Armed forces person-
nel (% of total labor
force)
EN Electricity production
from coal sources (% of
total)
FI Central government
debt, total (% of GDP)
DE Military expenditure
(% of GDP)
EN Electricity production
from hydroelectric
sources (% of total)
FI Business extent of dis-
closure index (0=less
disclosure to 10=more
disclosure)
DE Ratio of girls to boys in
primary and secondary
education (%)
EN Electricity production
from oil sources (% of
total)
FI Total tax rate (% of
profit)
DE Primary completion
rate, total (% of
relevant age group)
EN Energy imports, net
(% of energy use)
FI Household final con-
sumption expenditure,
etc. (% of GDP)
DE Total enrollment, pri-
mary (% net)
EN Alternative and nu-
clear energy (% of total
energy use)
FI Gross national expen-
diture (% of GDP)
DE School enrollment, sec-
ondary (% net)
EN Fossil fuel energy con-
sumption (% of total)
FI Exports of goods and
services (% of GDP)
DE Mortality rate, under-5
(per 1,000)
EN Energy use (kg of oil
equivalent) per $1,000
GDP (constant 2005
PPP)
FI Imports of goods and
services (% of GDP)
DE Prevalence of under-
nourishment (% of
population)
EN Electric power con-
sumption (kWh per
capita)
FI Trade (% of GDP) DE Population, female (%
of total)
EN CO2 emissions (metric
tons per capita)
FI Manufacturing, value
added (% of GDP)
DE Urban population
growth (annual %)
Table C.1: Full list of all categories used in the experiment with perceptual grouping as:
Agriculture (AG), Environment (EN), Financial (FI) and Demographical (DE). Source: World
Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog, last accessed 10th October 2010)
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Country Longitude Latitude Country Longitude Latitude
Albania 41 20 Korea, Rep. 37 127.5
Algeria 28 3 Kuwait 29.3375 47.6581
Angola -12.5 18.5 Kyrgyz Republic 41 75
Argentina -34 -64 Latvia 57 25
Armenia 40 45 Lebanon 33.8333 35.8333
Australia -27 133 Lithuania 56 24
Austria 47.3333 13.3333 Luxembourg 49.75 6.1667
Azerbaijan 40.5 47.5 Macedonia, FYR 41.8333 22
Bangladesh 24 90 Madagascar -20 47
Belarus 53 28 Malaysia 2.5 112.5
Belgium 50.8333 4 Malta 35.8333 14.5833
Bolivia -17 -65 Mexico 23 -102
Bosnia and Herzegovina 44 18 Moldova 47 29
Botswana -22 24 Mongolia 46 105
Brazil -10 -55 Morocco 32 -5
Brunei Darussalam 4.5 114.6667 Mozambique -18.25 35
Bulgaria 43 25 Namibia -22 17
Cambodia 13 105 Nepal 28 84
Cameroon 6 12 Netherlands 52.5 5.75
Canada 60 -95 New Zealand -41 174
Chile -30 -71 Nicaragua 13 -85
China 35 105 Nigeria 10 8
Colombia 4 -72 Norway 62 10
Congo, Dem. Rep. -1 15 Oman 21 57
Congo, Rep. 0 25 Pakistan 30 70
Costa Rica 10 -84 Panama 9 -80
Cote d’Ivoire 8 -5 Paraguay -23 -58
Croatia 45.1667 15.5 Peru -10 -76
Cyprus 35 33 Philippines 13 122
Czech Republic 49.75 15.5 Poland 52 20
Denmark 56 10 Portugal 39.5 -8
Dominican Republic 19 -70.6667 Romania 46 25
Ecuador -2 -77.5 Russian Federation 60 100
Egypt, Arab Rep. 27 30 Saudi Arabia 25 45
El Salvador 13.8333 -88.9167 Senegal 14 -14
Eritrea 15 39 Serbia 44 21
Estonia 59 26 Singapore 1.3667 103.8
Ethiopia 8 38 Slovak Republic 48.6667 19.5
Finland 64 26 Slovenia 46 15
France 46 2 South Africa -29 24
Gabon -1 11.75 Spain 40 -4
Georgia 42 43.5 Sri Lanka 7 81
Germany 51 9 Sudan 15 30
Ghana 8 -2 Sweden 62 15
Greece 39 22 Switzerland 47 8
Guatemala 15.5 -90.25 Syrian Arab Republic 35 38
Honduras 15 -86.5 Tajikistan 39 71
Hungary 47 20 Thailand 15 100
Iceland 65 -18 Trinidad and Tobago 11 -61
India 20 77 Tunisia 34 9
Indonesia -5 120 Turkey 39 35
Iran, Islamic Rep. 32 53 Ukraine 49 32
Ireland 53 -8 United Arab Emirates 24 54
Israel 31.5 34.75 United Kingdom 54 -2
Italy 42.8333 12.8333 United States 38 -97
Jamaica 18.25 -77.5 Uruguay -33 -56
Japan 36 138 Uzbekistan 41 64
Jordan 31 36 Venezuela, RB 8 -66
Kazakhstan 48 68 Vietnam 16 106
Kenya 1 38 Zambia -15 30
Table C.2: Countries with locations. Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog, last accessed 10th October 2010)
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Category Design Switzerl’d Category Design Switzerl’d
Agricultural land (% of land area) -0.11569 -0.11569 Road sector energy consumption
(% of total energy consumption)
-0.16915 -0.66915
Arable land (hectares per person) -0.94858 -0.94858 Armed forces personnel (% of to-
tal labor force)
-0.90702 -0.90702
Permanent cropland (% of land
area)
-0.93483 -0.93483 Military expenditure (% of GDP) -0.84677 -0.84677
Forest area (% of land area) -0.27179 -0.27179 Household final consumption ex-
penditure, etc. (% of GDP)
-0.16134 -0.16134
Agriculture value added per
worker (constant 2000 US$)
-0.36107 -0.36107 Gross national expenditure (% of
GDP)
-0.31205 -0.31205
Electricity production from coal
sources (% of total)
-1 -1 Exports of goods and services (%
of GDP)
-0.53902 -0.53902
Electricity production from hy-
droelectric sources (% of total)
0.060741 0.060741 Imports of goods and services (%
of GDP)
-0.61245 -0.61245
Electricity production from oil
sources (% of total)
-0.9944 -0.9944 Trade (% of GDP) -0.60174 -0.60174
Energy imports, net (% of energy
use)
0.900928 0.900928 Agriculture, value added (% of
GDP)
-0.95365 -0.95365
Alternative and nuclear energy
(% of total energy use)
-0.25514 -0.25514 Manufacturing, value added (% of
GDP)
0 0
Fossil fuel energy consumption
(% of total)
-0.01174 -0.01174 Industry, value added (% of
GDP)
-0.54981 -0.54981
Energy use (kg of oil equivalent)
per $1,000 GDP (constant 2005
PPP)
-0.95469 -0.95469 Services, etc., value added (% of
GDP)
0.583578 0.583578
Electric power consumption
(kWh per capita)
-0.55867 -0.55867 Adjusted savings: carbon dioxide
damage (% of GNI)
-1 -1
CO2 emissions (metric tons per
capita)
-0.69096 -0.69096 Inflation, GDP deflator (annual
%)
-0.41718 -0.41718
Population density (people per
sq. km)
-0.94315 -0.94315 Ratio of girls to boys in primary
and secondary education (%)
0.167554 0.167554
Bank capital to assets ratio (%) -0.86458 -0.86458 Primary completion rate, total
(% of relevant age group)
0.279551 0.279551
Consumer price index (2005 =
100)
-0.98104 -0.7821 Total enrollment, primary (%
net)
0.941255 0.941255
Inflation, consumer prices (an-
nual %)
-0.92773 -0.70773 School enrollment, secondary (%
net)
0.701312 0.701312
Real interest rate (%) -0.59578 -0.69578 Mortality rate, under-5 (per
1,000)
-0.98059 -0.98059
Research and development ex-
penditure (% of GDP)
0 0 Prevalence of undernourishment
(% of population)
-1 -1
Central government debt, total
(% of GDP)
-0.66196 -0.86196 Population, female (% of total) 0.736542 0.736542
Business extent of disclosure in-
dex (0=less disclosure)
-1 -0.95 Urban population growth (annual
%)
-0.22995 -0.22995
Total tax rate (% of profit) -0.79841 -0.99841
Table C.3: Country data for salience experiment. Source: World Bank
(http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog, last accessed 10th October 2010)
